Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Some disability activists argue that disability is merely a difference. It is often objected that this view has unacceptable implications, implying, for example, that it is permissible to cause disability. In reply, Elizabeth Barnes argues that viewing disability as a difference needn’t entail such implications and that seeing such implications as unacceptable is question-begging. We argue that Barnes misconstrues this objection to the mere difference view of disability: it’s not question-begging to regard its implications as unacceptable, and the grounds that (...) Barnes offers for potentially blocking some of these implications fail to explain our conviction that it’s impermissible to cause disability. (shrink)

Procreative obligations are often discussed by evaluating only the consequences of reproductive actions or omissions; less attention is paid to the moral role of intentions and attitudes. In this paper, I assess whether intentions and attitudes can contribute to defining our moral obligations with regard to assisted reproductive technologies already available, such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), and those that may be available in future, such as reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis, in a way compatible with person‐affecting constraints. I propose (...) the parent–child relationship argument, which is based on the moral distinction between creating and parenting a child. Hence, I first argue that intentions and attitudes can play a role in defining our moral obligations in reproductive decisions involving PGD. Second, I maintain that if we accept this and recognize reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis as person‐affecting procedures, we should be committed to arguing that prospective parents may have moral reasons to prefer reproduction via such techniques than via sexual intercourse. In both cases, I observe an extension of our procreative responsibility beyond what is proposed by the consequentialist person‐affecting morality. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen a considerable and progressive increase in historical claims. Within the context of colonialism criticism, but also outside this sphere, numerous politicians, collectives and intellectuals have emerged to denounce certain acts of the past, demanding recognition and repentance that would compensate for these past affronts. In this article we will analyze one of these cases: the demand for an apology from Spain and the Vatican by the President of Mexico, López Obrador. Taking as a guide the debate (...) around the ethical problem of non-identity, we will see what ethical and metaphysical assumptions serve as the basis for these claims. We will also assess whether the claims of the so-called «historical victims» are consistent and ethically acceptable. (shrink)