David-Ménard examines the problem of the genesis of Kant's moral philosophy. The separation between Kantian practical reason and the inclinations of sense which it regulates is shown by the author to originate in Kant's attempt to regulate his own tendency to hypochondria. Her argument links the themes from two of Kant's precritical works which attest to this tendency-"An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind" and Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime-to the final form of the (...) critical philosophy. (shrink)

In the Traité des systèmes, Condillac analyses a plurality of systematic metaphysical doctrines, specifically, those of Spinoza, Malebranche and Leibniz. Commentators have mainly interpreted this plurality as a way for Condillac to illustrate his criticisms and to raise doubts about the main contemporary systems while using the same criteria for interpretation. However, I note that his analytic tools differ according to which philosopher or philosophical system he analyses. This paper focuses on the criticism of Leibniz’s system, and aims to show (...) that Condillac operated from subsequent reconstructions. In order to raise criticisms against the Leibnizian system, Condillac gave it an architectonic structure that is borrowed mainly from Wolff. (shrink)

The foundation of Mathematics is both a logico-formal issue and an epistemological one. By the first, we mean the explicitation and analysis of formal proof principles, which, largely a posteriori, ground proof on general deduction rules and schemata. By the second, we mean the investigation of the constitutive genesis of concepts and structures, the aim of this paper. This “genealogy of concepts”, so dear to Riemann, Poincaré and Enriques among others, is necessary both in order to enrich the foundational analysis (...) with an often disregarded aspect (the cognitive and historical constitution of mathematical structures) and because of the provable incompleteness of proof principles also in the analysis of deduction. For the purposes of our investigation, we will hint here to a philosophical frame as well as to some recent experimental studies on numerical cognition that support our claim on the cognitive origin and the constitutive role of mathematical intuition. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est d’interroger la transition Kant-Fichte sur le double plan de la systématicité et du primat de la raison pratique. S’il est admis que Kant voyait dans l’exercice critique l’occasion de renouveler, plutôt que de supprimer, la possibilité d’une métaphysique positive, il est aujourd’hui convenu de rapporter son ébauche de «système» au seul héritage de laSchulmetaphysik. A contrario, on cherche ici à prendre à la lettre l’exigence kantienne d’un système qui attend du «pratique» une nouvelle et absolue (...) «fondation», plutôt qu’il ne devrait être complété en l’état. La perspective fichtéenne impose alors son fil rouge.In this article, I examine two aspects of the transition from Kant to Fichte: systematicity and the primacy of practical reason. It is commonly agreed that Kant saw the critical exercise as an occasion to renew, rather than supress, the possibility of a positive metaphysics; however, most scholars now consider the “system” he sketched to be the sole heritage ofSchulmetaphysik. However, I take literally Kant’s demand for a system that expects from the “practical” a new and absolute “foundation,” rather than a system that must be completed. Here, Fichte’s perspective gives us the common thread. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article esquisse une généalogie du privilège que le terme concept a acquis en français par rapport à notion et à idée en se fondant non seulement sur les ouvrages des philosophes, mais sur des dictionnaires de langue philosophique. Il comprend quatre parties chronologiques. Après avoir étudié l’introduction des termes concept, notion, idée dans la langue philosophique, la première partie répertorie leurs usages dans les dictionnaires scolastiques du SVIIe siècle. La deuxième montre que Descartes a imposé idée en donnant (...) de ce terme une acception large et que les dictionnaires post-cartésiens la reprenne. La troisième établit que Kant a, contre cette acception large, introduit une distinction entre Begriff et Idee, mais que, initialement, les dictionnaires français refusèrent cette distinction. La quatrième et dernière partie est consacrée à un XXe siècle marqué par l’idéalisme allemand et l’analyse logique : aussi différentes qu’aient été ces deux traditions, elles ont été d’accord pour consacrer la prééminence du terme concept. (shrink)

La cognition humaine paraît étroitement liée à la structure de l'espace et du temps relativement auxquels le corps, le geste, l'intelligibilité semblent devoir se déterminer. Pourtant, ce qui, après les approches physico-mathématiques de Galilée et de Newton, fut caractérisé par Kant comme formes de l'intuition sensible, n'a cessé au cours des siècles qui suivirent de se trouver remis en cause dans leur saisie première par les développements théoriques. En mathématiques d'abord, avec les géométries non-euclidiennes, en physique ensuite, où relativité générale (...) puis théories quantiques et critiques ont dû remanier profondément l'objectivité de ces concepts pour en faire des catégories, certes toujours aussi essentielles, mais de plus en plus contre-intuitives, et maintenant en biologie où la temporalité, notamment, et la causalité se révèlent largement différentes de celles de la physique. C'est ce que nous tentons de présenter et de discuter dans ce texte en vue d'en dégager la pertinence pour la cognition elle-même. (shrink)

C'est un Radieux amour de jeunesse que celui de Hegel pour «la belle totalité grecque» et cet amour est d'autant plus profond que le monde moderne alentour craque et se déchire. Hegel qui, dans la jeune histoire de la philosophie, occupe une place originale par sa lecture interprétative des œuvres grecques, sait bien que la République platonicienne n'a pas dessein de décrire les champs élyséens de la Grèce primitive; mais il retrouve en elle la vie harmonique et la plénitude de (...) cette communauté première qui, antérieure à l'Etat comme forme politique aussi bien qu'à la religion comme dogme, n'était qu'ordre et beauté en raison de l'intime entrelacs du politique et du religieux. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article examine la formalisation sémiotique de la traduction, proposée par Alexandre Ljudskanov, à travers la confrontation de son modèle avec celui de l’École de Leipzig. Alors que les allemands Kade et Neubert ne quittent pas le champ de la Translationslinguistik, le traductologue bulgare s’applique à mettre en œuvre une sémiotique du processus traductif. En partant de la prémisse que toute information n’existe que sous forme de code, il définit la traduction comme un échange communicatif entre deux systèmes sémiotiques, (...) qui demande forcément une médiation sémiotique de nature cognitive. Le modèle de Ljudskanov implique le décodage et l’encodage. Ces deux phases supposent la transformation des signes d’un code à l’autre de sorte à préserver l’information portée par le message. L’information invariante est transmise par des équivalents fonctionnels dont la pertinence et le principe de fonctionnement seront illustrés par des exemples de proverbes, d’aphorismes, d’expressions idiomatiques et leur traduction en plusieurs langues. (shrink)

Because our actions change, our responsibility is modified; because our responsibility is modified, we need to question the ethics of the action. Our action is situated right there between announcing a diagnosis, the theoretical and practical result of identification, the determining and naming of a fact and voicing the disease which is a human action where medical and technical expertise comes up against a life and its story. Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), or Lou Gehrig’s disease, is a degenerative disease of (...) the motor neurons leading to paralysis. In the absence of any curative treatment, the natural course always results in death. Since 1989, progress in the management of this disease in France has been exponential, resulting in the creation of 17 expert centres throughout the country in 2003. Guidelines have been drawn up through consensus conferences and coordination meetings. For the delicate stage of the announcement, three requirements have been adopted: the quality of receptiveness of the medical practitioner and his team, their ability to listen and to adapt to the particularities of the patient in their care; their commitment with regard to legal obligations as to how and to whom to transmit information; and the need for a multidisciplined approach to be able to rapidly support the patient and his family. Questioning in the field of applied ethics has led us to examine whether having a benevolent and non-harmful attitude towards these patients, respecting their autonomy and legal rights are parameters required in this specialized practice. Through a transversal thematic analysis of the experiences of the medical practitioners at the Centres, we would like to explore a hypothesis of the remarkable epistemological progression of the neurologist in this form of care in the pure Hippocratic tradition. Through the compassionate experience of the other by these committed doctors and their teams, we will try to outline the view of anthropological phenomenology with regard to the ALS patient, their awareness of the future paralysis of the body that is being announced, their awareness of the temporality and will characteristic of the ALS patient and of his finality that they will be accompanying. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: The analytic method by which Descartes established the first principle of his philosophy is a unique cognitive process of direct insight and non-logical inference that differs markedly from the deductive model of noetic apprehension long associated with seventeenth-century rationalism. In this paper, it is shown that the same analytic process is at work in the Third Meditation proof of the innateness of the idea of God, where, however, there are serious doubts about its legitimacy.

Hors du temps d’Alain Boyer est l’un de ces livres qui prêtent volontiers à la critique et à la discussion, non seulement en raison des thèses soutenues par l’auteur, qui sont, de son propre aveu, controversées, mais à cause également du ton employé, souvent polémique, parfois même irrévérencieux ou iconoclaste. Et sans doute l’un des buts essentiels de l’ouvrage consiste-t-il à déboulonner une statue, non pas tant celle du philosophe Kant, dont l’auteur reconnaît le génie et l’importance, mais celle d’un (...) certain Kant élevé au rang de chantre des modernes ou d’apôtre du pluralisme, de la liberté d’expression et du dialogue intersubjectif. Bien qu’il ne conteste pas complètement la vision poppérienne d’un Kant Aufklärer, Alain Boyer entend néanmoins la nuancer: maints aspects de la philosophie de Kant s’éloignent effectivement de l’Aufklärung. Il s’agira pour lui de montrer que Kant est un philosophe tant de l’ordre que de la liberté et que bien qu’il soit le père du criticisme, il n’en est pas moins lui-même un métaphysicien dogmatique cherchant avant tout à sauver la morale et la religion du péril que lui font courir ses principaux ennemis: les sceptiques empiriques, les rêveurs délirants ou les librespenseurs. Il entend également dénoncer l’imposture de certains interprètes de Kant qui passent volontiers sous silence les aspects les plus problématiques de sa pensée pour ne retenir que ce qui s’accorde avec leurs propres convictions, projetant ainsi sur sa pensée, de manière anachronique, leurs propres idées. Parmi les thèses kantiennes que l’on tente prudemment d’écarter se trouvent entre autres la condamnation absolue du mensonge, le refus du droit de résistance, la liberté intelligible ou encore l’énigmatique chose en soi. (shrink)

The philosopher has always been engrossed with the notion of death. Schopenhauer understood this and elevated the idea to the rank of the Muses:“Death is the true inspiring genius and the musagete of philosophy. This is why Socrates defined it as θανἑτoν μɛλέτη” (Plato, Phaedra, 81a).This notion has been presented to us by turns in its various aspects, at times as a metaphysical concept, at other times as an ethnological or religious reality.

RÉSUMÉ Dans cet article, je propose une interprétation de la philosophie de Wilhelm Dilthey qui repose sur trois idées directrices. La première idée identifie l'objet de sa philosophie : la vie. La deuxième idée établit sa méthode, soit l'autoréflexion. La troisième idée clarifie ce qui est révélé par l'autoréflexion, à savoir l'universalité et la variabilité de la vie. Dans un premier temps, je défends que la lecture épistémologique de la philosophie de Dilthey doit être abandonnée. Dans un deuxième temps, je (...) présente mon interprétation de la philosophie de Dilthey. ABSTRACT In this paper, I suggest an interpretation of Wilhelm Dilthey's philosophy that rests on three guiding ideas. The first idea identifies the object of his philosophy: life. The second one establishes its method, namely self-reflection. The third one clarifies what is revealed by self-reflection, that is the universality and the variability of life. First, I show that the epistemological reading of Dilthey's philosophy must be abandoned. Second, I detail my interpretation of Dilthey's philosophy. (shrink)

This paper raises the question – based on the works of Marc Richir and Dominique Pradelle – if and how phenomenology deals with an “anti-Copernican” revolution, considering that the motif of a “Copernican” revolution seems to have gone through some modifications that reflect a certain deposition of the constitutive role of the subject. Its fundamental thesis is that a certain dimension “beyond” the Copernican revolution does not reestablish a “Ptolemaic” realism but rather opens a dimension “beneath”: beneath the subject and (...) the object where can take place a mutual relationship between an a-subjective constitutive power and a pre-empirical foundational being. This dimension “beneath” means that the alternative does not concern a “pre-Copernican” realism on the one hand and an “idealism” leaving in the shadows the relationship between the transcendental method and an ontological perspective on the other, but rather puts forward a constructive circularity between the transcendental constitution and an ontological foundation. It follows that “normativity” is not achieved on the basis of pre-given objectivity – because it would mean a petition principia – but draws upon the “pre-immanent generativity”. (shrink)

In this article, I maintain that Habermas, in his critical essay on Brandom included inTruth and Justification(2003), reduces communication to its narrowly dialogical form, and in doing so tends to ignore the fact that the discursive process is, above all, for Brandom, the product of a shared coordination of different individual perspectives contributing to advancing the game of giving and asking one another for reasons. On the one hand, I propose to carry out a critical analysis of Habermas’ position and, (...) on the other hand, to do justice to Brandom by emphasizing the specificity of the discursive communicative process. (shrink)

Jean-Marc Ferry stands opposed to the philosophy of Cornelius Castoriadis, claiming that it relies upon an arbitrary ontological decision. According to Ferry, Castoriadis’ philosophy does not respect the Kantian critique of reason. In this contribution, I reply to this objection. I comment on his specific methodological operation: elucidation. I show that this method does not go beyond Kantian finitude, and that it allows him to justify his ontological concepts. In the last part of this article, I interpret his method as (...) a ‘grounded constructivism’ and I explain how it contributes to those philosophical theories. (shrink)

The mimetic theory forged by René Girard is completely closed by its own violence. Given that human violence was contained for centuries, by the victimary mechanism, its deconstruction by the Cross has unleashed a complete and total violence, leading us to the possibility of a real Apocalypse. We show here that this closure is based on a metaphysical view of desire, guiding us from the objet to the being of the model. Since Girard is always confined into metaphysics by his (...) constant use of the paradigm of the image, the presence and, consequently, the idol, we demonstrate that there is still a way out of violence, the same way that is today the way out of metaphysics. With Jean-Luc Marion and his phenomenology of givenness, we oppose the paradigm of the icon to the one of the idol, and therefore the model of the sign to the one of the image. We demonstrate then that global mimetic violence can be stopped if we no longer desire objects and start desiring saturated phenomena, which implies a complete shift in the way we think and receive phenomena. (shrink)

In this paper we want to focus on Husserl’s critique of Kantian ethics and to develop the following questions. Against the merely empiristic orientation of Hume’s ethics, the Kantian foundation of ethics has an aprioristic character; but does this aprioristic character have to be identified with the origin of ethical principles in the pure subjectivity, and if not, which is its phenomenological signification? The sense of the Copernican revolution is that the structures of the objects are in accordance with the (...) universal structures of the finite subject; a contrario, Husserl refuses this Copernican principle and assumes that every sort of object determines a regulative structure in the subject; is it possible to apply this anticopernican principle to the ethical sphere? As opposed to the Kantian principle of the supremacy of practical reason, we find in Husserl’s thought a supremacy of the theoretical reason; but which is the sense of this inversion? The concept of foundation has in Husserlian phenomenology a cardinal importance: all sorts of truth of superior degree are founded on the inferior level of sensible truth; is it possible to apply this principle of foundation to the ethical sphere, so that ethical consciousness would be founded on feelings? At last the Kantian concept of liberty is not an empirical one, but a cosmological and practical idea; which is the phenomenological sense of liberty? (shrink)