Extant literature suggests that firms may gain legitimacy through imitation. But little known is about whom foreign multinational enterprises (MNEs) will imitate, given that they have multiple social referents: home-country peers and host-country industry competitors. Drawing upon category theory, we develop a dynamic imitation model and explicate how MNEs’ categorization process is affected by social activism, which causes the shift from self-categorization to categorical imperative. We investigate this model in the context of MNE philanthropy and propose that the social movement (...) may delegitimize MNEs’ original self-category and change their imitation target. Using a hand-collected dataset of MNEs’ philanthropic donation for the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake in China, we find that MNEs imitate their home-country peers first but shift to host-country industry competitors after an online social movement. This is because the online social movement delegitimizes MNEs as a category and suggests host-country industry peers as the new model for comparison. Further, we find that liability of foreignness impedes whereas firm reputation facilitates an MNE’s adaptation after the online social movement. Our paper contributes to the literatures on MNEs’ imitation behavior and CSR in emerging market. We also contribute to category theory by integrating self-categorization and categorical imperative and highlighting the role of social movements. (shrink)

Corporate anti-corruption initiatives can make a substantial contribution towards curtailing corruption and advancing efforts to achieve the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. However, researchers have observed that underdeveloped assumptions with respect to the conceptualization of corruption and how firms respond to corruption risk impeding the efficacy of anti-corruption programs. We investigate the relationship between the perceived level of corruption in foreign host countries and the organizational structure of subsidiary operations established by multinational corporations. Foreign host market corruption is disaggregated into (...) two components—private and public corruption. We employ an uncertainty-based perspective grounded in transaction cost theory to focus upon the distinct mechanisms through which private and public corruption can each be expected to impact a foreign subsidiary’s organizational structure [wholly-owned subsidiary or a joint venture with a local partner]. We expect that each type of corruption fosters a different type of uncertainty which predominates in shaping the MNC’s choice of foreign subsidiary investment structure. Hypotheses are developed and tested with a sample of 187 entries into 19 foreign host markets. Each type of corruption was found to exert a distinct effect upon the organizational structure of foreign subsidiaries. More precisely, while heightened perceived levels of public corruption were found to motivate MNCs to invest through a JV with a local partner rather than a WOS, more pronounced private corruption precipitated the opposite outcome. (shrink)