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  1. The Success of Hyperrational Utility Maximizers in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma: A Response to Sobel.Robert A. Curtis - 1989 - Dialogue 28 (2):265-.
    Several recent commentators have suggested that for fully rational agents who find themselves in iterated prisoner's dilemmas of indefinite length, co-operation is the rational strategy. Their argument is that these fully rational agents can be taught, through the co-operative actions of other agents, to bypass the dominant move of noncooperation and co-operate instead. The proponents of the “teaching strategy” seem to have ignored the compelling argument of Jordan Howard Sobel. While the teaching argument may work for agents who are less (...)
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  • Deterrence, utility, and rational choice? A comment.Georges Bernard - 1982 - Theory and Decision 14 (1):89-97.
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  • "Deterrence,".S. M. Amadae - 2015 - In Prisoners of Reason: Game Theory and Neoliberal Political Economy. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 99-140.
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  • Uncertainty as the Reason for Action: Last Opportunity and Future Climate Disaster.Henry Shue - 2015 - Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 8 (2).
    In cases in which there is the possibility of massive human losses, the threshold likelihood of their occurrence, and the non-excessive costs of their prevention, we ought to act now. This is all the more definitely the case because it may well be that this is the time-of-last-opportunity to head off one or more potential disasters, all of which may still be preventable by sufficiently rapid reductions in carbon emissions from the combustion of fossil fuel. It is unfair that the (...)
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  • Is Nuclear Deterrence Paradoxical?W. E. Seager - 1984 - Dialogue 23 (2):187-198.
    A paradox is a situation in which two seemingly equally rational lines of thought lead to contradictory conclusions. A moral paradox is a situation where the employment of diverse moral principles, each of which is at least intuitively acceptable to roughly the same degree, leads to radically different moral assessments of one and the same action. In his “Some Paradoxes of Deterrence” Gregory Kavka argues that such moral paradoxes lurk in the concept of deterrence and further that the present world (...)
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  • Deterrence and utility again: A response to Bernard.Gregory S. Kavka - 1982 - Theory and Decision 14 (1):99-102.
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  • Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear Leviathan.S. M. Amadae - 2018 - In Daniel Bessner & Nicolas Guilhot (eds.), The Decisionist Imagination: Democracy, Sovereignty and Social Science in the 20th Century. New York, NY, USA:
    This paper explores how the Leviathan that projects power through nuclear arms exercises a unique nuclearized sovereignty. In the case of nuclear superpowers, this sovereignty extends to wielding the power to destroy human civilization as we know it across the globe. Nuclearized sovereignty depends on a hybrid form of power encompassing human decision-makers in a hierarchical chain of command, and all of the technical and computerized functions necessary to maintain command and control at every moment of the sovereign's existence: this (...)
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