Switch to: References

Citations of:

The virtue of prudence

In Stephen J. Pope (ed.), The Ethics of Aquinas (2002)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Morality of Risk Modeling.Nicos A. Scordis - 2011 - Journal of Business Ethics 103 (S1):7-16.
    This article applies the concept of prudence to develop the characteristics of responsible risk-modeling practices in the insurance industry. A critical evaluation of the risk-modeling process suggests that ethical judgments are emergent rather than static, vague rather than clear, particular rather than universal, and still defensible according to the discipline’s established theory, which will support a range of judgments. Thus, positive moral guides for responsible behavior are of limited practical value. Instead, by being prudent, modelers can improve their ability to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Medieval Consideration and Moral Pace.David A. Clairmont - 2013 - Journal of Religious Ethics 41 (1):79-111.
    This essay examines the relationship between virtue and understandings of time through a comparative examination of two medieval Christian writers, Bernard of Clairvaux and Thomas Aquinas. By locating temporal dimensions of virtue primarily in discussions of prudence, this essay compares Thomas's account of the virtue of counsel as preparatory to prudent judgment with Bernard's earlier account of consideration as an integrating virtue that coordinates an examination of physical surroundings and social responsibilities with an examination of one's own inner life and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Preeminent Necessity of Prudence.Brian Kemple - 2017 - Studia Gilsoniana 6 (4):549–572.
    Thomas Aquinas holds not only that prudence, the virtue of right practical reasoning, is necessary for living well, but emphatically asserts that it “is the virtue most necessary to human life.” This essay argues that the force of Thomas’ assertion should not be understood as simply contradicting the objection—that “it seems that prudence is not a virtue necessary to living a good life”—with vigor, but rather, as we intend to show, that although all the moral virtues are necessary for the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Envy and Its Discontents.Timothy Perrine & Kevin Timpe - 2014 - In Kevin Timpe & Craig Boyd (eds.), Virtues and Their Vices. Oxford University Press. pp. 225-244.
    Envy is, roughly, the disposition to desire that another lose a perceived good so that one can, by comparison, feel better about one’s self. The divisiveness of envy follows not just from one’s willing against the good of the other, but also from the other vices that spring from it. It is for this second reason that envy is a capital vice. This chapter begins by arguing for a definition of envy similar to that given by Aquinas and then considers (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations