This paper puts forward the argument that there are various, competing, and antithetical evidence‐based practice (EBP) definitions and acknowledges that the different EBP definitions are based on different epistemological perspectives. However, this is not enough to understand the way in which nurse professionals choose between the various EBP formations and consequently facilitate them in choosing the most appropriate for their needs. Therefore, the current article goes beyond and behind the various EBP epistemologies to identify how individuals choose an epistemology, which (...) consequently will assist our understanding as to how an individual chooses a specific EBP formation. Individuals choose an epistemology on the mere belief that the specific epistemology offers the ideals or ideas of best explaining or interpreting daily reality. These ideals or ideas are termed by science, history, and politics as ideology. Similarly, individual practitioners choose or should choose between the different EBP formations based on their own personal ideology. Consequently, this article proceeds to analyse the various ideologies behind different EBP definitions as to conclude that there are two broad ideologies that inform the various EBP formations, namely the ideology of truth and the ideology of individual emancipation. These two ideologies are analysed and their connections to the various EBP formations are depicted. Eventually, the article concludes that the in‐depth, critical, and intentional analysis by individual nurses of their own ideology will allow them to choose the EBP formation that is most appropriate and fitting for them, and their specific situation. Hence, the conscious analysis of individual ideology becomes the criterion for choosing between competing EBP formations and allows for best evidence to be implemented in practice. Therefore, the best way to teach EBP courses is by facilitating students to analyse their own ideology. (shrink)

Shared decision making has become the standard of care, yet there remains no consensus about how it should be conducted. Most accounts are concerned with threats to patient autonomy, and they address the dangers of a power imbalance by foregrounding the patient as a person whose complex preferences it is the practitioner's task to support. Other corrective models fear that this level of mutuality risks abdicating the practitioner's responsibilities as an expert, and they address that concern by recovering a nuanced (...) but genuinely directive clinical role. Cribb and Entwistle helpfully categorize models of shared decision making as ‘narrower’ and ‘broader’ and praise the latter's ‘open‐ended and fully dialogical ways of relating’. However, they stop short of providing a philosophical account of how that dialogue works. In this paper, a nurse–midwife and a philosopher collaborate to argue that the Socratic model of dialogue offers a solution to the practitioner–patient dilemma. In the Theaetetus, Socrates compares dialogical reasoning to ‘midwifery with all its standard features’. By means of a three‐way analogy, elements of midwifery practice are used to illuminate features of Socrates' claim that his dialogue is like midwifery; those features are then translated into an approach to shared decision making as the ‘midwifery of good thinking’ which both midwives and physicians would do well to adopt. A key concept that emerges is the need for practitioners to make a risk‐confidence assessment of the particular content of any decision to appropriately modulate their role in the practice of shared decision making. (shrink)