We deal with models of Peano arithmetic. The methods are from creature forcing. We find an expansion of equation image such that its theory has models with no end extensions. In fact there is a Borel uncountable set of subsets of equation image such that expanding equation image by any uncountably many of them suffice. Also we find arithmetically closed equation image with no ultrafilter on it with suitable definability demand. © 2011 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim.

In this paper we study the automorphism groups of models of Peano Arithmetic. Kossak, Kotlarski, and Schmerl [9] shows that the stabilizer of an unbounded element a of a countable recursively saturated model of Peano Arithmetic M is a maximal subgroup of Aut if and only if the type of a is selective. We extend this result by showing that if M is a countable arithmetically saturated model of Peano Arithmetic, Ω ⊂ M is a very good interstice, and a (...) ∈ Ω, then the stabilizer of a is a maximal subgroup of Aut if and only if the type of a is selective and rational. (shrink)

The main result of this paper partially answers a question raised in about the existence of countable just recursively saturated models of Peano Arithmetic with non‐isomorphic automorphism groups. We show the existence of infinitely many countable just recursively saturated models of Peano Arithmetic such that their automorphism groups are not topologically isomorphic. We also discuss maximal open subgroups of the automorphism group of a countable arithmetically saturated model of in a very good interstice.

This paper is an exposition of some recent results concerning various notions of strength and weakness of the concept of truth, both published or not. We try to systematically present these notions and their relationship to the current research on truth. We discuss the concept of the Tarski boundary between weak and strong theories of truth and we give an overview of non-conservativity results for the extensions of the basic compositional truth theory. Additionally, we present a natural strong theory of (...) truth which admits a number of apparently unrelated axiomatisations. Finally, we discuss other possible explications of the notion of ‘strength’ of axiomatic theories of truth. (shrink)