Is attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness? Call this central question of this treatise, “Q.” We commonly have the experience of consciously paying attention to something, but is it possible to be conscious of something you are not attending to, or to attend to something of which you are not conscious? Where might we find examples of these? This treatise is a quest to find an answer to Q in two parts. Part I reviews the foundations upon which the (...) discourse on Q is built. Different inputs to Q produce different answers. After consideration of the many ways “attention” and “consciousness” have been defined, I settle upon phenomenal consciousness and Executive Attention (defined as a suite of strategies for structuring cognition for further processing implemented by the executive of working memory) as the most interesting inputs to Q, and the ones on which Part II focuses. Attention without consciousness seems relatively easy to establish empirically, but consciousness without attention is much harder. The putative candidates all seem to have major problems, but I build a strong abductive case for the hitherto ignored case of foveal phenomenal overflow. We consciously see far more detail in our foveal fields than we can Executively Attend, although there is a serious obstacle to our ever confirming that empirically—identifying conscious content relies on Executive Attentional report. Triangulating the capacity limitations of attention, consciousness, and working memory strengthens this case for consciousness without attention, and suggests that cognition must work something like my “Witches’ Hat Model,” on which content can become conscious outside of Executive Attention or working memory. I conclude with some reflections on the implications of my arguments for the discourse on Q, and for other discourses such as the ontologies of attention and consciousness, theories of consciousness, some other cognitive concepts, and ethical considerations in humans, animals, and machines. A conclusive answer to Q continues to elude us. It may perhaps be an ultimately insoluble conundrum. But it is the very essence of humanity to seek an answer, and in so doing, to improve our understanding of our own nature: “The proper study of mankind is man.”1. (shrink)

Avicenna introduces the primary propositions as the most fundamental principles of knowledge. However, as far as we are aware, Avicenna’s primaries have not yet been independently studied. Nor do Avicenna scholars agree on how to characterize them in the language of contemporary philosophy. It is well-known that the primaries are indemonstrable; nonetheless, it is not clear what the genealogy of the primaries is, how, epistemologically speaking, they can be distinguished from other principles, what their phenomenology is, what the cause of (...) the assent to them is, how to explain the relationship between the ‘innate [nature] of the intellect’ and the primaries and, finally, back to their indemonstrability, in what sense they are ‘indemonstrable’. We will try to fill this gap. As a corollary, we will explain why Gutas’s view [Gutas, Dimitri.... (shrink)

-/- Human beings are conscious not only of the world around them but also of themselves: their activities, their bodies, and their mental lives. They are, that is, self-conscious (or, equivalently, self-aware). Self-consciousness can be understood as an awareness of oneself. But a self-conscious subject is not just aware of something that merely happens to be themselves, as one is if one sees an old photograph without realising that it is of oneself. Rather a self-conscious subject is aware of themselves (...) as themselves; it is manifest to them that they themselves are the object of awareness. Self-consciousness is a form of consciousness that is paradigmatically expressed in English by the words “I”, “me”, and “my”, terms that each of us uses to refer to ourselves as such. -/- A central topic throughout the history of philosophy—and increasingly so since the seventeenth century—the phenomena surrounding self-consciousness prompt a variety of fundamental philosophical and scientific questions, including its relation to consciousness; its semantic and epistemic features; its realisation in both conceptual and non-conceptual representation; and its connection to our conception of an objective world populated with others like ourselves. (shrink)

This thesis investigates the relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness. I consider two broad claims about this relationship: a constitutive claim, according to which all conscious experiences constitutively involve self-consciousness; and a typicalist claim, according to which ordinary conscious experiences contingently involve self-consciousness. Both of these claims call for elucidation of the relevant notions of consciousness and self-consciousness. -/- In the first part of the thesis ('The Myth of Constitutive Self-Consciousness'), I critically examine the constitutive claim. I start by offering an (...) elucidatory account of consciousness, and outlining a number of foundational claims that plausibly follow from it. I subsequently distinguish between two concepts of self-consciousness: consciousness of one's experience, and consciousness of oneself (as oneself). Each of these concepts yields a distinct variant of the constitutive claim. In turn, each resulting variant of the constitutive claim can be interpreted in two ways: on a 'minimal' or deflationary reading, they fall within the scope of foundational claims about consciousness, while on a 'strong' or inflationary reading, they point to determinate aspects of phenomenology that are not acknowledged by the foundational claims as being aspects of all conscious mental states. I argue that the deflationary readings of either variant of the constitutive claim are plausible and illuminating, but would ideally be formulated without using a term as polysemous as 'self-consciousness'; by contrast, the inflationary readings of either variant are not adequately supported. -/- In the second part of the thesis ('Self-Consciousness in the Real World'), I focus on the second concept of self-consciousness, or consciousness of oneself as oneself. Drawing upon empirical evidence, I defend a pluralist account of self-consciousness so construed, according to which there are several ways in which one can be conscious of oneself as oneself – through conscious thoughts, bodily experiences and perceptual experiences – that make distinct determinate contributions to one's phenomenology. This pluralist account provides us with the resources to vindicate the typicalist claim according to which consciousness of oneself as oneself – a sense of self – is pervasive in ordinary conscious experiences, as a matter of contingent empirical fact. It also provides us with the resources to assess the possibility that a subject might be conscious without being conscious of herself as herself in any way. (shrink)

A persistent tradition in metaphysics of mind insists that there is a substantial difference between mind and body. Avicenna’s numerous arguments, for a millennium, have encouraged the view that minds are essentially immaterial substances. In the first part, I redesign and offer five versions of such arguments and then I criticize them. First argument (indivisibility) would be vulnerable in terms of two counterexamples. Second argument (universals) confuses existence with location. Third argument (bodily tools) is less problematic than the first two, (...) though I will say a few words about why it may also not be convincing. Fourth argument (infinity) may not support substance dualism, because, I think, abundance is very different from infinity. Fifth argument (senescence) depends on empirically incorrect premises. Hence, it seems that no Avicennian argument can reasonably save substance dualism. (shrink)

Kirjasymposio: Jari Kaukua: Self-Awareness in Islamic Philosophy: Avicenna and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015. 268 sivua.

Artikkeli on vastauspuheenvuoro Jari Kaukuan teokselle Selfawareness in Islamic Philosophy: Avicenna and Beyond, joka käsittelee itsetietoisuutta kolmen islamilaisen maailman filosofin, Avicennan, Suhrawardīn ja Mullā Ṣadrān, ajattelussa. Kirjoitukseni keskittyy Kaukuan tulkintaan Avicennan itsetietoisuuskäsityksestä. Kaukuan tutkimus onnistuu nähdäkseni osoittamaan, että Avicenna rakentaa aristoteeliselta pohjalta aivan uudenlaisen käsityksen itsetietoisuudesta ihmissielun primitiivisenä ominaisuutena. Tämä aiheuttaa kuitenkin ongelmia Avicennan sielunkykyjen psykologian kannalta, jolloin herää kysymys kykeneekö Avicenna lopulta täysin perustelemaan näkemystään aristoteelisin käsittein. Erityisesti Kaukuan tulkinta itsetietoisuuskysymyksen kannalta keskeisestä leijuvan ihmisen ajatuskokeesta muodostuu Avicennan psykologian kontekstissa (...) ongelmalliseksi, ja ehdotan ajatuskokeelle vaihtoehtoista lukutapaa. Artikkelin toisessa osiossa tuon esille jännitteen, jonka Avicennan intellektualistinen etiikka tuo itsetietoisuuskäsitykseen. Vaikka itsetietoisuus on ihmisen perustava olemus, näyttäisi myös, että tietoisuus itsestä partikulaarisena olentona on Avicennalle lopulta jotain, mistä ihmisen tulisi vapautua. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta algunas de las visiones filosóficas más influyentes sobre la memoria, la verdad y la justicia en el Medioevo cristiano. En todasellas están presentes, en proporción diferente, las dos tradiciones dominantes, el neoplatonismo y el aristotelismo. San Agustín, Avicena y Tomás de Aquino encarnan perspectivas crecientemente desplatonizadas sobre la memoria. En cuanto al concepto de verdad, tanto el modelo teocéntrico de Agustín como el adecuacionista de Tomás son expresiones de una corriente principal que declina en el siglo XIV. (...) Finalmente, mientras que Agustín introduce de modo crítico la definición ciceroniana de la justicia, basada en la teoría grecorromana de la ley natural, Aquino coordina sistemáticamente teísmo cristiano, ley natural y naturalismo político aristotélico. (shrink)