Creativity is the hallmark of human cognition, yet scientific understanding of creative processes is limited. However, there is increasing interest in revealing the neural correlates of human creativity. Though many of these studies, pioneering in nature, help demystification of creativity, but the field is still dominated by popular beliefs in associating creativity with "right brain thinking", "divergent thinking", "altered states" and so on (Dietrich and Kanso, 2010). In this article, we discuss a computational framework for creativity based on Baars' global (...) workspace theory (Baars, 1988) enhanced with mechanisms based on information theory. Next we propose a neurocognitive architecture of creativity with a strong focus on various facets (i.e., unconscious thought theory, mind wandering, spontaneous brain states) of un/pre-conscious brain responses. Our principal argument is that pre-conscious creativity happens prior to conscious creativity happens prior to conscious creativity and the proposed computational model may provide a mechanism by which this transition is managed. This integrative approach, albeit unconventional, will hopefully stimulate future neuroscientific studies of the inscrutable phenomenon of creativity. (shrink)

Why does performing certain tasks cause the aversive experience of mental effort and concomitant deterioration in task performance? One explanation posits a physical resource that is depleted over time. We propose an alternative explanation that centers on mental representations of the costs and benefits associated with task performance. Specifically, certain computational mechanisms, especially those associated with executive function, can be deployed for only a limited number of simultaneous tasks at any given moment. Consequently, the deployment of these computational mechanisms carries (...) an opportunity cost – that is, the next-best use to which these systems might be put. We argue that the phenomenology of effort can be understood as the felt output of these cost/benefit computations. In turn, the subjective experience of effort motivates reduced deployment of these computational mechanisms in the service of the present task. These opportunity cost representations, then, together with other cost/benefit calculations, determine effort expended and, everything else equal, result in performance reductions. In making our case for this position, we review alternative explanations for both the phenomenology of effort associated with these tasks and for performance reductions over time. Likewise, we review the broad range of relevant empirical results from across sub-disciplines, especially psychology and neuroscience. We hope that our proposal will help to build links among the diverse fields that have been addressing similar questions from different perspectives, and we emphasize ways in which alternative models might be empirically distinguished. (shrink)

In attempts to formulate a computational understanding of brain function, one of the fundamental concerns is the data structure by which the brain represents information. For many decades, a conceptual framework has dominated the thinking of both brain modelers and neurobiologists. That framework is referred to here as "classical neural networks." It is well supported by experimental data, although it may be incomplete. A characterization of this framework will be offered in the next section. Difficulties in modeling important functional aspects (...) of the brain on the basis of classical neural networks alone have led to the recognition that another, general mechanism must be invoked to explain brain function. That mechanism I call " binding." Binding by neural signal synchrony had been mentioned several times in the liter ature before it was fully formulated as a general phenomenon. Although experimental evidence for neural syn chrony was soon found, the idea was largely ignored for many years. Only recently has it become a topic of animated discussion. In what follows, I will summarize the nature and the roots of the idea of binding, especially of temporal binding, and will discuss some of the objec tions raised against it. (shrink)

We report results of a study that utilizes a BCI to drive an interactive interface countermeasure that allows users to self-regulate sustained attention while performing an ecologically valid, long-duration business logistics task. An engagement index derived from EEG signals was used to drive the BCI while fNIRS measured hemodynamic activity for the duration of the task. Participants ( n = 30) were split into three groups (1) no countermeasures (NOCM), (2) continuous countermeasures (CCM), and (3) event synchronized, level-dependent countermeasures (ECM). (...) We hypothesized that the ability to self-regulate sustained attention through a neurofeedback mechanism would result in greater task engagement, decreased error rate and improved task performance. Data were analyzed by wavelet coherence analysis, statistical analysis, performance metrics and self-assessed cognitive workload via RAW-TLX. We found that when the BCI was used to deliver continuous interface countermeasures (CCM), task performance was moderately enhanced in terms of total 14,785 (σ = 423) and estimated missed sales 7.46% (σ = 1.76) when compared to the NOCM 14,529 (σ = 510), 9.79% (σ = 2.75), and the ECM 14,180 (σ = 875), 9.62% (σ = 4.91) groups. An “actions per minute” (APM) metric was used to determine interface interaction activity which showed that overall the CCM and ECM groups had a higher APM of 3.460 ( SE = 0.140) and 3.317 ( SE = 0.139) respectively when compared with the NOCM group 2.65 ( SE = 0.097). Statistical analysis showed a significant difference between ECM - NOCM and CCM - NOCM ( p p. (shrink)

ArgumentThe main contribution of the Alfred P. Sloan and Russell Sage Foundations' behavioral economics program (1984–1992) was not the resources it provided, which were relatively modest. Instead, the program's contribution lay in catalyzing “a sense of mission” in the collaboration between psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, economist Richard Thaler, and their associates. Partly this reflected the common strategy of American foundations to pick an individual or small group of scientists and stick with them until scientific success had been achieved. (...) But moreover, it was a consequence of the careful management of the program's director Eric Wanner. The various actors involved in the behavioral economics program constructed a new behavioral economic sub-discipline in economics by tapping into existing missionary sentiments in the economic and psychological disciplines, while at the same time actively shaping this sense of mission. (shrink)