Leibniz is unclear about the nature of pleasure. In some texts, he describes pleasure as a perception of perfection, while in other texts he describes pleasure as being caused by a perception of perfection. In this article, I disambiguate two senses of “perception of perfection”, which clarifies Leibniz’s considered position. I argue that pleasure is a perception of an increase in a substance’s power which is caused by a substance’s knowledge of a perfection of the universe or God. This reading (...) helps clarify the nature of Leibnizian happiness. Happiness is a cognitive process (akin to a mood), constituted fundamentally out of pleasure, which is grounded in increases in a substance’s power. A rational substance will sustain its happiness so long as it is more powerful than it is weak, and it is engaging in activities that increase its power. (shrink)

In order to develop a deep and detailed reflection on global norms, international law scholars need to pay more attention to insights supplied by the discussions on the philosophical problem of universals. Using the examples of the discussion on universals in Leibniz and Hobbes, the paper demonstrates the importance of the philosophical problem of universals to discussions on the possibility of global norms. In particular, the comparative study of Leibniz and Hobbes demonstrates that a world divided in states mostly presupposes (...) a denial of universals and thus an impossibility of truly global norms. Although in such a world cooperation and agreement between states is desirable and possible, the resulting agreement does not reach the threshold of normativity required under this view. On the other hand, truly global norms become possible if one accepts the existence of universals following Leibnizian tradition. However, in this case, the nature of normativity changes. Moreover, while states do not need to disappear, their role changes significantly and the main unit of consideration becomes the individual human being. Under this view, a wide variety of actors at the international arena are accorded equal importance. Based on lessons learned from this discussion, the article demonstrates how the questions raised by an explicit inclusion of the philosophical problem of universals into debates about global norms have continuing relevance today. It also suggests some possible avenues for future research. (shrink)

Leibniz puts forward an intriguing argument against the moral permissibility of chattel slavery in a text from 1703. This argument has three independent layers or sub-arguments. The first is that slavery violates natural rights. The second is that moral laws such as the principles of equity and piety oppose slavery, or at least severely limit the permissible actions toward slaves. The third and final layer is that slavery can at most be justified if the slave is permanently incapable of conducting (...) herself well. Yet, it is very doubtful that any actual human beings satisfy that description. This paper analyzes and evaluates Leibniz’s argument, which scholars have so far largely neglected. Even though some elements of the argument are not original to Leibniz, it is of considerable importance for the scholarship of early modern philosophy: it sheds light on Leibniz’s views not only on the moral status of slavery itself, but also on moral rights and obligations more generally. (shrink)

Seventeenth century philosopher Gottfried Leibniz's contributions to metaphysics, mathematics, and logic are well known. Lesser known is his ‘invention’ of deontic logic, and that his invention derives from the alethic logic of the Aristotelian square of opposition. In this paper, I show how Leibniz developed this ‘logic of duties’, which designates actions as ‘possible, necessary, impossible, and omissible’ for a ‘vir bonus’ . I show that for Leibniz, deontic logic can determine whether a given action, e.g. as permitted, is therefore (...) obligatory or prohibited . Secondly, since the deontic modes are derived from what is possible, necessary, etc., for a good person to do, and that ‘right and obligation’ are the ‘moral qualities’ of a good person, we can see how Leibniz derives deontic logic from these moral qualities. Finally, I show how Leibniz grounds a central deontic concept, namely obligation, in the human capacity for freedom. (shrink)