I explore two views about the relationship between spatial experience and spatial reality: spatial functionalism and spatial presentationalism. Roughly, spatial functionalism claims that the instantiated spatial properties are those playing a certain causal role in producing spatial experience while spatial presentationalism claims that the instantiated spatial properties include those presented in spatial experience. I argue that each view, in its own way, leads to an ontologically inflationary form of primitivism: whereas spatial functionalism leads to primitivism about phenomenal representation, spatial presentationalism (...) leads to primitivism about spatial properties. I conclude by discussing how to adjudicate between spatial functionalism and spatial presentationalism. (shrink)

This article argues that time‐asymmetric processes in spacetime are enantiomorphs. Subsequently, the Kantian puzzle concerning enantiomorphs in space is reviewed to introduce a number of positions concerning enantiomorphy, and to arrive at a dilemma: one must either reject that orientations of enantiomorphs are determinate, or furnish space or objects with orientation. The discussion on space is then used to derive two problems in the debate on the direction of time. First, it is shown that certain kinds of reductionism about the (...) direction of time are at variance with the claim that orientation of enantiomorphic objects is intrinsic. Second, it is argued that reductive explanations of time‐asymmetric processes presuppose that enantiomorphic processes do not have determinate orientation. (shrink)

The paper considers Ernst' Cassirer's standpoint with reference to Euclidean geometry and the complementarity principle of quantum theory, interpreted as a choice between a causal description and a space — time description. The acceptance of the complementarity principle by Cassirer not only lands him off the Kantian path slightly, but it also leads him to some contradictions and incompatibilities within his own system of thought. 1. Accepting complementarity, Cassirer cannot still hold that there is an infinite hierarchy of objective levels (...) as he does towards the end of hisDeterminismus; and 2. accepting complementarity, Cassirer cannot still hold on to the observability principle of Leibniz. (shrink)