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  1. Varieties of Bias.Gabbrielle M. Johnson - 2024 - Philosophy Compass (7):e13011.
    The concept of bias is pervasive in both popular discourse and empirical theorizing within philosophy, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence. This widespread application threatens to render the concept too heterogeneous and unwieldy for systematic investigation. This article explores recent philosophical literature attempting to identify a single theoretical category—termed ‘bias’—that could be unified across different contexts. To achieve this aim, the article provides a comprehensive review of theories of bias that are significant in the fields of philosophy of mind, cognitive science, (...)
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  • Unconscious Perception and Unconscious Bias: Parallel Debates about Unconscious Content.Gabbrielle Johnson - 2023 - In Uriah Kriegel, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 87-130.
    The possibilities of unconscious perception and unconscious bias prompt parallel debates about unconscious mental content. This chapter argues that claims within these debates alleging the existence of unconscious content are made fraught by ambiguity and confusion with respect to the two central concepts they involve: consciousness and content. Borrowing conceptual resources from the debate about unconscious perception, the chapter distills the two conceptual puzzles concerning each of these notions and establishes philosophical strategies for their resolution. It then argues that empirical (...)
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  • On non-ideal individual epistemology.Brett Karlan - 2024 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-7.
    Robin McKenna’s excellent Non-Ideal Epistemology is, among other things, a testament to restraint. McKenna does not want to unnecessarily inflame tensions between ideal and non-ideal theorists in epistemology. Often ideal and non-ideal projects are aimed at different target domains and not in tension with one another (though not always; e.g. McKenna 2023, ch. 6, especially pp. 112-21). In this commentary, I will have much less tact. I sketch a route by which the non-ideal epistemologist might become more belligerent towards their (...)
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  • Beliefs Without Judgments: A Plea for the Belief View of Implicit Attitudes.Ilia Patronnikov - 2025 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 32 (1):160-185.
    Implicit attitudes (IAs) are mental states that are responsible for discriminatory behaviour called 'implicit bias'. There is no agreement about the nature of IAs. Some argue that they don't differ from beliefs. This paper defends this view from the following objection: one is in a good epistemic position with respect to one's beliefs; if one believes that P, one tends to know that one believes that P. However, studies show that often people are not aware of having IAs. How can (...)
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