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Deciding what you know

In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 225--240 (2006)

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  1. Evidence that stakes don’t matter for evidence.Mark Phelan - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):488-512.
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  • Some worries for would-be WAMmers.Adam Leite - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):101-126.
    DeRose appeals to ordinary English usage to support his contextualist semantics for "know"-attributions. A common objection holds that though the relevant assertions are both appropriate and seemingly true, their seeming truth arises merely from their appropriateness. This Warranted Assertability Maneuver (WAM) aims to provide a stand-alone objection by providing a reason not to take the ordinary language data at face-value. However, there is no plausible model or mechanism for the pragmatic phenomena WAMmers must postulate. Given what the WAM requires, it (...)
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  • Coming to Terms with our Human Fallibility: Christensen on the Preface.Mark Kaplan - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):1-35.
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