Christians traditionally hold that we know God as God is revealed to us, but that we do not know God in essence, as God is in himself. But that raises the question of whether God as revealed accurately represents God’s essence. Perhaps, given our cognitive limitations, God logically cannot reveal the divine essence to us. Or perhaps God knows that it would not be good for us were he to do so. Descartes raised the possibility that God is an Evil (...) Genius who systematically misleads us. This paper explores several attempts to build a bridge from GR to GE. All appear to have serious limitations. It concludes that, contrary to much of the tradition, GR does reveal God’s essence to us. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas has long been understood to have reconciled faith and reason. Typically, he is understood as having provided justification for faith by means of proof, particularly, that the Five Ways prove the existence of God. Under this interpretation, faith becomes a species of justified belief, and the justification for faith rests upon the success of the Five Ways . In this dissertation, I argue that Aquinas' account of faith is not one of justified belief, at least as it is (...) understood in contemporary philosophy. Instead, I argue, faith has its own basis for epistemic "reasonableness"---a reasonableness that does not derive from ordinary evidence nor proof. Rather than requiring evidence accessible to the natural light of reason, Aquinas holds that faith has its own sort of "evidence"---that which results from the light of faith. Aquinas "Aristotelianizes" faith and argues that faith has the Aristotelian epistemic virtue of certitude, and in so doing reconciles faith and Aristotelian reason, at least as Aristotle was understood by Medieval philosophers. This reconciliation resolves important tensions between Aristotelian science and Christian doctrine. Further, I examine three contemporary accounts of what counts as an epistemically "responsible" belief and argue that under Aquinas' account, faith should be counted as rational, and in an important, though modified sense, as justified. (shrink)

One challenge to the rationality of religious commitment has it that faith is unreasonable because it involves believing on insufficient evidence. However, this challenge and influential attempts to reply depend on assumptions about what it is to have faith that are open to question. I distinguish between three conceptions of faith each of which can claim some plausible grounding in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Questions about the rationality or justification of religious commitment and the extent of compatibility with doubt look different (...) on accounts of faith in which trust or hope, rather than belief, are the primary basis for the commitments. On such accounts, while the person of faith has a stake in the truth of the content, practical as well as epistemic considerations can legitimately figure in normative appraisals. Trust and hope can be appropriate in situations of recognized risk, need not involve self-deception, and are compatible with the idea that one's purely epistemic opinions should be responsive only to evidence.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Authentic faith and acknowledged risk: dissolving the problem of faith and reasonVolume 49, Issue 1DANIEL J. MCKAUGHAN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000200Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Authentic faith and acknowledged risk: dissolving the problem of faith and reasonVolume 49, Issue 1DANIEL J. MCKAUGHAN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000200Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Authentic faith and acknowledged risk: dissolving the problem of faith and reasonVolume 49, Issue 1DANIEL J. MCKAUGHAN DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000200Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

John Hick's eschatological verification has continued to receive attention for twenty-five years. I would like to focus here on the changes in Hick's concept of eschatological verification in ‘Eschatological Verification Reconsidered’ the implications of these changes for eschatological verification, and how these changes illustrate problem areas for Hick's theology.

Both philosophy and theology are given a raison d'etre by their problems. Some of their problems they share, and some they do not. They share a concern with the nature of morality and they share the problem of human freedom. But the filioque issue and the controversy between Arius and Athanasius regarding the consubstaniality of the persons of the Trinity belong to theology, if contemporary theology will have them. The problems of reference and denotation, and of classes, in the cast (...) given them by Frege, Russell and others, are exclusively in the domain of philosophy. Sometimes the problems shared by philosophy and theology are also human problems: they intimately touch human lives and have palpable ramifications for the way men live. Camus, who said with a flourish that the only philosophical problem is whether or not to commit suicide, was saying in part that the only philosophical problems worth considering are human problems. And William James would perhaps concur; he would insist that only philosophical problems that are “living, forced and momentous” present a genuine option to men. (shrink)

The article discusses a response to Schellenberg’s atheistic ‘hiddenness argument’ that neither objects to its premises nor formulates a new inductive argument in favour of the existence of God. According to the proposed response, it is sufficient for the task of defending theism to reverse Schellenberg’s reasoning and present a theistic meta-argument that takes as its assumption the fact that there are resistant believers in the world. The paper defends the claim that both arguments have similar persuasive power. However, because (...) of their contradictory conclusions both cannot be sound. It is argued that the way to decide the dilemma is to compare the demographics of theism and atheism and to compare accommodation strategies of both arguments. The first comparison favours theism, but it does not exclude the possibility that quantitative proportions between theists and atheists can change in the future. The second comparison refers to accommodation strategies of proponents of A-argument who have to give an account of how it is possible that in an atheistic world there exist resistant believers and of proponents of T-argument who have to give an account of how it is possible that in the world governed by an all-powerful and all-loving God there exist nonresistant nonbelievers. The conclusion of the considerations is the claim that the theistic accommodation strategy compares favourably to the atheistic one. (shrink)

Living in multi-religious societies in almost all parts of the world, religious diversity is a fact of life for all of us in the contemporary world. However, it is possible to take diverse philosophical approaches to this diversity. Religious pluralism is one such approach, which claims that all religions are equally valid. In this paper, I wish to analyse this approach and clarify its philosophical implications. I try to show that its acceptance raises serious questions about our understanding of the (...) concept of truth, our conception of a religious worldview and the nature of believers’ commitment. One philosophical issue raised by acknowledgment of religious diversity pertains to conflicting truth claims of different religions and how these can be said to be true at the same time. I discuss some philosophical perspectives which provide theoretical frameworks to accommodate diverse religious standpoints and thus seem to support pluralism. However, each of these has problematic dimensions raising questions about its tenability. My objective is not to undermine the importance of a pluralistic approach to religious diversity, which I consider as eminently desirable, but to emphasize that acceptance of pluralism challenges many of our widely held conceptions and beliefs. Moreover, I wish to point out that the thesis that all religions are equally valid is not in agreement with the self-understanding and ethos of almost all the major religions of the world. Therefore, acceptance of religious pluralism seems to require a significant revision of how believers generally understand the doctrinal claims and the worldview of the religion they follow and how religious traditions look at their own ontological commitments. Although many religions can accommodate religious tolerance in varying degrees, it seems doubtful whether any religious tradition can accept whole heartedly the thesis of equal validity of all religions. Religious pluralism thus is not a descriptive but a prescriptive or revisionary thesis about religions. I argue that religious pluralism may be a tenable thesis if we either accept a relativistic conception of truth or a non-cognitive analysis of doctrinal statements. Both these suppositions have wide ranging implications; the former requires a significant modification in our generally accepted notion of truth and the latter in our common understanding of religious assertions, and both are opposed to the self-understanding of most of the major religions of the world with respect to their ontologies. I find merit in the philosophical standpoint which tries to explain diversity of religious worldviews with the help of the idea of interpretation of reality. However, this perspective also has problems given the realist framework of religious worldviews. It seems to me that admitting the significance of interpretation in the context of religious experience leads to the conclusion that religious ontologies should be regarded as offering creative interpretations of reality by people in the light of their religious experiences. However, this approach necessarily brings in an element of subjectivity and is prescriptive. The difficulties of providing a satisfactory theoretical basis for religious pluralism, however, cannot be regarded as a justification for exclusivist or intolerant tendencies. It is imperative in the contemporary world to evolve a constructive conception of religious tolerance and strengthen interfaith dialogue. (shrink)

I argue against the standard view that ontological debates can be fully described as disagreements about what we should believe to exist. The central thesis of the paper is that believing in Fs in the ontologically relevant sense requires more than merely believing that Fs exist. Believing in Fs is not even a propositional attitude; it is rather an attitude one bears to the term expressed by 'Fs'. The representational correctness of such a belief requires not only that there be (...) Fs, but also that the term expressed by 'Fs' should not misrepresent them. In certain cases we might believe that there are Fs without believing our conception of Fs applies to them. This may well be the situation we are in with regard to abstract entities of various sorts. (shrink)

The article based on Kuhn’s paradigmatic approach and Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes, analyses certain aspects of selected cognitive functions of religous beliefs. Our approach is based on the search for angalogy between scientific theories on one hand and systems of religious beliefs on the other hand. Contemporary philosophy of science demonstrates that scientific models are the products of creative analogous immagination, data are theory-laden, theories as a whole are resistent to falsification and it is hard (if at all) (...) to find reliable criterions for the selection of a paradigm. These «subjective features» are more evident within religion, since a wider range of models, greater impact of interpretations on data, greater arduousness in regard to the commitment to a paradigm and more ambiguity in the process of the selection of a paradigm, exist in this area. However, with each of these features, I see the difference between science and religion in their degree and not in absolute contrast. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider how the embodied approach can be applied to religious faith, and possibly other kinds of faith. I start with the reformed epistemologists’ idea that religious faith is similar to sense perception, and I argue that we can elaborate this idea by taking into account our capability perceptually to grasp what is not accessible by senses—the ‘presence in absence’ or, as I call it, perceptual faith. As perception necessarily involves not only a mental but also an (...) embodied relation to its object; an embodied relation can be seen as a constitutive component of faith as well. According to phenomenological accounts of perception, embodiment and enactment allow humans to transcend perspectival limitations and to perceive an object as it is beyond its appearances: constant despite changes of angle, light, and other conditions and whole even when only parts of it are visible. I argue that, in the same vein, embodied relations and particular normativity involved in perception-based faith allow humans to transcend the precariousness of our experience and to sustain a perception-like relation to religious objects, achieved in a ‘better look’ moments of religious experience. I conclude that an embodied account can provide new insights into the nature of religious faith and resolve some puzzles, such as how faith can be a virtue. (shrink)

The paper offers a historical survey of the emergence of logical formalization in twentieth-century analytically oriented philosophy of religion. This development is taken to have passed through three main ?stages?: a pioneering stage in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (led by Frege and Russell), a stage of crisis in the 1920s and early 1930s (occasioned by Wittgenstein, logical positivists such as Carnap, and neo-Thomists such as Maritain), and a stage of rehabilitation in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s (led (...) by the Cracow Circle and Quine). (shrink)

Was Jesus Christ a deluded prophet who expected an imminent collapse of the world followed by the dawning of a kingdom that has never eventuated? Some who reject Christianity think that he was, and as a consequence are highly suspicious about any other claims that are attributed to Jesus. However, other interpretations of the apparently eschatological pronouncements in the New Testament exist, one of which is realized eschatology, this being the idea, roughly, that the kingdom or reign of God was (...) realized in or through the ministry of Jesus itself. Debates surrounding the competing interpretations of New Testament eschatology raise fascinating issues, both exegetical and conceptual. Exploring some of these issues from the perspective of philosophy of religion, informed by theological and biblical studies, this article argues that realized eschatology is a religious option that, contrary to common criticisms, is neither incoherent nor implausibly reductive. (shrink)

این مقاله به بررسی دیدگاه جان هیک - فیلسوف دین تحلیلی معاصر- دربارۀ دلایل وجود تصورات مختلف از خداوند و عدم امکان دست‌یابی به مفهوم خداوند می‌پردازد. ابتدا ضمن اشاره به تفکیک مفهوم و تصور خداوند و ویژگی‌های اساسی تصورات گوناگون از خداوند ‌‌- با تکیه بر مبانی او یعنی تفکیک نومن از فنومن کانت‌‌، «دیدن به عنوان» ویتگنشتاین متأخر و وصف‌ناپذیری خداوند ‌‌- نشان خواهیم داد که با تفکیک کانت تنها می‌توان تفکیک مفهوم خداوند از تصور او را توجیه (...) کرد‌‌ و نمی‌توان از دست‌یابی به مفهوم خداوند دفاع کرد‌‌؛ زیرا طبق آن‌‌، راهی به نومن خداوند نیست. با تکیه بر دیدگاه ویتگنشتاین متأخر نیز هیچ تجربۀ ناب و خالصی نیست که بتوان از مفهوم خداوند سخن گفت‌‌، بلکه همواره تصوراتی از او داریم. وصف‌ناپذیری خداوند نیز مشکل تجربۀ ما را از او دوچندان کرده و باعث تصورات گوناگون از خداوند می‌شود. در پایان نیز به نتایج دیدگاه او مانند توفیق او در تفکیک مفهوم و تصور خداوند و توجیه وجود تصورات مختلف از خداوند‌‌، گشودن راه نقد و بررسی آموزه‌های مسیحی‌‌، دفاع از کثرت‌گرایی دینی و نزدیک شدن او به تصور پنن تئیستی از خداوند اشاره خواهیم کرد. (shrink)