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  1. Robustness, optimality, and the handicap principle. [REVIEW]Jean-Louis Dessalles, Edouard Machery, Fiona Cowie & Jason Mckenzie Alexander - 2010 - Biology and Philosophy 25 (5):868-879.
    This symposium discusses J.-L. Dessalles's account of the evolution of language, which was presented in Why we Talk (OUP 2007).
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  • Prcis of “why think?” Evolution and the rational mind.Ronald de Sousa - 2008 - American Journal of Bioethics 8 (5):4 – 9.
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  • Does the eye know calculus? The threshold of representation in classical and connectionist models.Ronald de Sousa - 1991 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 5 (2):171 – 185.
    Abstract The notion of representation lies at the crossroads of questions about the nature of belief and knowledge, meaning, and intentionality. But there is some hope that it might be simpler than all those. If we could understand it clearly, it might then help to explicate those more difficult notions. In this paper, my central aim is to find a principled criterion, along lines that make biological sense, for deciding just when it becomes theoretically plausible to ascribe to some process (...)
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  • Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of thinking.Wim De Neys & Tamara Glumicic - 2008 - Cognition 106 (3):1248-1299.
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  • Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification.Helen de Cruz, Maarten Boudry, Johan de Smedt & Stefaan Blancke - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):517-535.
    What are the consequences of evolutionary theory for the epistemic standing of our beliefs? Evolutionary considerations can be used to either justify or debunk a variety of beliefs. This paper argues that evolutionary approaches to human cognition must at least allow for approximately reliable cognitive capacities. Approaches that portray human cognition as so deeply biased and deficient that no knowledge is possible are internally incoherent and self-defeating. As evolutionary theory offers the current best hope for a naturalistic epistemology, evolutionary approaches (...)
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  • Vaulting optimality.Peter Dayan & Jon Oberlander - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):221-222.
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  • The purpose of experiments: Ecological validity versus comparing hypotheses.Robyn M. Dawes - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):20-20.
    As illustrated by research Koehler himself cites (Dawes et al. 1993), the purpose of experiments is to choose between contrasting explanations of past observations – rather than to seek statistical generalizations about the prevalence of effects. True external validity results not from sampling various problems that are representative of “real world” decision making, but from reproducing an effect in the laboratory with minimal contamination (including from real world factors).
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  • Organisms, scientists and optimality.Michael Davison - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):220-221.
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  • Imagining a non-biological machine as a legal person.David J. Calverley - 2008 - AI and Society 22 (4):523-537.
    As non-biological machines come to be designed in ways which exhibit characteristics comparable to human mental states, the manner in which the law treats these entities will become increasingly important both to designers and to society at large. The direct question will become whether, given certain attributes, a non-biological machine could ever be viewed as a legal person. In order to begin to understand the ramifications of this question, this paper starts by exploring the distinction between the related concepts of (...)
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  • Enhancement and the Conservative Bias.Ben Davies - 2017 - Philosophy and Technology 30 (3):339-356.
    Nicholas Agar argues that we should avoid certain ‘radical’ enhancement technologies. One reason for this is that they will alienate us from current sources of value by altering our evaluative outlooks. We should avoid this, even if enhancing will provide us with novel, objectively better sources of value. After noting the parallel between Agar’s views and G. A. Cohen’s work on the ‘conservative bias’, I explore Agar’s suggestion in relation to two kinds of radical enhancement: cognitive and anti-ageing. With regard (...)
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  • Reasonable Disagreement about Identifed vs. Statistical Victims.Norman Daniels - 2012 - Hastings Center Report 42 (1):35-45.
    People tend to contribute more—and think they have stronger obligations to contribute more—to rescuing an identified victim rather than a statistical one. Indeed, they are often disposed to contribute more to rescuing a single identified victim than a greater number of statistical ones. By an “identified victim,” I mean Terry Q., lying injured in the passenger seat of the wrecked automobile on the corner of Main Street and Broadway, or Jessica McClure, the child who fell into the Texas well in (...)
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  • Correct decisions and their good consequences.Steven Daniel - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):13-14.
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  • Natural selection doesn't have goals, but it's the reason organisms do.Martin Daly - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):219-220.
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  • Evidence in Default: Rejecting Default Models of Animal Minds.Mike Dacey - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (2):291-312.
    Comparative psychology experiments typically test a null statistical hypothesis against an alternative. Coupled with Morgan’s canon, this is often taken to imply that the model positing the simpler psychological capacity should be treated as a ‘default’ that must be ruled out before any other model can be accepted. It has been posited that this practice neglects evidence. I argue that the problem is deeper, including the way it structures the evaluation of evidence that is considered; it frames model choice around (...)
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  • A model theoretic approach to 'natural' reasoning.Newton C. A. da Costa & Steven French - 1993 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (2):177-190.
    Abstract A general framework is proposed for accommodating the recent results of studies into ?natural? decision making. A crucial element of this framework is the notion of a ?partial structure?, recently introduced into the semantic approach to scientific theories. It is through the introduction of this element that connections can be made with certain problems regarding inconsistency and rationality in general.
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  • Scaring the Public: Fear Appeal Arguments in Public Health Reasoning.Louise Cummings - 2012 - Informal Logic 32 (1):25-50.
    The study of threat and fear appeal arguments has given rise to a sizeable literature. Even within a public health context, much is now known about how these arguments work to gain the public’s compliance with health recommendations. Notwithstanding this level of interest in, and examination of, these arguments, there is one aspect of these arguments that still remains unexplored. That aspect concerns the heuristic function of these arguments within our thinking about public health problems. Specifically, it is argued that (...)
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  • Evaluating Fallacies: Putnam's Model-Theoretic Legacy.Louise Cummins - 2002 - Philosophica 69 (1).
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  • Some optimality principles in evolution.James F. Crow - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):218-219.
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  • Symposium on ''Cognition and Rationality: Part I'' Relationships between rational decisions, human motives, and emotions. [REVIEW]Cristiano Castelfranchi, Francesca Giardini & Francesca Marzo - 2006 - Mind and Society 5 (2):173-197.
    In the decision-making and rationality research field, rational decision theory (RDT) has always been the main framework, thanks to the elegance and complexity of its mathematical tools. Unfortunately, the formal refinement of the theory is not accompanied by a satisfying predictive accuracy, thus there is a big gap between what is predicted by the theory and the behaviour of real subjects. Here we propose a new foundation of the RDT, which has to be based on a cognitive architecture for reason-based (...)
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  • The Scope and Limits of Preference Sovereignty.Tyler Cowen - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (2):253.
    Economists use tastes as a source of information about personal welfare and judge the effects of policies upon preference satisfaction; neoclassical welfare economics is the analytical embodiment of this preference sovereignty norm. For an initial distribution of wealth, the welfare-maximizing outcome is the one that exhausts all possible gains from trade. Gains from trade are defined relative to fixed ordinal preferences. This analytical apparatus consists of both the Pareto principle, which implies that externality-free voluntary trades increase welfare, and applied costbenefit (...)
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  • Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3579-3610.
    Norms—that is, specifications of what we ought to do—play a critical role in the study of informal argumentation, as they do in studies of judgment, decision-making and reasoning more generally. Specifically, they guide a recurring theme: are people rational? Though rules and standards have been central to the study of reasoning, and behavior more generally, there has been little discussion within psychology about why (or indeed if) they should be considered normative despite the considerable philosophical literature that bears on this (...)
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  • Message Framing, Normative Advocacy and Persuasive Success.Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2010 - Argumentation 24 (2):153-163.
    In a recent article in Argumentation, O’Keefe (Argumentation 21:151–163, 2007) observed that the well-known ‘framing effects’ in the social psychological literature on persuasion are akin to traditional fallacies of argumentation and reasoning and could be exploited for persuasive success in a way that conflicts with principles of responsible advocacy. Positively framed messages (“if you take aspirin, your heart will be more healthy”) differ in persuasive effect from negative frames (“if you do not take aspirin, your heart will be less healthy”), (...)
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  • Introduction: The coming of the knowledge society and the challenges for the future of europe. [REVIEW]Francesco Coniglione - 2009 - Axiomathes 19 (4):353-372.
    This paper explicates the philosophical and epistemological background of the MIRRORS project, which is the starting point of the various contributions in this issue. Developments in the philosophy of science will be discussed, especially the watershed work of Kuhn, in order to analyze further developments in the sociology of science, particularly starting from the Strong Programme. Finally, it will be shown how a multidisciplinary approach in Science & Technology (S&T) studies, as opposed to an interdisciplinary one, is to be preferred. (...)
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  • Are base rates a natural category of information?Terry Connolly - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):19-20.
    The base rate fallacy is directly dependent on a particular judgment paradigm in which information may be unambiguously designated as either “base rate” or “individuating,” and in which subjects make two-stage sequential judgments. The paradigm may be a poor match for real world settings, and the fallacy may thus be undefined for natural ecologies of judgment.
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  • Replies and objections.Randall Collins - 1992 - Social Epistemology 6 (3):267 – 272.
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  • Idealisations in normative models.Mark Colyvan - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1337-1350.
    In this paper I discuss the kinds of idealisations invoked in normative theories—logic, epistemology, and decision theory. I argue that very often the so-called norms of rationality are in fact mere idealisations invoked to make life easier. As such, these idealisations are not too different from various idealisations employed in scientific modelling. Examples of the latter include: fluids are incompressible (in fluid mechanics), growth rates are constant (in population ecology), and the gravitational influence of distant bodies can be ignored (in (...)
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  • The need for a theory of evidential weight.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):18-19.
    There is a familiar risk of antinomy if fromxisEand p(xisH/xisE) =rit is permissible to infer p(xisH) =r, and what Carnap (1950) called “The requirement of total evidence” will not prevent such antinomies satisfactorily. What is needed instead is a properly developed theory of evidential weight.
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  • Status of the rationality assumption in psychology.Marvin S. Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):332-333.
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  • Do, or should, all human decisions conform to the norms of a consumer-oriented culture?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):12-13.
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  • Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
    The object of this paper is to show why recent research in the psychology of deductive and probabilistic reasoning does not have.
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  • Are there any a priori constraints on the study of rationality?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):359-370.
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  • Trust and the trickster problem.Zac Cogley - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (1):30-47.
    In this paper, I articulate and defend a conception of trust that solves what I call “the trickster problem.” The problem results from the fact that many accounts of trust treat it similar to, or identical with, relying on someone’s good will. But a trickster could rely on your good will to get you to go along with his scheme, without trusting you to do so. Recent philosophical accounts of trust aim to characterize what it is for one person to (...)
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  • Intuitions are Used as Evidence in Philosophy.Nevin Climenhaga - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):69-104.
    In recent years a growing number of philosophers writing about the methodology of philosophy have defended the surprising claim that philosophers do not use intuitions as evidence. In this paper I defend the contrary view that philosophers do use intuitions as evidence. I argue that this thesis is the best explanation of several salient facts about philosophical practice. First, philosophers tend to believe propositions which they find intuitive. Second, philosophers offer error theories for intuitions that conflict with their theories. Finally, (...)
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  • Strong Belief is Ordinary.Roger Clarke - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    In an influential recent paper, Hawthorne, Rothschild, and Spectre (“HRS”) argue that belief is weak. More precisely: they argue that the referent of believe in ordinary language is much weaker than epistemologists usually suppose; that one needs very little evidence to be entitled to believe a proposition in this sense; and that the referent of believe in ordinary language just is the ordinary concept of belief. I argue here to the contrary. HRS identify two alleged tests of weakness – the (...)
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  • Conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorizing.Steve Clarke - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (2):131-150.
    The dismissive attitude of intellectuals toward conspiracy theorists is considered and given some justification. It is argued that intellectuals are entitled to an attitude of prima facie skepticism toward the theories propounded by conspiracy theorists, because conspiracy theorists have an irrational tendency to continue to believe in conspiracy theories, even when these take on the appearance of forming the core of degenerating research program. It is further argued that the pervasive effect of the "fundamental attribution error" can explain the behavior (...)
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  • Altruism across disciplines: one word, multiple meanings.Christine Clavien & Michel Chapuisat - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (1):125-140.
    Altruism is a deep and complex phenomenon that is analysed by scholars of various disciplines, including psychology, philosophy, biology, evolutionary anthropology and experimental economics. Much confusion arises in current literature because the term altruism covers variable concepts and processes across disciplines. Here we investigate the sense given to altruism when used in different fields and argumentative contexts. We argue that four distinct but related concepts need to be distinguished: (a) psychological altruism , the genuine motivation to improve others’ interests and (...)
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  • Brains, genes, and language evolution: A new synthesis.Morten H. Christiansen & Nick Chater - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (5):537-558.
    Our target article argued that a genetically specified Universal Grammar (UG), capturing arbitrary properties of languages, is not tenable on evolutionary grounds, and that the close fit between language and language learners arises because language is shaped by the brain, rather than the reverse. Few commentaries defend a genetically specified UG. Some commentators argue that we underestimate the importance of processes of cultural transmission; some propose additional cognitive and brain mechanisms that may constrain language and perhaps differentiate humans from nonhuman (...)
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  • Many Meanings of ‘Heuristic’.Sheldon J. Chow - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):977-1016.
    A survey of contemporary philosophical and scientific literatures reveals that different authors employ the term ‘heuristic’ in ways that deviate from, and are sometimes inconsistent with, one another. Given its widespread use in philosophy and cognitive science generally, it is striking that there appears to be little concern for a clear account of what phenomena heuristics pick out or refer to. In response, I consider several accounts of ‘heuristic’, and I draw a number of distinctions between different sorts of heuristics (...)
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  • Developmental changes in probabilistic reasoning: The role of cognitive capacity, instructions, thinking styles and relevant knowledge.Francesca Chiesi, Caterina Primi & Kinga Morsanyi - unknown
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  • The rational analysis of mind and behavior.Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford - 2000 - Synthese 122 (1-2):93-131.
    Rational analysis (Anderson 1990, 1991a) is an empiricalprogram of attempting to explain why the cognitive system isadaptive, with respect to its goals and the structure of itsenvironment. We argue that rational analysis has two importantimplications for philosophical debate concerning rationality. First,rational analysis provides a model for the relationship betweenformal principles of rationality (such as probability or decisiontheory) and everyday rationality, in the sense of successfulthought and action in daily life. Second, applying the program ofrational analysis to research on human reasoning (...)
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  • Two projects for understanding the mind: A response to Morris and Richardson. [REVIEW]Nick Chater & Martin Pickering - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (4):553-569.
    We respond to Morris and Richardson 's claim that Pickering and Chater's arguments about the lack of a relation between cognitive science and folk psychology are flawed. We note that possible controversies about the appropriate uses for the two terms do not affect our arguments. We then address their claim that computational explanation of knowledge-rich processes has proved possible in the domains of problem solving, scientific discovery, and reasoning. We argue that, in all cases, computational explanation is only possible for (...)
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  • The principle of nondirectiveness in genetic counseling. Different meanings and various postulates of normative nature.Weronika Chańska - 2022 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 25 (3):383-393.
    The article aims at organizing multifaceted discourse on the concept of nondirectiveness in the practice of genetic counseling. The analysis of areas where nondirectiveness was invoked and discussed reveals the problematic confusion of different meanings of the term that often leads to false conclusions about the relations between the professional standards and the practice of genetic counseling. The article offers clear and comprehensive description of different approaches to nondirectiveness and various ideas associated with the term. Normative consequences of various meanings (...)
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  • Prospect relativity: how choice options influence decision under risk.Neil Stewart, Nick Chater, Henry P. Stott & Stian Reimers - 2003 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 132 (1):23.
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  • Why argue? Towards a cost–benefit analysis of argumentation.Cristiano Castelfranchi & Fabio Paglieri - 2010 - Argument and Computation 1 (1):71-91.
    This article proposes a cost-benefit analysis of argumentation, with the aim of highlighting the strategic considerations that govern the agent's decision to argue or not. In spite of its paramount importance, the topic of argumentative decision-making has not received substantial attention in argumentation theories so far. We offer an explanation for this lack of consideration and propose a tripartite taxonomy and detailed description of the strategic reasons considered by arguers in their decision-making: benefits, costs, and dangers. We insist that the (...)
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  • Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):4989-5007.
    In a series of works Sosa (in: Knowledge in perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991; A virtue epistemology: apt belief and reflective knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; Reflective knowledge: apt belief and reflective knowledge, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; ‘How Competence Matters in Epistemology’, Philos Perspect 24(1):465–475, 2010; Knowing full well, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011; Judgment and agency, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015; Epistemology, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2017) has defended the view that there are two kinds or (...)
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  • Rationality in mental disorders: too little or too much?Valentina Cardella - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2):13-36.
    The idea that mental illnesses are impairments in rationality is very old, and very common (Kasanin 1944; Harvey et al. 2004; Graham 2010). But is it true? In this article two severe mental disorders, schizophrenia and delusional disorder, are investigated in order to find some defects in rationality. Through the analysis of patients’ performances on different tests, and the investigation of their typical reasoning styles, I will show that mental disorders can be deficits in social cognition, or common sense, but (...)
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  • On Spearman's “problem of correlation”.John B. Carroll - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):7-7.
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  • A neo-Cartesian alternative.David Caplan - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):6-7.
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  • The implications of Koehler's approach for fact finding.Craig R. Callen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):18-18.
    Koehler's work will assist the effort to understand legal fact finding. It leaves two questions somewhat open: (i) the extent to which empirical research can measure correctness of fact-finding, a function that involves the resolution of normative questions and (ii) the standards judges should use in the absence of the research he advocates.
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  • On the Reality of the Base-Rate Fallacy: A Logical Reconstruction of the Debate.Martina Calderisi - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Does the most common response given by participants presented with Tversky and Kahneman’s famous taxi cab problem amount to a violation of Bayes’ theorem? In other words, do they fall victim to so-called base-rate fallacy? In the present paper, following an earlier suggestion by Crupi and Girotto, we will identify the logical arguments underlying both the original diagnosis of irrationality in this reasoning task under uncertainty and a number of objections that have been raised against such a diagnosis. This will (...)
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