The author discusses a number of issues in the theory of legal sources. The first topic is whether sources should be conceived of as acts or texts. The alternatives are connected with two competing theories of legal interpretation (viz., the cognitive theory and the sceptical theory), which entail different concepts of legal rules and law‐making. The second topic is whether a “formal” or a “material” criterion of recognition of sources should be preferred. The third section is devoted to the analysis (...) of rules of change. Four theories of rules of change are discussed, and five kinds of such rules are distinguished. The fourth section concerns judicial law‐making, with special reference to the creation of new legal rules by constitutional courts. (shrink)

The aim of this master’s thesis is to analyse and highlight the interaction between science, politics and law. More precisely, our research question concerns the use of scientific arguments in social spheres (notably in politics and law) instead of legal or political arguments. In fact, we want to raise the way in which certain actors invoke scientific arguments to impose "objective" elements of fact in debate and, in this way, refrain from politically and "subjectively" discussing these same elements (or, at (...) least, their social consequences). This Master’s thesis will adopt an interdisciplinary theoretical framework (chapter 1) mobilising philosophy of science, philosophy of law, sociology of law, legal technique and analytical theories. Then, we will apply it to a case study: the European regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) after the European Court of Justice (CJEU) ruling of 25 July 2015 (chapter 2). The first chapter will provide theoretical elements to rethink the interaction between science, politics and law. The first section will propose a 'state of the art’ of the philosophical literature on the relationship between science (as a regime of truth) and politics. This master’s thesis will assess a truth under construction rather than a transcendental truth. Section 2 anticipates authoritarian claims based on science by considering the relationship science can have with power (Foucault). A solid review of philosophical, sociological and legal literature highlights the risks of giving decision-making power to an all-powerful science. Notably, the use of science to justify discriminatory policies is emphasised as these policies could not be challenged because, at the time, it was considered an objective scientific truth. Finally, section 3 offers a critique of the narratives of neutral and objective science, through the approach of science in action. This sociological approach presented all the doubts and subjectivity of science in action. The second chapter will propose a case study to illustrate the theoretical framework. We have chosen GMOs because they constitute a hybrid 'event', marked by scientific controversies, and with major socio-economic implications. The legal framework of GMOs in the European Union will be presented in the first section. In addition, the legal status of new breeding techniques (NBTs) will be examined. The second section will analyse the ruling of the European Court of Justice which made NBTs subject to GMO regulation. Finally, the third section will propose a reflection on the philosophy of law on the modes of existence of scientific, legal and political disciplines. (shrink)

The author discusses a number of topics related to the concept of legal order and the structure of legal orders. In particular, the following theses are challenged: (1) legal orders are sets of rules; (2) the criterion of membership to such sets is validity; (3) legal orders are dynamic sets; (4) legal orders are provided with a hierarchical configuration; (5) legal orders are coherent and consistent sets.

The relation between art and law is not limited to the scope of censorship or constitutional protection of works of art. The endless tension between State censorship and freedom of expression, even if it highlights the justifiable need to secure the autonomy of art vis-à-vis law, leads us to ignore the common philosophical matrix of the two normative phenomena. The article aims at illuminating the ontological, aesthetic and political parameters of the production of art/law, through the analysis of two important (...) films, Prova d’Orchestra by Federico Fellini and Blow Up by Michelangelo Antonioni. (shrink)

Taking together place, time and manner, it would be possible to describe the encounter as comprising at least six modes: fragility, temporality, activity, integrity, causality and disparity. The author then explores what is meant by a rationality, and discusses the encounter between legal rationalities in Africa. The suggestion is that the law exists in Africa only in the tension between old and new, imposition and negotiation; the question at issue is the possibility of thinking ‘between-two-realities’, the ‘space-between’.

Si le concept d’auteur est une notion centrale de la littérature et de la théorie littéraire, il s’agit d’abord d’une notion juridique qui a été mobilisée par les philosophes modernes, en particulier Hobbes et Spinoza, dans le but politique et scientifique de lutter contre le régime traditionnel des autorités et de défendre la liberté de pensée contre les interprétations normatives des docteurs de la loi et de la religion. L’article remonte aux origines politiques et juridiques de l’auteur-législateur moderne et retrace (...) sa marche vers la Souveraineté. (shrink)

Alchourrón y Bulygin sostienen que el derecho positivo, además de normas, contiene definiciones, que ponen de manifiesto un aparato conceptual a través del cual pensamos la realidad. A partir de esta afirmación argumentaré que hay un aspecto del derecho al que la teoría jurídica no ha prestado la atención que merece: la red de conceptos o categorías a través de la cual el derecho piensa, estructura, esquematiza o imagina la realidad. Sobre la base de una visión pluralista, sostengo que el (...) derecho moderno contiene una red conceptual singular, diferente a la construida por la ciencia y a la que está implícita en la vida cotidiana, aun cuando pueda receptar aspectos de una y otra. Dicho en el léxico de Quine, el derecho incluye criterios propios de objetivación e individuación, es decir, una ontología propia. En ese camino propongo algunas distinciones generales que pueden ser útiles para la descripción del derecho: definiciones expresas e implícitas por un lado; aparatos conceptuales derivados y aparatos conceptuales singulares del derecho, por el otro. La argumentación revela asimismo la relevancia y singularidad de categorías jurídicas muy básicas, como las de persona y cosa. (shrink)