Certain works in the most recent Polish constitutional law literature suggest that there is acceptance of the principle or the concept of autonomous interpretation of a constitution (autonomy of interpretation of constitutional terms). The Constitutional Tribunal also makes reference to this in numerous rulings. Paradoxically, however, that concept is not very popular in legal theory. It might seem that Polish legal theoreticians and philosophers do not appreciate the concept of interpretation of a constitution devised through practice with the support of (...) constitutional law doctrine. It might, however, mean that opinions on autonomous interpretation of Polish Constitution are nothing more than rhetorical arguments formulated ad hoc not a coherent concept or a theory. This text is an attempt to analyse this concept and its potential in discussions surrounding application of the Polish Constitution. (shrink)

This paper offers a diachronic reconstruction of MacCormick's theory of law and legal argumentation: In particular, two related points will be highlighted in which the difference between the perspective upheld in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory and the later writings is particularly marked. The first point concerns MacCormick's gradual break with legal positivism, and more specifically the thesis that the implicit pretension to justice of law proves legal positivism false in all its different versions. The second point concerns MacCormick's acceptance (...) of the one-right-answer thesis and the consequent thinning of the differences between MacCormick's theory of legal reasoning and that of Ronald Dworkin and of Robert Alexy. The intent, however, is not only to describe this change in MacCormick's thought, but also to attempt a defence of the original view that we find in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. (shrink)