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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Truth and Contradiction in Aristotle’s De Interpretatione 6-9
Phronesis 55 (1):26-67 (2010)
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Provisional draft, pre-production copy of my book “The Modal Future” (forthcoming with Cambridge University Press). |
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The section 18b16–25 of the famous chapter 9 of Aristotle’s De interpretatione presents two objections against the assumption that both members of a contradictory pair of future singular statements might be false. This section is unlikely to be genuine, because (1) the first objection is either directly begging the question or misusing a previous argument in a question-begging way, (2) the second objection includes irrelevant observations, and (3) the rebuttal of the said assumption interrupts the intimate connection between the immediately (...) |
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La hipótesis que intentaremos defender en este trabajo es que en Sobre la filosofía Aristóteles hace una defensa dialéctica de su concepción de los principios, tomando como punto de partida algunas de las opiniones existentes al respecto. En ese sentido, el modo de proceder aristotélico en esta obra es consistente con el implementado con idénticos fines en las obras canónicas y contribuye a comprender el uso epistémico de la dialéctica en este pensador. Para demostrar esto, nos centraremos en el análisis (...) |
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Roger Swyneshed, in his treatise on insolubles, dating from the early 1330s, drew three notorious corollaries from his solution. The third states that there is a contradictory pair of propositions both of which are false. This appears to contradict what Whitaker, in his iconoclastic reading of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, dubbed “The Rule of Contradictory Pairs”, which requires that in every such pair, one must be true and the other false. Whitaker argued that, immediately after defining the notion of a contradictory (...) |
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Aristotle holds that rational agents can think true thoughts about their practical ends. Specifically, we can think true thoughts about whether our ends are good and able to be brought about in action. But what makes these thoughts true? What sort of thing is a practical end, such that it both is good, and also may be brought about in the future? These questions are difficult to answer. They are metaphysical questions about Aristotle’s practical philosophy: they ask what practical ends (...) |
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Antiphasis is a case of core-dependent homonymy, and has three significations in Aristotle's philosophy: antiphasis as an opposition between propositions ; antiphasis as the opposition between ‘subject’ and ‘not a subject’ in coming-to-be and perishing ; and antiphasis as the opposition between possession and privation . Argument based on the fifth type of priority described in Cat. 12 shows that, for Aristotle, the ontological significations are prior to the propositional. |
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AtCategories7, 6a36-7 Aristotle defines relatives, but at 8a13-28 worries that the definition may include some substances. Aristotle introduces a second account of relatives to solve the problem. Recent commentators have held that Aristotle intends to solve the extensional adequacy worry by restricting the extension of relatives. That is, R2 counts fewer items as relative than R1. However, this cannot explain Aristotle’s attitude to relatives, since he immediately returns to using R1. I propose a non-extensional reading. R1 and R2 do not (...) |
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Roger Swyneshed, in his treatise on insolubles (logical paradoxes), dating from the early 1330s, drew three notorious corollaries of his solution. The third states that there is a contradictory pair of propositions both of which are false. This appears to contradict the Rule of Contradictory Pairs, which requires that in every such pair, one must be true and the other false. Looking back at Aristotle's treatise De Interpretatione, we find that Aristotle himself, immediately after defining the notion of a contradictory (...) |
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