The Indakasutta, its commentary, and sub-commentary describe and discuss the phases of intrauterine development. By adopting a terminology remarkably comparable to that of other Buddhist and non-Buddhist texts, they illustrate fundamental Buddhist teachings like the non-self view and the dependent arising. I here offer a translation of these three texts, preceded by an introductory outline of their contents.

The text Jié tuō dào lùn, or Chinese translation of *Vimuttimagga mentions the Avīci Hell all of a sudden in the section on the cognitive process. The problematic phrase wújiān shēng Āpídìyù has been interpreted in different ways by several scholars. Japanese scholars tend to skip the phrase, or regard the term Āpídìyù as a typographic error. Given that we do not have an original text, however, the phrase needs to be understood as it is. In contrast, the English translation (...) interprets the term wújiān as a name of hell, and considers it as a synonym of Āpídìyù, namely the Avīci Hell. Even though the Chinese term wújiān itself is usually understood as the Avīci Hell, namely, Wújiāndìyù or Āpídìyù, of which the corresponding Pāli is Avīci-niraya, it is not the case here since a hell as such has nothing to do with the cognitive process. Assuming that the term Āpídìyù is not a typographic error, I propose to understand this problematic phrase as the simile in the sentence ‘seven mind-moments [immediately proceed just as one who has performed] the Five Sins is reborn into the Avīci Hell [as soon as he dies]’. The term wújiān meaning ‘no-gap’ in the cognitive process section conveys that there is not any intermission between the successive mind-moments. In Pāli perspectives, it implies that the successive mind-moments are in the proximity condition. The Jié tuō dào lùn was likely to use a metaphor in order to set a rule for governing the cognitive process rather than making a specific technical term. (shrink)

The term bhavaṅga is regarded as a unique technical term of Theravāda abhidhamma tradition, and the text Jié tuō dào lùn, i.e. the Chinese translation of *Vimuttimagga, mentions yŏufēnxīn the Chinese counterpart of bhavaṅga eleven times. These occurrences are found in the section of the text on the cognitive process. The text is, however, too abstruse to understand the term easily, and the existing translations of it are imperfect. Subsequently, the term in the Jié tuō dào lùn has been considered (...) and interpreted by former translations in the same way as it is in other Pāli abhidhamma texts. Indeed, the Jié tuō dào lùn has more than similar definitions for bhavaṅga. It is described as the inactive state of mind from which the active states of mind arise. On the other hand, there are also a number of small but significant differences in its description of bhavaṅga. It has no sub-states, and there are no technical terms for conditional relations with other states of mind. The similarities and differences found in the discussion of bhavaṅga shed light on some salient features of the Jié tuō dào lùn. (shrink)

I’ll organize my replies around four topics: mind wandering and phenomenal selfhood, transformation versus enactive emergence, agency versus ownership, and finally the importance of doing philosophy of mind from a cross-cultural perspective.