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  1. How Corporate Reputation Disclosures Affect Stakeholders’ Behavioral Intentions: Mediating Mechanisms of Perceived Organizational Performance and Corporate Reputation.Kim T. Baumgartner, Carolin A. Ernst & Thomas M. Fischer - 2020 - Journal of Business Ethics 175 (2):361-389.
    Corporate reputation is decisive for stakeholders’ supporting or repelling behavior and, therefore, one of firms’ most valuable intangible resources. Drawing on signaling theory, this paper focuses on the usefulness of voluntarily provided corporate reputation disclosures (CRDs) and examines their impact on stakeholders’ attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. Our experimental vignette studies reveal that CRDs reduce stakeholders’ information asymmetries, which positively affects perceived organizational performance and corporate reputation as well as stakeholders’ purchase, investment, and employment intentions. The relationships between CRDs and stakeholders’ (...)
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  • Mandating Diversity on the Board of Directors: Do Investors Feel That Gender Quotas Result in Tokenism or Added Value for Firms?Jessica M. Rixom, Mark Jackson & Brett A. Rixom - 2022 - Journal of Business Ethics 182 (3):679-697.
    Under resource dependence theory, firms should benefit from diverse boards of directors. Ethical arguments also highlight that boards should be as diverse as the stakeholders and communities that they serve. In an attempt to increase diversity and women’s presence on boards of directors, legislative efforts have enacted gender quotas. We examine how such efforts are perceived by U.S. market participants. We expect that when a firm operating under a quota law meets only the minimum requirement, investors will view the female (...)
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  • Do Compensation Committee Members Perceive Changing CEO Incentive Performance Targets Mid-Cycle to be Fair?Anne M. Wilkins, Dana R. Hermanson & Jeffrey R. Cohen - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 137 (3):623-638.
    We examine the influences of social capital, source credibility, and fairness perceptions on the judgments of experienced compensation committee members who are considering a proposal to reduce management’s performance targets in the middle of a compensation cycle due to difficult circumstances. Eighty-nine U.S. public company CC members participated in a 2 × 2 experiment with social capital and source credibility each manipulated as low or high, and outcome fairness to management, process fairness to shareholders, and outcome fairness to shareholders included (...)
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  • Contextual and Individual Dimensions of Taxpayer Decision Making.Valentina L. Zamora, Gil B. Manzon & Jeffrey Cohen - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 126 (4):631-647.
    We examine whether a taxpayer’s decision to choose a taxpayer-favorable characterization of income is associated with contextual and individual dimensions of that decision. Using a 2 × 2 factorial experimental design, we manipulate the prevailing social norm on whether there is a general belief that a specific form of income should be characterized as a capital gain or as ordinary income, and the group affiliation on whether the individual is making a tax characterization decision as a sole proprietor or as (...)
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  • Discussant Comment on An Examination of the Effect of CEO Social Ties and CEO Reputation on Nonprofessional Investors’ Say-on-Pay Judgments, by Steve Kaplan, Janet Samuels, Jeffrey Cohen.Regan N. Schmidt - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 126 (1):119-123.
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  • The Effects of Current Income Attributes on Nonprofessional Investors’ Say-on-Pay Judgments: Does Fairness Still Matter?Steven E. Kaplan & Valentina L. Zamora - 2018 - Journal of Business Ethics 153 (2):407-425.
    The say-on-pay regulation in the Dodd-Frank Act requires publicly-traded U.S. firms to hold a nonbinding, advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation. Advocates claim that SOP voting gives shareholders a mechanism to hold managers and boards more accountable. Critics contend that SOP votes may simplistically reflect shareholders’ reactions to the overall value of CEO compensation or the firm’s net income. However, based on prior research, we contend that market participants’ SOP votes are likely to consider current income attributes. For example, the (...)
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