Organizational transgressions cause recurring scandals. Often disclosed by whistleblowers, they generate public outrage and force organizations to respond. Recent studies have tried to answer the question: “What happens after a transgression becomes publicly known?” They highlight organizational responses marked by recognition of the transgression, penance and reintegration of the organization. However, that research only deals with transgressions involving illegal organizational practices. This article broadens the field of study to include legal but unethical organizational practices. It is based on the case (...) study of a recent scandal: LuxLeaks (2010–2018). This scandal concerns tax avoidance practices that were advised by the international audit and consulting firm PwC to hundreds of companies and made public by whistleblowers. The case data result from cross-comparisons of several organizational (PwC) and governmental (Luxembourg) communication documents as well as parliamentary, judicial and press documents. The article’s results highlight a legalistic organizational response that is so far under-explored in the literature. This response is marked by a rhetoric of denial, reformism and self-victimization and by judicial retaliation against the whistleblowers. It reveals the paradoxes of “legalization” in contemporary organizations, and its role in the perpetuation of unethical corporate practices. (shrink)

Whistleblowing is an effective tool against fraud and corruption in organizations. However, as researchers have struggled to acquire data on actual whistleblowers, research relies on hypothetical intention data and student samples, which is seen as a major limitation. Using a field study of 1,416 employees from China, Germany, and Russia, the purpose of this article is to identify differences and similarities between intention and actual whistleblowing decisions, thus aiding research and interpretation of prior and future studies. I also contribute by (...) analyzing whether findings can be generalized across different cultures and whether status and power influence the whistleblowing process. My results reveal that the key difference between hypothetical and real decisions is not in variables that affect the process, but in effect sizes: Employees underestimate the effect of situational (retaliation) and organizational (compliance measures) variables in hypothetical compared to actual whistleblowing. Thus, reliance on intention research is not inherently problematic, when effect sizes are interpreted with caution. I also find that results are similar across countries and that status and power may not be decisive factors in whistleblowing. My findings should also be of interest to practitioners and policymakers, as they assist in designing effective whistleblowing systems and environments in organizations. (shrink)