Recently, a number of philosophers have defended a novel, materialist view on the nature of musical works—musical perdurantism. According to this view, musical works are a peculiar kind of concreta, namely perduring mereological sums of performances and/or other concrete entities. One problem facing musical perdurantism stems from the thought that if this view is correct, then virtually no musical work can exist in a continuous, non-intermittent fashion. The aim of this paper is to expound this problem and show that it (...) cannot be plausibly solved by a musical perdurantist. (shrink)

In this essay I shall focus on the adoption of the Semantic Approach by structural realists, including myself, who have done so on the grounds that it wears its structuralist sympathies on its sleeve. Despite this, the SA has been identified as standing in tension with the ontological commitments of the so-called ’ontic’ form of this view and so I shall explore that tension before discussing the usefulness of the SA in framing scientific representation and concluding with a discussion of (...) the implications of the ontological status of theories and models themselves. (shrink)

This paper explores how a new theory on the ontology of musical works, Musical Stage Theory, can address the problem of change in musical works. A natural consequence of the ontological framework of this theory is that musical works change intrinsically through a change in the sonic-structural properties of performances. From this a surprising consequence follows: everyone can change a musical work. Still, it seems that some changes matter more than others. The article offers a revisionary reply to this concern (...) by arguing that normative change is not a change in the ontological nature of the work but rather in its authenticity conditions. (shrink)

Nick Zangwill (2004, 2007) appears to be acquiring the status of repudiator-in-chief of emotion in music. He is invoked in this role by such authors as Kraut (2007, p. 67), Bonds (2014, p. 5), Robinson (2014), Young (2014, pp. vii, 1, 3–4, 151), Davies (2017) and Kania (2017). His ‘manifesto’ paper (2004) was recently reprinted in Lamarque and Olsen (2018, pp. 574–582). This development is unfortunate, because Zangwill, for all his radical-sounding theses, actually argues against views that hardly anyone holds. (...) What is more, some of his arguments in favour of the obvious seem confused and defective. But as for his really radical thesis that ‘Music, in itself, has nothing to do with emotion’, he provides hardly any justification. What is more, contrary to what Zangwill believes, such justification is not to be found in Hanslick, who in fact sees emotional content as a relatively important element of music. (shrink)

Repeatable artworks like musical works have presented theorists in the ontology of art with a puzzle. They seem in some respects like eternal, immutable objects and in others like created, historical objects. Creationists have embraced the latter appearances and attempted to compel Platonists to follow them. I examine in detail each argument in a cumulative case for Creationism, showing how the Platonist can respond. The conclusion is that the debate between Platonists and Creationists is a stalemate. In order for progress (...) to be made in the first-order debate, second-order progress on the metaontology of art needs to come first. (shrink)

Repeatable artworks like musical works have presented theorists in the ontology of art with a puzzle. They seem in some respects like eternal, immutable objects and in others like created, historical objects. Creationists have embraced the latter appearances and attempted to compel Platonists to follow them. I examine in detail each argument in a cumulative case for Creationism, showing how the Platonist can respond. The conclusion is that the debate between Platonists and Creationists is a stalemate. In order for progress (...) to be made in the first-order debate, second-order progress on the metaontology of art needs to come first. (shrink)

This essay examines the music of Radiohead as a means of introducing various elementary concepts and theories in the philosophy of music.

This paper explores early Australasian philosophy in some detail. Two approaches have dominated Western philosophy in Australia: idealism and materialism. Idealism was prevalent between the 1880s and the 1930s, but dissipated thereafter. Idealism in Australia often reflected Kantian themes, but it also reflected the revival of interest in Hegel through the work of ‘absolute idealists’ such as T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Henry Jones. A number of the early New Zealand philosophers were also educated in the idealist tradition (...) and were influential in their communities, but produced relatively little. In Australia, materialism gained prominence through the work of John Anderson, who arrived in Australia in 1927, and continues to be influential. John Anderson had been a student of Henry Jones, who might therefore be said to have influenced both main strands of Australian philosophical thought. (shrink)

Can music be considered a language of the emotions? The most common view today is that this is nothing but a Romantic cliché. Mainstream philosophy seems to view the claim that 'Music is the language of the emotions' as a slogan that was once vaguely defended by Rousseau, Goethe, or Kant, but that cannot be understood literally when one takes into consideration last century’s theories of language, such as Chomsky's on syntax or Tarski's on semantics (Scruton 1997: ch. 7, see (...) also Davies 2003: ch. 8, and Kania 2012). In this chapter, I will show why this common view is unwarranted, and thus go against nowadays philosophical mainstream by defending what I call the musicalanguage hypothesis. In Section 1, I will introduce the musicalanguage hypothesis and present, based on empirical evidence, some of the many similarities between language and music and explain why we should take them seriously. I will introduce a framework that aims to explain the communicative power of music using what we already know about linguistic communication (1.1). I will then outline several working hypotheses about musical grammar, musical meaning, and affective meaning (1.2), and thus defend that music is indeed very close to literally be a language of the emotions. In Section 2, I will detail some of the methodology, expectations, and preliminary results of a cross-cultural study on musical grammar that I am presently conducting between South India (Chennai) and Switzerland (Geneva and Lausanne)4. This empirical study focuses on two musical idioms and their grammatical features: Western classical music of the Common Period (ca. 1600-1900) and South Indian classical music (also know as Carnatic music). The main hypothesis of this study is that you need to master the grammar of a musical idiom in order to properly understand its musical meanings. (shrink)

Music is said to consist of melody, rhythm, and harmony. Sound is assumed to be something that automatically follows once musical structure is determined. Sound, which is what actually impinges on our eardrums, has been so long forgotten in the history of musical theory. It is ironic that we do not talk about the music which we hear every day but rather are exclusively concerned about the abstracted structure behind it. This is a legacy of ancient Greek ideas about music, (...) which most contemporary musical discourses are based on. Under this tradition, imperceptible music has priority over perceptible music in reality. On the contrary, music was explained in the framework of sound, tone, and music in ancient China. Although different thinkers tried to define music in a variety of ways, sound was never completely expelled from their musical theorizations. On one hand, music was regarded as a continuum of sound and tone, namely, perceptible music and intelligible music in its structure. On the other hand, music was considered as something that could not be reduced to its structure or notation but could be associated with much broader contexts. This article explores two different traditions in ancient Greece and China in terms of their musical ontology. By answering the question, “What is music as such?” differently, they developed different views on issues such as the relationship of music and emotion, the role of music in society, the symbolization of music, and so on. (shrink)

One of the ways of analysing the relationship between music and emotions in through musical expressiveness. As the theory I discuss in this paper puts it, expressiveness in a particular kind of music's secondary quality or, to use the term which gives the theory its name, a _disposition_ of music to arouse a certain emotional response in listeners. The most accurate version of the dispositional theory is provided by Derek Matravers in his book _Art and Emotion_ and in other papers: (...) what I will try to do, then, is to illustrate Matravers theory and claim that it is a good solution to many problems concerning music and its capacity to affect our inner states. (shrink)

We tackle the philosophical implications of post-2020 music practices. To situate our discussion, we address pending issues in current definitions of music-making. Our analysis indicates that post-2020 definitions of music should feature sonic information and events, framed through social interactions and through the material grounding of the musical activity. Ubiquitous music furnishes a promising playing field for the emerging aspects of creative music-thinking. New frameworks that encompass the dynamic, multimodal and situated characteristics of music while skewing an anthropocentric perspective on (...) creativity may provide meaningful targets for ubimus research toward a new notion of musicality. Three artistic projects serve to exemplify key aspects of this proposal: Atravessamentos, Memory Tree and Lyapunov Time. We address the philosophical implications of these artistic endeavors toward the construction of ubimus philosophical frameworks. (shrink)

What is art? What is beauty? Why are we driven to create? People have been struggling with the answers to these questions for millenia. In this book Jay Friedenberg examines age old and contemporary responses to the perceptual and performative side of aesthetics. The work is wide-ranging in scope, addressing all forms of art including painting, photography, writing, film, music, theater, dance, and more. Issues are examined from multiple perspectives with separate chapters on history, philosophy, mathematics, physics, psychology, and neuroscience. (...) This beautifully illustrated book can be read by a general audience or used as an undergraduate or graduate textbook for courses in art history, aesthetics, or media studies. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate one popular view in current methodological debate about musical ontology, namely, descriptivism. According to descriptivism, the task of musical ontology is to offer a description of the ‘structure of our thought’ about musical works, as it manifests itself in actual musical practices. In this regard, descriptivists often appeal to our pre-theoretical intuitions to ground ontological theories of musical works. This practice, however, is worrisome, as such intuitions are unstable and contradictory. For example, there is a (...) broad variety of intuitions in our musical practice concerning what counts as an authentic performance of a musical work. All such intuitions reflect at least a part of actual practice; however, they are in conflict with each other. This raises a problem, for how can they thus represent a reliable basis for our ontology? A further worry for descriptivism concerns the triviality of the knowledge it gives us access to. If, according to descriptivism, the task of musical ontologists is simply to codify the regularities found in our intuitive thought or discourse about practice, then how can the resulting theories be informative at all with regard to the object of their concern? (shrink)

This essay reviews Iain Morley’s The Prehistory of Music, an up-to-date and authoritative overview of recent research on evolution and cognition of musicality from an interdisciplinary viewpoint. Given the diversity of the project explored, integration of evidence from multiple fields is particularly pressing, required for any novel evolutionary account to be persuasive, and for the project’s continued progress. Moreover, Morley convincingly demonstrates that there is much more to understanding musicality than is supposed by some theorists. I outline Morley’s review of (...) the archaeological and ethnographic literature, and then go on to critique his assessment of philosophical and evolutionary theories, offering some alternative perspectives that might better benefit his project. (shrink)

Despite frequent valorizations of music in the west, the art has also been perceived as a threat to philosophy and theology, ostensibly on the grounds of its potential for danger to the polis (Plato and Aristotle), temptation to impiety (Augustine and Calvin), coercion (Kant), or lack of objective content (Hegel). Accompanying these doubts is a longstanding anxiety concerning music's relation with inarticulation or silence. Debates over the definition and ontology of music persist today in both analytic and continental traditions, with (...) neither approach succeeding in forging consensus. Musical Platonism (Kivy, Norris) is today's uneasy default position in the academy. However, recent reassessments of speech acts (Miller) and of the Derridean world as phantasm (Naas) can return music to its structural constitution in différance – to an alternation between sound and silence. This redefinition of music and its parallel with language can contextualize Derrida's most extended engagement with the topic, his interview with Ornette Coleman. (shrink)