Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is characterized by excessive and uncontrollable worry about everyday life. Prior neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that GAD is associated with disruptions in specific brain regions; however, little is known about the global functional connectivity maps in adolescents with GAD. Here, first-episode, medication-naive, adolescent GAD patients ( N = 36) and healthy controls ( N = 28) (HCs) underwent resting-state functional MRI (R-fMRI) and completed a package of questionnaires to assess clinical symptoms. Functional connectivity strength and seed-based (...) functional connectivity were employed to investigate the functional connectivity architecture. GAD patients showed reduced functional connectivity strength in right supramarginal gyrus (SMG) and right superior parietal gyrus (SPG) compared with HCs. Further seed-based functional connectivity analysis revealed that GAD patients displayed decreased functional connectivity between right SMG and left fusiform gyrus, inferior temporal gyrus, parahippocampal gyrus, bilateral precuneus and cuneus, and between right SPG and bilateral supplementary motor area and middle cingulate gyrus, as well as between the SMG-based network and the SPG-based network. Moreover, the disrupted intra-network connectivity (i.e., the SMG-based network and the SPG-based network) and inter-network connectivity between the SMG-based network and the SPG-based network accounted for 25.5% variance of the State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) and 39.5% variance of the trait subscale of STAI. Our findings highlight the abnormal functional architecture in the SMG-based network and the SPG-based network in GAD, providing novel insights into the pathological mechanisms of this disorder. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have recently begun to pay more attention to scientific practice, moving away from the discipline’s focus on theories. The creation of the Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice in 2006, as well as the emergence of scholarship on experimental practice (e.g. Sullivan 2009; 2010; 2016) as well as on the tools scientists use to construct explanations and theories (e.g. Feest 2011) all point to a disciplinary shift towards a more practice-conscious philosophy of science. In addition, scholars (...) are realizing the potential social relevance of philosophy of science and identifying the obstacles that stand in the way of realizing said potential (e.g. Douglas 2010). The aim of this dissertation is to propose a novel descriptive framework for philosophy of science, one that rests on the idea that scientific practice should be described as accurately as possible so that philosophical discussions of science rest on a solid descriptive base and can more easily be of use in engaging users and practitioners of science. The dissertation is organized along the stages of developing what I call the dynamic-iterative model of scientific practice. In chapter 1, I clarify the project’s philosophical background and outline six conditions of adequacy on a descriptive model of science. These conditions allow me to evaluate the three descriptive models reviewed in chapter 2. Chapter 3 combines Nickles’ problem-solving view of science (1981) with core insights from the heuristics and biases literature into a workable version of the dynamic-iterative model. I then apply the model to the case of place cell research in chapter 4 as a test of the model’s usefulness and applicability. In chapter 5 I evaluate the model with respect to my six conditions and assess its strengths and weaknesses. The dynamic-iterative model is a flexible descriptive framework that not only allows for more complete philosophical analyses of cases than other current models, but also supports important practical applications. (shrink)