This article argues that existing approaches to programming ethical AI fail to resolve a serious moral-semantic trilemma, generating interpretations of ethical requirements that are either too semantically strict, too semantically flexible, or overly unpredictable. This paper then illustrates the trilemma utilizing a recently proposed ‘general ethical dilemma analyzer,’ GenEth. Finally, it uses empirical evidence to argue that human beings resolve the semantic trilemma using general cognitive and motivational processes involving ‘mental time-travel,’ whereby we simulate different possible pasts and futures. I (...) demonstrate how mental time-travel psychology leads us to resolve the semantic trilemma through a six-step process of interpersonal negotiation and renegotiation, and then conclude by showing how comparative advantages in processing power would plausibly cause AI to use similar processes to solve the semantic trilemma more reliably than we do, leading AI to make better moral-semantic choices than humans do by our very own lights. (shrink)

Particularists in ethics emphasize that the normative is holistic, and invite us to infer with them that it therefore defies generalization. This has been supposed to present an obstacle to traditional moral theorizing, to have striking implications for moral epistemology and moral deliberation, and to rule out reductive theories of the normative, making it a bold and important thesis across the areas of normative theory, moral epistemology, moral psychology, and normative metaphysics. Though particularists emphasize the importance of the holism of (...) the normative, however, it is not something that they have been able to explain. In this paper I’ll show how to use a small number of simple and, I’ll argue, independently compelling assumptions in order to both predict and explain the holistic features of the normative with respect to the non-normative. The basic idea of the paper is simple. It is that normative claims are holistic because they are general, rather than because they defy generalization. (shrink)

The paper attempts to construct a theoretical account of what melancholy—in a psychoanalytical and cultural sense—may mean for jurisprudence. It argues that the map of relations and displacements between the object and the subject that is associated with melancholy in different psychoanalytical approaches can be fruitfully adopted for understanding of normativity. Based on a thorough re-reading of Freud’s Trauer und Melancholie, it suggests that there is an irremovable component of melancholy contained in the primordial act of separation of normativity from (...) non-normative reality. This interpretation is confronted with Kelsen’s Theory of Pure Law in order to analyse in which respect the momentum of self-sufficiency within normativity entails structures of melancholy. Kelsen’s concept of ‘effectiveness’ is proposed as a key link which explains how melancholic withdrawal allows the law to interact with reality. Then the paper discusses Agamben’s theory of applicability and of the state of exception to demonstrate the law’s melancholic trap. Finally, the paper draws on Lacanian and post-Lacanian approaches to melancholy in order to investigate how melancholic momentum is inherent in the very structure of the law’s validity. (shrink)

This paper is motivated by the need to respond to the spread of influential misinformation and manufactured ignorance, which places pressure on the work of experts in various sectors. To meet this need, the paper discusses the conditions required for expert testimony to evolve a reconceptualisation of negative capability as a new form of epistemic humility. In this regard, professional knowledge formation is not considered to be separate from the institutional and social processes and values that uphold its production. Drawing (...) attention to the structural and relational aspects of ignorance, as opposed to the individualistic and internal aspects, we rely on the sociology of knowledge, the social epistemologies and the feminist epistemologies that have played a fundamental role in the development of the investigation of ignorance. First, we analyse the criteria for epistemic humility based on prior theoretical discussions concerning negative knowledge as a form of reflective practice. Then, we seek to determine what kinds of strategies, virtues and skills experts need to have so as to ‘manage ignorance’ in socially complex situations. Finally, we suggest the reformulation of negative expertise as a phronetic skill for navigating through situations of ignorance and uncertainty in an epistemically and socially responsible manner. (shrink)

A recent study suggests that vaccine hesitancy amongst key demographics – including females, younger individuals, and certain ethnic groups – could undermine the pursuit of herd immunity against COVID-19 in the United Kingdom. At the same time, the UK Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunization (JVCI) indicated that it will not facilitate the choice between available COVID-19 vaccines. This paper reflects upon lessons from the introduction of the UK’s combined Measles, Mumps and Rubella (MMR) vaccine strategy of the 1980s when (...) Member of Parliament Miss Julie Kirkbride argued that had parents been allowed to choose between vaccine variants, then the crisis of low herd immunity – and subsequent outbreaks – could have been avoided. This paper explores this argument, as applied to the COVID-19 vaccination strategy, by considering how three key elements of informed consent – disclosure of risk, benefit, and reasonable alternatives – may be employed to tackle vaccine hesitancy and build vaccine confidence. (shrink)

This article critically reviews what is known about the ethical status of psychologists’ putative involvement with enhanced interrogations and torture. We examine three major normative ethical accounts of EITs and conclude, contra the American Psychological Association, that reasonable arguments can be made that in certain cases the use of EITs is ethical and even, in certain circumstances, morally obligatory. We suggest that this moral question is complex as it has competing moral values involved, that is, the humane treatment of detainee (...) competes with the ethical value/duty/virtue of protecting innocent third parties. We also suggest that there is an ethical duty to minimize harm by making only judicious and morally responsible allegations against the psychologists alleged to be involved in EITs. Finally, we make recommendations regarding completing the historical record, improvements in the professional ethics code, and the moral treatment of individuals accused in this controversy. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to propose a set of 11 moral rules that are based on a combination of Kant´s categorical imperative, Mill´s Greatest Happiness and Mill´s Principle of Harm. In short the 11 rules of deontoutilitarianism are: 1) Human Beings have the duty of a) to preserve themselves and b) not attempt to destroy the lives of other human beings 2) Rule 1b does not apply if the human being starts an attack against other innocent beings 3) (...) Rule 1a does not apply under extreme physical suffering 4) In exceptional circumstances, where there is conflict between 1a and 1b, it is possible to violate 1a or 1b. 5) Human beings should have plain reproductive freedom 6) Human beings should not discriminate against other human beings. 7) Human beings should never be cruel against other forms of life in the universe 8) Human beings should always protect life in the universe and never threaten other forms of life, except under certain conditions to be described 9) Human beings should not use other living beings as a food source, unless under certain conditions to be described 10) Research involving animals should always respect the 3R’s (Replace, Reduce, Refine) 11) Every human being has the right to know the truth about subjects affecting their personal lives, except when knowing the truth leads to a direct violation of rule 1. Next I apply these rules to examine the morality or immorality of behaviours such as suicide, euthanasia, animal welfare, stem cell research, selection of embryos, reproduction, population policies, immortality, enhancement, war and peace, lying and telling the truth. (shrink)

It is widely known that neuroscience research can lead humankind to understand and combat many illnesses or conditions that cause untold suffering around the world such as dementia, Alzheimer’s, depression or stress and can also lead us to achieve considerable improvements in memory, learning abilities, executive functions, moods and in many others areas related to cognition and emotion. In this article I will be focusing specifically on the research related to the neuroscience of ethics. The neuroscience of ethics is an (...) area of neuroethics that is concerned with the understanding of the brains mechanism that are involved in moral cognition and in our ethical (or anti-ethical) decisions, and I propose here to expand this concept a little further, defining neuroscience of ethics as the field concerned to the understanding of the brain mechanisms of all main behaviours related to ethics and morality. In this article I identify a set of neuroscience studies that have been published in the last 10 years and that are relevant for ethics, shedding light on behaviours such as altruism, generosity, selfconfidence, trust, altruistic punishment, violence, lying and prejudice, all of them connected somehow to morality. I then discuss how the understanding of each one of these behaviours can benefit society and how we can use this research to help humankind to improve moral standards and promote general happiness. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a view about machine autonomy grounded in the theoretical frameworks of 4E cognition and PF Strawson’s reactive attitudes. I begin with critical discussion of White, and conclude that his view is strongly committed to functionalism as it has developed in mainstream analytic philosophy since the 1950s. After suggesting that there is good reason to resist this view by appeal to developments in 4E cognition, I propose an alternative view of machine autonomy. Namely, machines count as (...) autonomous when we members of the moral community adopt reactive attitudes in response to their actions. I distinguish this view from White’s and suggest assets and liabilities of this approach. (shrink)

Ancient moral philosophers, especially Aristotle and his followers, typically shared the assumption that ethics is primarily concerned with how to achieve the final end for human beings, a life of “happiness” or “human flourishing.” This final end was not a subjective condition, such as contentment or the satisfaction of our preferences, but a life that could be objectively determined to be appropriate to our nature as human beings. Character traits were treated as moral virtues because they contributed well toward this (...) ideal life, either as means to it or as constitutive aspects of it. Traits that tended to prevent a “happy” life were considered vices, even if they contributed to a life that was pleasant and what a person most wanted. The idea of “happiness” was central, then, in philosophical efforts to specify what we ought to do, what sort of persons we should try to become, and what sort of life a wise person would hope for. (shrink)

I argue that the problem of evil can be a moral objection to theistic belief. The thesis has three broad sections, each establishing an element in this argument. Section one establishes the logically binding nature of the problem of evil: The problem of evil must be solved, if you are to believe in God. And yet, I borrow from J. L. Mackie’s criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God, and argue that the fundamentally evaluative nature of the (...) premises within the problem of evil entails that it cannot be used to argue for the non-existence of God. Section two establishes the moral objectionability of many responses to the problem of evil. I discuss the work of the moral ‘anti-theodicists’, and support some of the key premises within their arguments via appeal to the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita. I combine the claims of section one and section two, and conclude that theism inherits the moral objectionability of theodicy. In section three, I establish the plausibility of a morally motivated non-cognitive atheism, offering an example, before finally distilling the central claims of this thesis into the form of a slogan: God lacks humanity. (shrink)