This thesis has, as its primary target, the neo-cartesianism, or property dualism of certain philosophers of mind: David Chalmers, Tim Bayne, and others. All begin with a pre-theoretic commitment to the view that all perceptual states are conscious. They define consciousness by saying that it is synonymous with having ‘qualia’ – a term directed at phenomenal properties which defy reduction to physical states. The thesis argues that this position is challenged by certain neurological conditions, - blindsight, visual form agnosia etc- (...) which we can generalise as ‘dissociations’: conditions in which functions are separated from awareness. The thesis holds that these are examples of unconscious perception, which present the case for a different pre-theoretic position, and a redefinition of concepts used in the vicinity. Insofar as the neo-cartesians recognise the empirical, their inclination to reject the dissociations is challenged with new cases and paradigms which have emerged in recent years. It is contended that the dissociations disrupt Chalmers’ coherence between the phenomenal and the psychological, Bayne’s commitment to the Unity of Consciousness, and Phillips’ campaign against unconscious perception. In addition, synaesthesia is advanced as a problem case for Bayne’s unity contention. I argue that the dissociations are not easily dismissed, and present a real challenge for neo-cartesianism. In exploring this challenge, the thesis contributes to the case for a different philosophy of mind – a Higher Order Thought approach. The notion of unconscious perception – it is contended - much more easily finds an accommodation in HOT theories, so this thesis contributes to existing arguments for that position. HOT theories also have an advantage in being receptive to reduction, in giving a developmental account of consciousness, and in being more open to the accommodation of empirical discoveries. In each respect, there is an advantage over the respective positions taken by Chalmers and Bayne. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the concept of consciousness in C. S. Peirce’s work, revealing how its ways of being are associated with the three Peircean phenomenological categories. In this article, I intend to reflect on the heuristic power of the mind, namely, its ability to bring about new ideas, which, within Peirce’s logic of inquiry, is called by the well-known term of abduction. The abductive logical step promotes a synthesis of signs that constitutes a logical structure capable of proposing a (...) new mediation or representation of a new phenomenon. I make use of a metaphorical passage from Peirce not only to give the title to this essay, but also to highlight the importance of the first category as a sort of synechistic envelopment of an unprecedented logical structure of signs that composes a new synthesis. Two continua intertwine themselves, namely, those of the first and third categories, to account for what appears as a fact of the world in the theater of secondness. The essay also seeks to bring to light the core realism of Peirce’s philosophy, the genetic aspect of this bottomless lake, through its cosmology, where the generalization of forms and the acquisition of habits of reality are the proper ground of his Objective Idealism. One of the heuristic aspect of the lake metaphor is a sort of invitation to extend the concept of synthesis from the realm of logical structures to that one of arts, which in this essay will remain as a suggestion for a further reflection. (shrink)