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Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency

Paul Katsafanas

In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 219 (2006)

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Autonomy, Character, and Self-Understanding.Paul Katsafanas - 2016 - In Iskra Fileva (ed.), Questions of Character. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details Autonomy, traditionally conceived, is the capacity to direct one’s actions in light of self-given principles or values. Character, traditionally conceived, is the set of unchosen, relatively rigid traits and proclivities that influence, constrain, or determine one’s actions. It’s natural to think that autonomy and character will be in tension with one another. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: while character influences and constrains choice, this poses no problem for autonomy. However, in particular cases character can affect (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The Phenomenology of Moral Agency in the Ethics of K. E. Logstrup.Simon Thornton - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Essexdetails Many philosophers hold that moral agency is defined by an agent’s capacity for rational reflection and self-governance. It is only through the exercise of such capacities, these philosophers contend, that one’s actions can be judged to be of distinctively moral value. The moral phenomenology of the Danish philosopher and theologian K. E. Løgstrup, currently enjoying a revival of interest amongst Anglo-American moral philosophers, is an exception to this view. Under the auspices of his signature theory of the ‘sovereign expressions of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Nietzsche and Kant on the Will: Two Models of Reflective Agency.Paul Katsafanas - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):185-216.details Kant and Nietzsche are typically thought to have diametrically opposed accounts of willing: put simply, whereas Kant gives signal importance to reflective episodes of choice, Nietzsche seems to deny that reflective choices have any significant role in the etiology of human action. In this essay, I argue that the dispute between Kant and Nietzsche actually takes a far more interesting form. Nietzsche is not merely rejecting the Kantian picture of agency. Rather, Nietzsche is offering a subtle critique of the Kantian (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
Why Care about Being an Agent.Caroline T. Arruda - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):488-504.details The question ‘Why care about being an agent?’ asks for reasons to be something that appears to be non-optional. But perhaps it is closer to the question ‘Why be moral?’; or so I shall argue. Here the constitutivist answer—that we cannot help but have this aim—seems to be the best answer available. I suggest that, regardless of whether constitutivism is true, it is an incomplete answer. I argue that we should instead answer the question by looking at our evaluative commitments (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations

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