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  1. The Role of Moral Experts in Secret Policy.Lars Christie - 2023 - Res Publica 30 (1):107-123.
    Is it morally permissible to spy on allied countries? What type of otherwise criminal acts may covert intelligence agents commit in order to keep their cover? Is it permissible to subject children of high-value targets to covert surveillance? In this article, I ask whether democratically elected politicians ought to rely on advice from ethics committees in answering moral choices in secret policy. I argue that ethics committees should not advise politicians on how they ought to conclude secret moral choices. Instead, (...)
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  • Modeling Deep Disagreement in Default Logic.Frederik J. Andersen - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Logic.
    Default logic has been a very active research topic in artificial intelligence since the early 1980s, but has not received as much attention in the philosophical literature thus far. This paper shows one way in which the technical tools of artificial intelligence can be applied in contemporary epistemology by modeling a paradigmatic case of deep disagreement using default logic. In §1 model-building viewed as a kind of philosophical progress is briefly motivated, while §2 introduces the case of deep disagreement we (...)
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  • Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews
    While the epistemic significance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and (...)
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  • The Argument From Moral Disagreement.Rachel Rupprecht - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    The argument from moral disagreement contends that if moral realism is true, there would not be the kind of moral disagreement that there is and hence, that moral realism is false. Convergentist moral realists grant that a particular kind of moral disagreement would pose a problem for moral realism but argue that the moral disagreements of which we have empirical evidence are not that kind. To do so they offer alternative, defusing explanations of them. I critique two such defusing explanations. (...)
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