This article argues that the testimony of mystics provides an interesting potential source of evidence for theism. The model of inference to the best explanation is utilized to analyze and assess mystics' testimony. It is argued that the evidential value of the reports from mystics, both within the theistic tradition and from without, ultimately proves weak.

This article revisits Oman's idea that an intuitive felt knowledge of the divine underlies the articulate knowledge found in faith and theology. Such feeling, Oman claims, is analogous to ordinary perception and gives rise to the attempt to evaluate, understand, and respond to the divine. Theology is the formalized attempt to respond to the intuition of the divine. The article argues that Oman's emphasis on the experiential and experimental character of theology is helpful, but that his analysis of the logic (...) of faith requires reformulation.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.John Oman on feeling and theologyVolume 49, Issue 1ADAM HOOD DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000108Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. John Oman on feeling and theologyVolume 49, Issue 1ADAM HOOD DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000108Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. John Oman on feeling and theologyVolume 49, Issue 1ADAM HOOD DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000108Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

Mysticism is condemned as often as it is praised. Much of the condemnation comes from mysticism’s apparent disregard of morality and ethics. For mystics, the experience of “union” transcends all moral concern. In this careful examination of the works of such practitioners or examiners of mysticism as Paul Tillich, Thomas Merton, Evelyn Underhill, and Martin Buber, the author posits a spectrum of uneasy relationships between mysticism and morality. Horne explores the polarities of apophatic (imageless) and imaginative mysticism, the contemplative and (...) the active life, and morality and amorality. He stresses the importance of the distinction between “proper-name” (entirely personal) morality and “social” morality, for the history of Christian mysticism is a mix of minimal moral concern, proper-name morality, and social morality. The volume will be of interest to students of religious experience, ethics, and the recent history of mysticism. Carefully reasoned and documented, the argument is couched in clear prose, easily accessible to lay readers as well as to scholars. (shrink)

Se explora la relación entre las dimensiones proposicional y no proposicional de la creencia religiosa para mostrar que la última dirige el proceso de justificación y representa su límite. Se defiende que la no proposicional también tiene valor cognitivo, porque constituye una suerte de elección epistémica preteórica que no es exclusiva de la fe religiosa. Se explora la noción de ambigüedad religiosa, tanto a nivel intelectual como experiencial, y se sostiene que la relación entre la dimensión proposicional y la no-proposicional (...) de la fe está mediada por la función directiva de las presuposiciones metafísicas instauradas por la experiencia religiosa. (shrink)

This article explores body constructs along the descending, ascending, and extending body-soteriological pathways, as well as it lays the foundation to identify their potential for transbody and transpersonal transformation. Insights are provided on the nexus of pluralistic body constructs using Jorge Ferrer’s participatory theory juxtaposed with Buddhist Modernism focused on Vajrayāna Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. An exuberant richness of physical and metaphysical bodies has been recognized in both Vajrayāna Buddhism and participatory theory. In Vajrayāna, the body is central to liberation and viewed (...) as the culmination of immanence, transcendence, and expansion. In participatory theory, the body is viewed as equal to vital, heart, mind, and consciousness as part of an integrated larger whole. Embodiment, disembodiment, and body awareness are critically discussed, and special attention is given to the implications of these two contrasting views and the potential of practices from both approaches to ameliorate disembodiment and foster transbody and transpersonal transformation. (shrink)

Capitalizing on the constructivist approach developed by philosophers and psychologists, Steven Katz argues that mystical experience is in part constructed, shaped and colored by the concepts and beliefs which the mystic brings to it. Merits and problems of this constructivist account of mysticism are discussed. The approach is seen to be ill-suited to explain the novelties and surprises for which mysticism is renowned. A new model is suggested: that mysticism is produced by a process similar to forgetting. Two forms of (...) forgetting are described: a massive and complete forgetting of concepts in the “pure consciousness event” and de automatization in the more permanent unitive experiences. (shrink)

This paper is a revised version of a talk I delivered to the American Academy of Religion Mysticism Group's Panel on Attachments and Letting Go, San Francisco, November, 1992.

This paper addresses the importance of words and of surrendering words, and so will consider both the philosophical and axiological potential of ineffability, both of which imply epistemic humility. On the one hand, epistemic humility implicates surrendering ill-fitting and limited constructs; this reflects a project of unknowing, a condition for a more authentic knowing, driven less by rigid categories and argument and more by humility and love. On the other hand, epistemic humility—as an observable phenomenon in the world’s religious traditions—has (...) axiological value and thus should be cultivated: it subverts an arrogant knowing which too often is the seed of destructive conflict. (shrink)

Some philosophers such as Ninian Smart have claimed that mystics from different religious traditions may sometimes have the same experience , while nevertheless giving different and tradition-bound descriptive reports of that experience. In two important essays, Steven Katz has challenged such a claim. Mystics from different religious traditions do not have the same experience.

Wright maintains that tradition (including language) plays a fundamental role in the origins and shaping of the monastic world that made a unique Chan mind possible. Through a creative application of the Buddhist idea of dependent origination, Wright has broadened the hermeneutic concept of historicity in that it is more than a linear and causal relationship of contextuality (that is, the person is always a person-in-community, and the text is always a text-in-context). Instead, contextuality refers to a (w)holistic network of (...) associations and re-associations. The word tradition thus becomes an open tradition that is constantly shaped and reshaped, formed and transformed. The meaning of tradition as such is always a trace of that other which is forever absent. In this sense, Wright is quite Derridean. Like Derrida’s deconstruction, Wright’s interpretative endeavor, as part of the tradition of linguistic turn, seems to become separated from the real world of flux and takes on an independent status, that is, the realm of reading, explaining, and understanding (perhaps mis-understanding, sometimes). Wright’s project fits the need of those who have a passion for doing things with words, and those who prefer meditative reading to meditative practice (in a Buddhist sense). Though Wright keeps reminding us that the effort to play language in relation to Chan experience does not imply that Chan enlightenment/mind is in any sense reducible to language; it still remains a question whether his critical philosophical meditations are fully out of the spell of conceptuality of the hermeneutical circle. Wright might say that there is no need to be out of the circle, or there is no such circle in the first place. (shrink)

Albert Einstein deliberately and repeatedly expressed his general religious views. But what were his views of mysticism? His statements on the subject were few, relatively obscure, and often misunderstood. A coherent answer requires setting those statements in historical, cultural, and theological context, as well as examining Einstein's philosophical and religious views. Though the Einstein that emerges clearly rejected supernatural mysticism, his views of “essential” mysticism were—though largely implicit—more nuanced, more subtle, and ultimately more sympathetic than “mere appearance” suggests.

It is shown in this article that many positions that are usually considered incompatible or antagonistic can be synthesized into a unified framework, creating a model of transpersonal development based around plurality and complexity. The model focuses on evolutionary developmental biology as well as around psychological theories. A large degree of variability in the nature of transpersonal experience in the life cycle is to be expected, due to differences in both the “timing of onset” of transpersonal characteristics and the “length (...) of developmental period.” Numerous developmental patterns are identified, using the work of some prominent transpersonal theorists. (shrink)

This article considers the psychology of meditation and other introverted forms of mystical development from a neo-Piagetian perspective, which has commonalities with biogenetic structuralist and neurotheological approaches. Evidence is found that lines of meditative development unfold through Patañjali’s stages at different rates in an echo of the unfolding of lines of cognitive development through Piaget’s stages at different rates. Similar factors predicting the degree of independence of development apply to both conventional cognitive and meditative contents. As the same brain and (...) the same nervous system are involved in both cognitive developmental psychology and meditation there are likely to be commonalities between conventional psychological and transpersonal development. Neo-Piagetian transpersonal psychology predicts a variable landscape of spiritual development across traditions and individuals, in line with variability in the cultural learning environment. (shrink)

Owen Flanagan's The Bodhisattva's Brain represents an ambitious foray into cross-cultural neurophilosophy, making a compelling, though not entirely unproblematic, case for naturalizing Buddhist philosophy. While the naturalist account of mental causation challenges certain Buddhist views about the mind, the Buddhist analysis of mind and mental phenomena is far more complex than the book suggests. Flanagan is right to criticize the Buddhist claim that there could be mental states that are not reducible to their neural correlates; however, when the mental states (...) in question reflect the embodied patterns of moral conduct that characterize the Buddhist way of being-in-the-world, an account of their intentional and normative status becomes indispensable. It is precisely this synthesis of normativity and causal explanation that makes Buddhism special, and opens new avenues for enhancing, refining, and expanding the range of arguments and possibilities that comparative neurophilosophy can entertain. (shrink)

Criticizing some psychological approaches that speak in too general terms about both music and religion, this article turns to a precise empirical observation and asks what psychology might possibly contribute to its understanding, after first necessarily questioning what terms such as ‘religion’, ‘religious music’, ‘religious experience’ encompass. Given the nature of the leading question, a cultural–psychological approach is chosen. After refuting a number of commonly heard assertions, and drawing on a number of psychological theories, the article then discusses several empirical (...) observations and argues that contemporary psychology has indeed achieved some progress in dealing with classical questions. (shrink)

Intellectuals such as William James and Aldous Huxley have thought it possible to develop a technique to apply to this world the mystical-type insights gained during drug-enabled experiences. Particularly, Huxley claimed that the visionary experience triggered by psychedelics could help us rethink our relationship with technology and promote a much-needed cultural change. In this article, we explore this hypothesis. To do so, we build a philosophical framework based on Günther Anders's philosophy of technique, presenting human beings as morally blind when (...) facing technological development. Mystical experiences are then proposed as a means to improve our moral faculties—and psychedelic drugs as tools to enable them. We finally explore the empirical feasibility of such a hypothesis by thoroughly reviewing the recent scientific literature on the nature of the psychedelic experience, concluding that the long-term effects in the personality domain openness and in nature relatedness point to the emergence of a morally improved agent, thus providing substance to an application of mysticism. (shrink)

Mysticism today is not only a popular term often referred to the strange and incomprehensible phenomena, oscillating between psychology and spirituality. Mysticism is also a research problem, which has long been analyzing by the specialists from various scientific disciplines. Philosophy also has its own contribution to the study of mysticism. Moreover, one can also put forward the thesis about its special competencies for this. There is no doubt that a mystical intuition accompanies the philosophers from the very beginning, and for (...) a long time the philosophy itself has been also developing, here and there, as a mystical philosophy. Currently, the attention of philosophers dealing with mysticism is mainly focused on problems determined by the philosophy of mysticism. Here the most important discussions and disputes are taking place—especially the so-called dispute between essentialism and contextualism. The author of the article formules the thesis that moderate contextualism, as the position that opts for the existence of several irreversible types of experiences defined today as mystical, better explains the complex phenomenon of mysticism than the reductionist essentialist attitude. This does not mean, however, that it gives an exhaustive explanation. Although the dispute examined in the article does not seem to be possible to unambiguously settle, the philosophical analysis of the most important, constitutive themes allows us to better understand the nature of the main processes that shape the broadly understood mysticism. The purpose of this article is therefore to identify the way in which philosophy enters the area of mysticism, the contribution it makes to the analysis of the mystical experience, as well as several major methodological problems that it encounters. (shrink)