Joseph Heath's Communicative Action and Rational Choice may be read as a critical commentary upon Habermas's critical social theory, but it may also be read as merely using the latter as “scaffolding” for the presentation of Heath's own version of critical theory. In what follows, I will focus on the second option and thus largely ignore the exegetical question to what extent Heath provides a fair reading of Habermas. This does not mean, however, that I will not make comparative judgements. (...) On the contrary, my overall claim will be that Heath's new critical theory is more functionalist, and. partly as a result, less critical than Habermas's. Since lack of space does not permit me to argue this in accordance with the standards of detail that Heath's own book generally observes, my procedure may be justified by the attempt to provoke a clarificatory response from Heath. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Though Habermas explicitly rejected psychoanalysis as a model for a critical theory of society, it seems to have continued to shape his thought beyond the publication of Knowledge and Human Interests. The conceptual framework underlying his more recent social theory would also be indebted to the psychoanalytical paradigm. This thesis is developed through the idea of the pathology of society, which represents the cornerstone of a specifically critical theory of society. In his demonstration, the author establishes a structural relationship (...) between psychical and social organization, and between individual pathology and the diagnostic of modern societies. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Some business ethicists view agency theory as a cautionary tale—a proof that it is impossible to carry out successful economic interactions in the absence of ethical behaviour. The cautionary-tale view presents a nuanced normative characterisation of agency, but itsunilateralfocus betrays a limited understanding of the structure of social interaction. This article moves beyond unilateralism by presenting a descriptive and normative argument for abilateralcautionary-tale view. Specifically, we discuss hat swaps and role dualism in asymmetric-information principal-agent relationships and argue that the norm (...) of reciprocity can function as a moral solution to agency risks in adverse-selection and moral-hazard problems. Our bilateral cautionary-tale formulation extends the normative boundaries of agency theory, while leaving the fundamental economic assumptions of agency theory intact. (shrink)

Like most books in philosophy, Communicative Action and Rational Choice contains a large number of arguments. Each of these arguments I adhere to with a greater or lesser degree of conviction. Some of them I think are pretty decisive. In other cases, I was doing the philosophical equivalent of throwing things against the wall just to see what sticks. Of course, I did not present things that way in the book, choosing instead to dress up my scruffier arguments in the (...) hope that they might appear to share the same pedigree as my more refined ones. It is thus a testament to the astuteness of my critics here that they have focused their criticism almost entirely on my more tentative arguments—especially my so-called “pragmatic theory of convergence,” which is less a theory than a set of suggestions about how a theory might be constructed. Thus my desire to defend these arguments against criticism, which predominates in what follows, should be understood also as tempered by the recognition that much of what I say may ultimately prove to be unsustainable. (shrink)