The author rejects the theory of holism and criticises especiallyA. Meyer's works. An important starting point ofMeyer's arguments consists in the opinion that the physiologists of to day are out of days because they still want to base biology on classical physics which has been superseded by the “Quantenmechanik” . As organisms, however, are not microphysical systems — as may be proved —Meyer's arguments become futile. Also the opinion that the qualities of the whole are not determined by those of (...) the parts, but that on the contrary the whole determines the performances of its parts is rejected, since the whole can only work by influences proceeding from its parts. —Meyer's opinion that not physical but biological laws are the more generally valid results from a use of the words „more generally valid” in a sense differing from common usage. Many other results ofA. Meyer also arise through a modified use of language.L'auteur récuse la théorie du holisme et critique avant tout les travaux deA. Meyer. Un point de départ important des arguments deMeyer consiste dans l'opinion que les physiologistes d'aujourd'hui soient arriérés parce qu'ils veulent encore baser la biologie sur la physique classique qui est dépassée par la „Quantenmechanik” . Comme toutefois les organismes ne sont pas des systèmes microphysicaux, ce qui est prouvable, les arguments deMeyer sont mal assurés. Il faut aussi récuser l'opinion que les qualités du tout ne soient pas déterminées par celles des parties mais que, inversement, le tout stipule les traveaux de ses parties, puisque le tout peut seulement agir par des influences partant de ces parties. — L'opinion deMeyer, que ce ne sont pas les lois physiques mais les lois biologiques qui sont d'une validité plus générale , résulte de l'emploi des mots „validité plus générale” s'écartant de la manière de parler. Encore bien d'autres résultats deMeyer ne résultent que d'une manière de s'exprimer modifiée. (shrink)

: Since its almost serendipitous rediscovery in the late seventies, Fleck's monograph, Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsachee, initially published in 1935, translated into English in 1979 (Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact), has been met with increasing acclaim within the philosophy and the sociology of science. In historizing, sociologizing and relativizing science, Fleck is claimed to have expressed prescient views on the history, philosophy and sociology of science and in deeply influencing Kuhn. Though the neglect of Fleck by (...) his contemporaries has been difficult to account for, the basis of his epistemology has evoked little interest, partly due to the lack of apparent sources. Fleck's philosophical writings, published between 1927 and 1939, indicate, however, a polemic, deeply ingrained in an ongoing debate, on the standing of old established scientific disciplines versus new and emerging ones, occasioned by the rapid changes within the natural sciences. Most obvious to the lay community, and also reflected in the new positivist philosophy, were the revolutionary changes within physics. As a participant in the debate, eagerly striving for recognition, Fleck used modern physic heuristically as the basis of his epistemology. The tracing of his sources, and the voices of other contemporaneous scientists opposing his views, are attempted. (shrink)

Erwin Schrödinger holds a prominent place in the history of science primarily due to his crucial role in the development of quantum physics. What is perhaps lesser known are his insights into subject-object duality, consciousness and mind. He documented himself that these were influenced by the Upanishads, a collection of ancient Hindu spiritual texts. Central to his thoughts in this area is that Mind is only One and there is no separation between subject and object. This chapter aims to bridge (...) Schrödinger’s view on One Mind with the teachings of Dōgen, a twelfth century Zen master. This bridge is formed by addressing the question of how time relates to One Mind, and subject-object duality. Schrödinger describes the experience of One Mind to be like a timeless now, whereas subject-object duality involves a linear continuum of time. We show how these differing positions are unified in the notion of ‘absolute present’, which was put forward in the philosophy of Nishida Kitarō (1871–1945). In addition, we argue that it is in this notion of absolute present that the views of Schrödinger, Dōgen and Nishida meet. (shrink)

The paper discusses objections against non-hidden variable versions of the epistemic conception of quantum states—the view that quantum states do not describe the properties of quantum systems but reflect, in some way to be specified, the epistemic conditions of agents assigning them. In the first half of the paper, the main motivation for the epistemic conception of quantum states is sketched, and a version of it is outlined, which combines ideas from an earlier study of it with elements of Richard (...) Healey's recent pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory. In the second half, various objections against epistemic accounts of quantum states are discussed in detail, which are based on criticisms found in the literature. Possible answers by the version outlined here are compared with answers from the quantum Bayesian point of view, which is at present the most discussed version of the epistemic conception of quantum states. (shrink)

In present-day physics the fundamental dynamical laws are taken as a time-translation-invariant and time-reversal-invariant one-parameter groups of automorphisms of the underlying mathematical structure. In this context-independent and empirically inaccessible description there is no past, present or future, hence no distinction between cause and effect. To get the familiar description in terms of causes and effects, the time-reversal symmetry of the fundamental dynamics has to be broken. Thereby one gets two representations, one satisfying the generally accepted rules of retarded causality (“no (...) effect can precede its cause”). The other one describes the strange rules of advanced causality. For entangled (but not necessarily interacting) quantum systems the arrow of time must have the same direction for all subsystems. But for classical systems, or for classical subsystems of quantum systems, this argument does not hold. As a cosequence, classical systems allow the conceptual possibility of advanced causality in addition to retarded causality. Every mathematically formulated dynamics of statistically reproducible events can be extended to a description in terms of a one-parameter group of automorphisms of an enlarged mathematical structure which describes a fictitious hidden determinism. Consequently, randomness in the sense of mathematical probability theory is only a weak generalization of determinism. The popular ideas that in quantum theory there are gaps in the causal chain which allow the accommodation of the freedom of human action are fantasies which have no basis in present-day quantum mechanics. Quantum events are governed by strict statistical laws. Freedom of action is a constitutive necessity of all experimental science which requires a violation of the statistical predictions of physics. We conclude that the presently adopted first principles of theoretical physics can neither explain the autonomy of the psyche nor account for the freedom of action necessary for experimental science. (shrink)

The existence of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is not enough for philosophical purposes. On the other hand, there's more to NCC than meets the sceptic's eye. (I) NCC are useful for a better understanding of conscious experience, for instance: (1) NCC are helpful to explain phenomenological features of consciousness – e.g., dreaming. (2) NCC can account for phenomenological opaque facts – e.g., the temporal structure of consciousness. (3) NCC reveal properties and functions of consciousness which cannot be elucidated either (...) by introspective phenomenology or by psychological experiments alone – e.g., vision. (II) There are crucial problems and shortcomings of NCC: (1) Correlation implies neither causation nor identity. (2) There are limitations of empirical access due to the problem of other minds and the problem of self-deception, and (3) due to the restrictions provided by inter- and intraindividual variations. (4) NCC cannot be catched by neuroscience alone because of the externalistic content of representations. Therefore, NCC are not sufficient for a naturalistic theory of mind, (5) nor are they necessary because of the possibility of multiple realization. (III) Nevertheless, NCC are relevant and important for the mind-body problem: (1) NCC reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. (2) But NCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. (3) NCC restrict nomological identity accounts. (4) The investigation of NCC can refute empirical arguments for interactionism as a case study of John Eccles' dualistic proposals will show. (5) The discoveries of NCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone, for which, e.g., a principle of supervenience and a further condition – and therefore philosophical arguments – are required. (shrink)

In the Copenhagen interpretation the Heisenberg inequality ΔQΔP≥ℏ/2 is interpreted as the mathematical expression of the concept of complementarity, quantifying the mutual disturbance necessarily taking place in a simultaneous or joint measurement of incompatible observables. This interpretation was criticized a long time ago and has recently been challenged in an experimental way. These criticisms can be substantiated by using the generalized formalism of positive operator-valued measures, from which an inequality, different from the Heisenberg inequality, can be derived, precisely illustrating the (...) Copenhagen concept of complementarity. The different roles of preparation and measurement in creating uncertainty in quantum mechanics are discussed. (shrink)

The existence of quantum correlates of consciousness (QCC) is doubtful from a scientific perspective. But even if their existence were verified, philosophical problems would remain. On the other hand, there could be more to QCC than meets the sceptic's eye: • QCC might be useful or even necessary for a better understanding of conscious experience or quantum physics or both. The main reasons for this are: the measurement problem (the nature of observation, the mysterious collapse of the wave function, etc.), (...) ostensibly shared features of quantum phenomena and conscious phenomena (e.g., complementarity, nonspatiality, acausality, spontaneity, and holism) and connections (ontology, causation, and knowledge), the qualia problem (subjectivity, explanatory gap etc.). But there are many problems, especially questions regarding realism and the nature and role of conscious observers; • QCC are conceptually challenging, because there are definitory problems and some crucial ontological and epistemological shortcomings. It is instructive to compare them with recent proposals for understanding neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). QCC are not sufficient for a quantum theory of mind, nor might they be necessary except perhaps in a very broad sense; • QCC are also empirically challenging. Nevertheless, QCC could be relevant and important for the mindbody problem: QCC might reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. But QCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. QCC restrict accounts of nomological identity. The discovery of QCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone. But there are also problems with QCC in the framework of other ontologies. (shrink)

This paper analyses Bohr’s complementarity framework and applies it to biosemiotic studies by illustrating its application to three existing models of living systems: mechanistic biology, Barbieri’s version of biosemiotics in terms of his code biology and Markoš’s phenomenological version of hermeneutic biosemiotics. The contribution summarizes both Bohr’s philosophy of science crowned by his idea of complementarity and his conception of the phenomenon of the living. Bohr’s approach to the biological questions evolved – among other things – from the consequences of (...) an epistemological lesson of quantum theory and in light of complementarity of observer as a priori living creature and ex post scientific explanation of the living. In a manifestation of the phenomenon of the living, each model of living system and its description makes accessible – from its own presuppositions, contexts and concepts – some features which are not accessible from the others. Nevertheless, for a general understanding of that phenomenon, incompatible sophisticated approaches are equally necessary. Bohr’s epistemology of complementarity turns out to be a heuristic and methodical framework for testing the extent to which biosemiotics can become one of the special sciences or its potential as a cross-disciplinary branch of study. (shrink)

In comparing it with the mechanistic and vitalistic views, the author seeks to make clear the nature of holistic causality, referring toDonnan's equations as an example.Holistic causality is essentially dimensional simplification. A complex system which forms a whole must be described in the first instance autonomo-phenomenologically, and if possible mathematically. Thereafter it is simplified into other wholes of less dimensionality, through progressive elimination of its higher dimensions, and so on until there remain over constituents no longer showing „wholeness”. These are (...) called „atoms” in the general sense. In holistic thought we do not begin with the atom; it is found at the end of the process of simplification.All unitary systems which lie between the atoms — the ultimate terms of holistic simplification, no longer showing wholeness — and the highest world-whole which we call the universe, are relative wholes. Each of these unitary systems is a complete whole only with respect to those systems of lower dimension into which it can itself be simplified. On the other hand it is itself a partial whole in relation to the wholes of higher dimension to which it is subordinated. Accordingly all these systems are at the same time complete wholes and partial wholes.It follows from this principle, as indeed theDonnan equations show, that theoretical biology can be simplified into the complementary domain of theoretical physics, but that it is quite impossible to „deduce„ the principles and theorems of theoretical biology from those of theoretical physics, as all mechanistic doctrines maintain.L'auteur, en discutant les points de vue mécanistes et vitalistes, cherche à définir la causalité holistique tout en se référant aux équations deDonnan, qu'il prend comme exemple.La causalité holistique est essentiellement une simplification dimensionnale. Un système complexe, constituant une totalité, doit être décrit avant tout de façon autonomo-phénoménologique et — si possible — de façon mathématique. Ensuite il est simplifié de manière à former d'autres totalités de dimensionalité inférieure par suite de l'élimination progressive de ses dimensions supérieures et ainsi de suite jusqu'à ce qu'il n'en reste plus que les parties ne formant plus totalité. Celles-ci s'appellent „atomes” dans le sens propre du mot. Dans le holisme on ne commence pas par l'atome, qu'on trouve au contraire à la fin de la simplification.Tous les systèmes constituant une totalité et se trouvant entre les atomes en tant que restes de la simplification holistique, qui ne possèdent plus un caractère de totalité, et d'autre part la totalité mondiale la plus élevée, appelée Univers, sont des totalités relatives. Tout système constituant de cette façon une totalité, ne forme une totalité complète que pour ceux-là des systèmes de dimensions inférieures dans lesquels il peut être simplifié lui-même; par contre il constitue lui-même un membre-totalité pour les totalités de dimensions supérieures auxquelles il est luimême subordonné. Ainsi tous ces systèmes sont en même temps membres-totalités et totalités complètes.Il s'ensuit de ce principe, que, comme le démontrent aussi les équations deDonnan, la biologie théorique peut bien être simplifiée dans les domaines qui lui sont complémentaires de la physique théorique, mais qu'il est complètement impossible de dériver les principes et les théorèmes de la biologie théorique de ceux de la physique théorique, comme le prétendent toutes les doctrines mécanistes. (shrink)

The theory of quantum mechanics has often been thought to show an affinity with logical empiricism: in both, observation plays a central role, and questions about what is unobservable are dismissed. However, there were also strong tensions between the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle and implications drawn from quantum physics. In the 1920s and 1930s, many physicists thought that quantum mechanics revealed a limit to what could be known scientifically, and this opened the door to a wide range of (...) speculations, in which quantum mechanics was connected with free will, organic life, psychology, and religion—speculations in which many leading quantum physicists were engaged. Members of the Vienna Circle, such as Frank and Schlick, looked at quantum mechanics for a confirmation of their empiricist views, but they were at the same time critical about these wider implications drawn from quantum mechanics, which in their eyes were connected with broader mystical and irrational trends in society. They engaged in particular with the views of Bohr and Jordan, both of whom expressed a sympathy for logical empiricism while at the same time arguing for claims that proved hard to reconcile with the scientific world conception of the Vienna Circle. (shrink)