Contemporary philosophical logic rests on a distinction between things and properties. Properties are thought to differ from things in that their proper expression is incomplete or unsaturated. In this paper, I will argue that Aristotle did not distinguish between things and properties in this way. I will show, first, that Aristotle’s essences are not properties, and that certain passages in Aristotle make sense only if we do not take accidents to be properties either. The notion of a property is thus (...) not fundamental in Aristotle’s theory of predication. Aristotle’s predicate terms do not stand for properties but for non-substantial things. Second, I will explain and explore the distinction between substances and non-substantial things. This will yield a viable alternative to our contemporary, Fregean account of predication. (shrink)

There is a dispute as to what sort of entity non-substantial individuals are in Aristotle's Categories. The traditional interpretation holds that non-substantial individuals are individual qualities, quantities, etc. For example, Socrates' white is an individual quality belonging to him alone, numerically distinct from (though possibly specifically identical with) other individual colors. I will refer to these sorts of entities as 'individual instances.' The new interpretation1 suggests instead that non-substantial individuals are atomic species such as a specific shade of white that (...) is indivisible into more specific shades. On this view, non-substantial individuals are what we would call universals2 which can be present in different individual substances, but are labelled 'individuals' by Aristotle because, like individual substances, there is nothing they are said of.3 In this paper I will defend the traditional account by attempting to show that it is supported by the slender textual evidence that is available. I will begin by stating three serious objections to the traditional interpretation. Next I will show that in works later than the Categories Aristotle accepted individual instances of properties of the sort found in the Categories by the traditional interpretation. Finally, I will set out the evidence that supports the traditional interpretation and answer the three objections. (shrink)

Se hace una revisión del uso e implicaciones de la expresión Ka fKaoTov en buena parte de la obra aristotélica -interesan de manera especial en este estudio los tratados que conforman el Organon, pero sin dejar de lado textos ontológicos, cosmológicos, éticos, políticos y biológicos del filósofo-. Dicha fórmula designa al individuo en la lógica discursiva del Estagirita, pero los modos en que se va comprendiendo no son completamente congruentes; así, se pasa de un singularismo, que supone una identidad única (...) e insustituible, por ende incognoscible por parte de la ciencia. a un particularismo, esto es, una visión desde una perspectiva universalista que convierte a los individuos en partícipes de condiciones comunes, con lo cual los problemas cognitivos se solventan, aunque la potencia de la individuación, que podría estar en su pretendida singularidad, queda suspendida. Es pretensión fundamental de este trabajo mostrar cómo en el aristotelismo hay una fuerte tendencia universalista como fórmula para solventar las aporías que surgen de la individuación, y que por ende es el formalismo, surgido en el platonismo sin duda, el que habrá de definir los modos por excelencia de acceso a lo real tangible. (shrink)