This study is the first part of an attempt to settle a vigorous debate among historians of medieval philosophy by harnessing the resources of analytic philosophy. The debate is about whether Avicenna's epistemology is rationalist or empirical. To settle the debate, I first articulate in this article the three core theses of rationalism and one core thesis of empiricism. Then, I probe Avicenna's epistemology in his major works according to the first core thesis of rationalism (the intuition thesis). In the (...) end, I find Avicenna committed to this thesis in at least one substantive way, namely, in his claim to intuit the intelligible forms or essences. This suffices to count Avicenna as rationalist. In a subsequent article, I shall probe Avicenna's epistemology according to the other two core theses of rationalism, presenting further evidence that he was a rationalist, not an empiricist. (shrink)

Appealing to some analytic tools developed by contemporary analytic philosophers, I discuss Avicenna’s views regarding the problem(s) of linguistic and mental reference to non-existents, also known as the problem(s) of ‘empty intentionality’. I argue that, according to Avicenna, being in an intentional state directed towards an existing thing involves three elements: (1) an indirect relation to that thing, (2) a direct relation to a mental representation of that thing, and (3) a direct relation to the essence of that thing. Empty (...) intentionality does not involve the first element. Moreover, depending on the nature of the non-existent we are thinking about, the third element may not be involved either. Thus, the necessary element of being in an intentional state towards something is to be related to a mental representation of that thing. The nature of this representation may vary depending on the nature of the non-existent towards which our thought is directed. (shrink)

Many scholars consider Avicenna’s theory of cognitive forms a theory of representation, which raises two questions. First, why does a cognitive form represent a particular object instead of another? This issue is known as the determination problem. Second, what is the nature of intentionality of the cognitive form? This is known as the nature problem. This paper examines Avicenna’s theory of cognitive forms and focuses on how he would address the two problems. I argue that Avicenna offers a pluralistic approach (...) to the determination problem: depending on the type of representation, the object of representation is determined differently. Additionally, Avicenna views the nature of intentionality as a referential relation towards the object that can be attributed to the representation in virtue of the object somehow existing in the subject immaterially. (shrink)