In a familiar limerick attributed to Ronald Knox, the narrator asks how a “tree/should continue to be/when there’s no one about in the Quad,” and is subsequently reassured that its continuous existence is guaranteed by God’s being “always about in the Quad” observing it. This is meant to capture Berkeley’s so‐called ‘continuity argument’ for the existence of God, on which the claim that objects exist continuously over time is supposed to entail the existence of a Divine Mind that continuously perceives (...) the ideas that constitute those objects. But the continuity argument is not an uncontroversial one. For one thing, we might ask what divine perception is supposed to be like – does God perceive all of the ideas that we do, and in the same way that we do? And if so, does this mean that God perceives pain – that God suffers? For another thing, we might ask whether Berkeley is entitled to the claim that objects exist continuously to begin with. In this paper, I look at some of the problems associated with the continuity argument, and then present a reading of divine perception that attempts to prevent these problems from arising at the outset. (shrink)

Berkeley holds that objects in the world are constituted of ideas. Some commentators argue that for Berkeley, ideas are identical to acts of perception; this is taken to proceed from his view that ideas are like pains. In this paper, I evaluate the identity claim. I argue that although it does not follow from the pain analogy, nonetheless the texts suggest that Berkeley does think ideas and acts are identical. I show how Berkeley can account for objects persisting over time (...) and being perceivable by multiple observers, even if the ideas that constitute them are intermittent and dependent on particular actors. (shrink)

That the legacy of Berkeley's philosophy has been a largely sceptical one is perhaps rather surprising. For he himself took it as one of his objectives to undermine scepticism. He roundly denied that there were ‘any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down’ . Yet Hume was to write of Berkeley that ‘most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism, Bayle not excepted’. And it has become something of a (...) commonplace to say that Berkeley's philosophy is sceptical in direction, if not in intention. He is represented as a half-hearted sceptic, applying radical empiricist principles in his treatment of matter but baulking at their implications when he came to consider spirits. Hume is credited with being the more thoroughgoing of the two. Berkeley had denied the substantiality of extended things. Hume felt obliged, by parity of reasoning, to deny the substantiality of the self. On his account of the mind there is ‘properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different’ . It is commonly supposed that Berkeley, in maintaining the quite contrary view that we know ourselves to be simple, undivided beings , showed a lack of rigour or consistency. (shrink)

Berkeley claims idealism provides a novel argument for the existence of God. But familiar interpretations of his argument fail to support the conclusion that there is a single omnipotent spirit. A satisfying reconstruction should explain the way Berkeley moves between first person singular and plural, as well as providing a powerful argument, once idealism is accepted. The new interpretation offered here represents the argument as an inference to the best explanation of a shared reality. Consequently, his use of the first (...) person must be taken as ‘exemplary’ rather than ‘Cartesian’. This explains the freedom of movement in the text between singular and plural. However, it also reveals Berkeley as side-stepping sceptical doubt. (shrink)

Propongo tres vías para el conocimiento de Dios o espíritu infinito en Berkeley. Las tres vías se desprenden de su propio pensamiento, pero las dos primeras se basan en la parte filosófica del mismo, principalmente en los conceptos de « idea » y « mundo sensible », mientras la tercera en la parte teológico-religiosa y tiene que ver con la actividad evangélica de Berkeley, reflejada en su estancia en América y en sus labores pastorales como deán y como obispo. Las (...) tres vías, distintas entre sí pero a la vez complementarias, se fundamentan en la « analogía », concepto central para que los espíritus finitos puedan conocer a Dios. /// Je propose d’identifier trois voies pour la connaissance de Dieu ou de l’esprit infini chez Berkeley. Ces trois voies lui sont propres, mais les deux premières relèvent davantage de sa philosophie, reposant essentiellement sur des concepts tels que ceux d’« idée » ou de « monde sensible », tandis que la troisième trouve sa source dans la pensée théologico-religieuse et dans l’activité évangélisatrice de Berkeley, telle qu’elle s’est développée lors de son séjour en Amérique et dans son rôle de doyen et, plus tard, comme évêque. Ces trois voies, complémentaires quoique différentes, se fondent sur l’« analogie », un concept central permettant aux esprits finis de connaître Dieu. /// In this paper I propose three ways to know God or infinite spirit in Berkeley. The three ways stem from his own thought, but the first two are based on his more philosophical side, mainly in concepts such as ‘idea’ and ‘sensible world’, whereas the third way is based on his theological-religious side and is related to Berkeley’s evangelical activity, reflected on his time in America and on his labors as a dean and later as a bishop. The three ways, different between them but at the same time complementary, are based on ‘analogy’, a central concept for finite spirits to know God. (shrink)

I outline a version of idealism that borrows from Humean Supervenience. The resulting theory is immune to what is often considered to be the most powerful anti-idealist argument, the gist of which is that the idealist can’t supply truthmakers (or an adequate supervenience base) for commonly accepted truths about the physical world. That charge has no purchase on Humean idealism.

This article examines a somewhat neglected argument for the existence of God which appeals to the divine perspective as a way of reconciling the conflicting claims of realism and anti-realism. Six representative examples are set out (Berkeley, Ferrier, T. H. Green, Josiah Royce, Gordon Clark and Michael Dummett), reasons are considered why this argument has received less attention than it might, and a brief sketch given of the most promising way in which it might be developed.