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The self

Milwaukee: Marquette University Press (1988)

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  1. Making and Mending Our Selves: A Practical Proposal.Aaron Brian Davis - 2022 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 6 (1).
    Theological anthropology has tended to view human flourishing as consisting in the loving communion of ourselveswith God. Recently, Natalia Marandiuc has brought the tools of attachment theory to theological anthropology to argue that a self is not inherent to human persons but rather is co-created through our loving relationships with one another and with God. In this paper I argue for the introduction of narrative, particularly as understood through the work of Eleonore Stump, to Marandiuc’s account as a practical means (...)
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  • (1 other version)The self and the SESMET.Galen Strawson - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (4):99-135.
    Response to commentaries on keynote article.
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  • The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Does the self exist? If so, what is its nature? How long do selves last? Galen Strawson draws on literature and psychology as well as philosophy to discuss various ways we experience having or being a self. He argues that it is legitimate to say that there is such a thing as the self, distinct from the human being.
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  • (1 other version)El nudo del mundo. Subjetividad y ontología de la primera persona.Pedro Enrique García Ruiz - 2009 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 10:194-223.
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  • There is no problem of the self.Eric T. Olson - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):645-657.
    Because there is no agreed use of the term 'self', or characteristic features or even paradigm cases of selves, there is no idea of "the self" to figure in philosophical problems. The term leads to troubles otherwise avoidable; and because legitimate discussions under the heading of 'self' are really about other things, it is gratuitous. I propose that we stop speaking of selves.
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  • Aham: I: The Enigma of I-Consciousness.Anindita Niyogi Balslev - 2013 - New Delhi: Oxford University Press India.
    This book analyses the many facets-psychological, epistemological, metaphysical-of the repeated philosophical adventures over centuries to explore and explain the indubitability of I-consciousness. While the major focus is on the Upanisadic and the Buddhist traditions, this volume also examines Western philosophical traditions in a cross-cultural philosophical context.
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  • The knot of the world, subjectivity and ontology of the first person. [Spanish].Pedro García Ruiz - 2009 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 10:194-223.
    Normal 0 21 false false false ES-CO X-NONE X-NONE Este ensayo busca mostrar la relevancia de la perspectiva de la primera persona a través de un enfoque fenomenológico. Frente a la negativa de las distintas tendencias de la filosofía de la mente analítica, las ciencias cognitivas y las neurociencias de considerar la realidad de los estados mentales como fenómenos subjetivos, se esboza una revisión de la cuestión con la finalidad de señalar la relación entre la experiencia subjetiva y una ontología (...)
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  • Against 'Corporism': The Two Uses of 'I'.Galen Strawson - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (4):428-448.
    In his book Individuals P. F. Strawson writes that ‘both the Cartesian and the no-ownership theorists are profoundly wrong in holding, as each must, that there are two uses of ‘I’, in one of which it denotes something which it does not denote in the other’ . I think, by contrast, that there is a defensible ‘Cartesian materialist’ sense, which Strawson need not reject, in which I can and does denote two different things, and which is nothing like the flawed (...)
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