Two eight-century Jaina contemporaries, a Śvetāmbara philosopher Siddhasena Mahāmati and a Digambara Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa revolutionised Jaina epistemology, by radically transforming basic epistemological concepts, which had been based on canonical tradition. The paper presents a brief historical outline of the developments of basic epistemological concepts in Jaina philolosophy such as the cognitive criterion and logical faculties as well as their fourteen typological models which serve as the backdrop of important innovations in epistemology introduced by Siddhasena, Pātrasvāmin and Akalaṅka. An important contribution (...) of these Jaina thinkers was to economize Indian logic and the rules of inference, first, by devising only one kind of logical reason called ‘inexplicability otherwise’, based on the single inseparable connection of the proving property with the inferable property, and, second, by limiting the necessary number of the members of the proof formula merely to two. These two innovations were related to the thinkers’ intention to devise a logic which would not primarily be based on empirical verification but its structural patterns would be valid irrespective of external observation. Further, the paper focuses on the nature of the epistemological shifts which Siddhasena and Akalaṅka introduced independently of each other and on the question how Siddhasena’s and Akalaṅka’s ideas were partly anchored in Buddhist concepts of the pramāṇa school of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. With the Buddhist background, Siddhasena sought to define the criteria essential to distinguish true from false cognitions and to provide a novel classification of the pramāṇas. He can further be accredited with formulating the first Jaina descriptive definition of the cognitive criterion. The final section of the paper explains how Akalaṅka applies novel epistemological ideas, first, to construct realistic ontology and objectivity of both the external world and the cognising subject, and, secondly, to combat fundamental Buddhist concepts such as idealism and momentariness. (shrink)

This paper attempts to make sense of Dharmakīrti’s conflicting statements regarding the object of valid cognition ( prameya ) in various parts of his works, considering in particular the claims that (i) there are two kinds of prameyas (particulars and universals), (ii) the particular alone is prameya , and (iii) what is non-existent also qualifies as prameya . It inquires into the relationship between validity ( prāmāṇya ), reliability ( avisaṃvāda ) and causal efficacy ( arthakriyā ) and suggests that (...) the discussion on non-existent prameyas in Pramāṇaviniścaya 3 provides an alternative to an overall “practicalist” reading of Dharmakīrti, practicalist in the sense that pramāṇas are primarily oriented toward human aims and hence bear on objects capable of fulfilling them through their causal capacities. Considering the views of Dharmakīrti’s interpreters, it shows how Dharmottara (8th c.), rejecting such an alternative, strives to reconcile claim (iii) with a practicalist interpretation, while Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (12th c.) generalizes the application of a criterion of validity superseding an arthakriyā -oriented framework by bringing to the fore the notion of “non-opposition” ( abādhana ) introduced by Dharmakīrti with regard to non-existent prameyas and suprasensorial objects. (shrink)

The two theories of verbal cognition, namely abhihitānvaya and anvitābhidhāna, first put forth by the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas respectively in the second half of the first millennium C.E., can be considered as being foundational as all subsequent thinkers of the Sanskritic intellectual tradition engaged with and elaborated upon these while debating the nature of language and meaning. In this paper, I focus on the first chapter of Śālikanātha’s Vākyārthamātṛkā and outline the process of anvitābhidhāna described therein. Śālikanātha explains this (...) as comprising three steps, and thereafter discusses each of these three to elaborate upon and philosophically defend this conception of how one cognizes sentential meaning. The aim of this paper is to present Śālikanātha’s three-step model, and thus demonstrate especially the distinct conception of abhidhāna for the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas as complex and chronologically extended as contrasted with the Bhāṭṭa conception of abhidhāna as non-complex and instantaneous. Such an understanding of the disparate semantic contents with which the Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras use the identical term abhidhāna is crucial for any correct study of their respective doctrines. (shrink)

본 논문은 인도불교의 인식•논리학에서 근본 논서로 일컬어지고 있는 디그나가의 『집량론(集量論)』의 귀경게(maṅgalaśloka)와 동아시아 불교에 가장 큰 영향을 끼친 『기신론』의 귀경게를 비교분석한다. 두 논서에서 예경의 대상으로 성스럽게 지칭되는 붓다의 공통점은 대승불교의 근간이라고 할 수 있는 대비(大悲)이다. 각각의 논서에서 다양한 논리로 지칭되고 있고 특징 지워지고 있는 붓다의 명호는 결국 중생 구제라는 최종의 목적을 향하고 있으며, 이를 가능하게 하는 바탕은 붓다의 자비로움이다. 디그나가는 귀경게에서 예경의 대상을 붓다에 한정하며, 이는 PS를 주석한 다르마키르티의 기본 입장도 다르지 않다. 반면 『기신론』의 귀경의 대상은 불법승 삼보로 그 의미가 확대된다. (...) 디그나가나 원효 모두 논서를 저술함에 있어서 두 가지 목표를 지향한다고 할 수 있다. 하나는 그들의 주장이 철학적으로 논리적임을 증명하는 것이고, 또 하나는 최종적으로 자신의 주장이 주석하고자 하는 근본 논서들의 결론과 결코 충돌하지 않음을 논증하고자 한다. 이는 결국 종교적 믿음과 철학적 사유의 구조가 전통의 계승이라는 연속적인 측면과 혁신이라는 새로운 요소를 동시에 내포하고 있다. 디그나가와 원효는 시•공간적인 차이에도 불구하고, 개별적 사상의 계승이라는 측면을 배제하더라도, 종교적 근본 믿음을 위한 토대 구축과 그에 근간한 철학적 논리의 사유 구조를 전개함에서 공통적인 연속성을 엿볼 수 있다. (shrink)

미망사학파에서 ‘자아’는 지성의 본성이며 불변의 실체이며, 앎의 능력인 인식능력을 소유한 ‘아는자’이다. 인식 능력을 소유한 자아의 실체성과 편재성은 해탈의 경지에서도 결코 소멸되지 않고 영원하다. 미망사학파는 ‘나라는 개념’의 재인식에 주목함으로써 자아의 존재를 증명한다. 마치 과거에 존재 했었고 현재에 존재하고 있는 어떤 대상이 성립하기 위해서는 과거에서 현재까지 지속적으로 존재한다는 믿음으로 정당화되는 것처럼, 기억 속의 경험의 주체로서 나 스스로에 대한 재인식이다. 쿠마릴라와 샤바라는 경험적 현상 세계에 실존하는 존재를 근거로 초월적 자아의 존재성을 증명하며, 자아의 영원성과 불변성을 지지하면서도 양태 변화의 정당성을 옹호한다. ‘나는 안다’는 것은 일차적으로는 (...) 앎을 의미하지만 동시에 직접 경험에 의해 증명되는 행위를 의미한다. 쿠마릴라는 언어로 표현되는 모든 것들은 행위이며, 자아는 결지와 존재성을 보유한 행위의 행위자이다. 따라서 앎도 행위의 범주에 포함되게 된다. 미망사학파는 지혜에 의한 해탈의 가능성을 부정하고, 앎을 행위로 분류함으로써 자아는 앎의 주체인 동시에 행위의 주체이기도 하다. 따라서 존재론적 근거로 형이상학의 범주에서 논의된 자아는 인식론과 윤리학 논의의 근거이기도 하다. (shrink)

Dharmarāja Adhvarin’s Vedānta Paribhāṣā is a well-known introduction to Advaita Vedānta, targeted to beginners who are already trained in Navya Nyāya. According to Dasgupta, the VP is so heavily indebted to Rāmādvaya’s Vedānta Kaumudī, which was composed in the middle of the 14th century and is today almost forgotten, that the VP’s “claim to originality vanishes”. The VK was, however, only edited in 1955 and then again in 1973. In the light of this improved textual basis, what is our judgement (...) about Dasgupta’s hypercritical statement? Did actually the VP ever claim to be original? Was this originality somehow superimposed on the VP later? Is the VP really so much indebted to the VK? This paper aims at comparatively analysing the textual background of these questions. I will start from the analysis of one Advaita’s epistemological tenet, namely the valid knowledge, in the VK and then compare it to the corresponding parts in the VP. (shrink)