Is there a moral difference between euthanasia for terminally ill adults and euthanasia for terminally ill children? Luc Bovens considers five arguments to this effect, and argues that each is unsuccessful. In this paper, I argue that Bovens' dismissal of the sensitivity argument is unconvincing.

In 2014, Article 3 of the the Belgian Euthanasia Act (2002) (the Euthanasia Act) was amended (‘the Amendment’) to include the ‘capacity for discernment’ requirement. This paper explores the implications of this highly controversial Amendment. I remain unconvinced of the benefits for children < 12 years old suffering chronic or terminal illnesses. In Part One, I argue that the phrase ‘capacity for discernment’ is problematic and vulnerable to abuse; neither a consistent, widely accepted definition of the phrase has been established (...) nor a standardised method or procedure to adequately gauge a minor’s capacity for discernment. In Part Two I advance the argument that specifically for children < 12 years, aggressive and sophisticated paediatric palliative care treatment, which risks, but does not intend death, is more ethically justified than Euthanasia treatment. A definition of a child’s interests is best achieved through a care-based ethics framework; namely, the child’s relationship with their parents and family members, their doctors and medical practitioners is held to be an interest of crucial importance for the child. I conclude that paediatric palliative care arguably better promotes and upholds this interest. (shrink)