In ancient Rome, there was no need for people to have distinct names, they followed that of their tribe. For instance, a family of four children would classify their kids as young, middle, old, and first-born. There was no need for them to have their own identity because this identity was no expected to serve any purpose. Although two thousand years have gone by, this ideological reproduction of the self into a miniature replica is still present within contemporary Levantine societies. (...) This paper will particularly shed light on 21 st century Lebanon and its system of ideological stratification and inheritance; this structure functions on the basis of an advanced rendition of primitive tribalism, known as sectarianism. Consequently, this sectarian identity enables the othering of the self from its own surrounding as well as any “outsider”. This constant and inter-generational practice is classified as a manifestation of persistence. (shrink)

“Laughing at Finitude” interprets Slavoj Žižek’s intellectual project as responding to a challenge left by Being and Time. Setting out from discussions of Heidegger’s book in The Parallax View and The Ticklish Subject, the essay exfoliates Žižek’s response to the Heideggerian version of a “philosophy of finitude”—both finding the central insight of Žižek’s work in Heidegger’s radical proposal for “anticipatory resoluteness” and developing Žižek’s critique of Being and Time as indicating Heidegger’s retreat from that proposal within the very book where (...) it appears. Žižek reads Being and Time’s existential thematic as proposing a radical subjectivism and, unlike other Heidegger-critics, praises this aspect of the project. Indeed, Žižek claims that the weakness of Being and Time as a whole is that it is insufficiently radical in its subjectivism. For him, Heidegger is a thinker of ambiguous value, one who develops a program from whose own demands he hides. “Laughing at Finitude” both articulates this accusation of self-deception in Heidegger and examines the imperatives necessary to avoid it, for a dialectical shift from the “tragic” voice in existential treatments of finitude and for a revolutionary collectivist re-conception of social “Mitsein.” It suggests, in the process, Žižek’s own intellectual itinerary. (shrink)