This paper argues that a strong-sense Buddhist nominalism, which denies any resemblance between two things, even among natural kinds, fails to explain why names and concepts can successfully identify a group among other things. Drawing evidence from the theory of the three natures in two major Yogācāra texts—the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha—I propose that these two texts affirm the affinity between concepts and things because they hold that it is the utilization of concepts in previous lives that gives rise to (...) our shared world. While rejecting the idea that there is an inherent property or universal shared by natural kinds, these two texts agree that natural kinds are regulated by concepts and therefore share some features from among the set of characteristics defined by those concepts. I therefore propose a weak-sense Buddhist nominalism that endorses the idea that natural kinds share resemblances. (shrink)