Summary This essay is divided into three parts. The first examines the documents about Antiphon in the “Lives of the Ten Orators”, which have been attributed to the collection of Craterus, and shows that they must be forgeries because the information contained in them is inconsistent with reliable sources about Athenian laws and legal procedure and with the language and formulas of the preserved decrees of the fifth century and contains other serious mistakes. The second section examines the fragments of (...) the work of Craterus and shows that all are Athenian decrees, most of which relate to imperial administration or to famous personalities and are dated to the period between roughly 480 and 410. None of the fragments of this work can be dated earlier or later than this period. The third section reviews the documents inserted into the texts of the speeches of Andocides, Aeschines and Demosthenes and shows that in the majority of cases the editors who inserted these documents into the text could not have used the work of Craterus either for the texts of the genuine documents or for the information contained in the forged documents. In the other cases there is no evidence indicating that these editors consulted his work, and it appears that those who composed these documents used other sources. (shrink)

Taking as its point of departure the existing critical literature on the intersections between René Girard’s and Giorgio Agamben’s anthropogenetic theories, this essay aims to add further considerations to the debate by discussing some of Agamben’s intuitions within a Girardian paradigmatic explanatory framework. I show how by regressing the archeological analysis to a pre-institutional and pre-legal moment, and by re-examining the antinomic structure of the sacred in its genetic organizing form, one can account more cogently for certain key issues relevant (...) to Agamben’s theoretical project, such as the “paradox of sovereignty,” the nature of the “state of exception,” and the dissociation between culpa and individual responsibility in archaic law, as recently discussed in Karman. I also put forward arguments concerning the limitations of Agamben’s immanent ontology to account for the zoe/bios distinction as a key structural element of his particular take on biopolitics, viewing this specifically in the light. (shrink)