The concept of imitation is both ubiquitous and curiously under-analysed in theoretical discussions about the cognitive powers and capacities of machines, and in particular—for what is the focus of this paper—the cognitive capacities of large language models (LLMs). The question whether LLMs understand what they say and what is said to them, for instance, is a disputed one, and it is striking to see this concept of imitation being mobilised here for sometimes contradictory purposes. After illustrating and discussing how this (...) concept is being used in various ways in the context of conversational systems, I draw a sketch of the different associations that the term ‘imitation’ conveys and distinguish two main senses of the notion. The first one is what I call the ‘imitative behaviour’ and the second is what I call the ‘status of imitation’. I then highlight and untangle some conceptual difficulties with these two senses and conclude that neither of these applies to LLMs. Finally, I introduce an appropriate description that I call ‘imitation manufacturing’. All this ultimately helps me to explore a radical negative answer to the question of machine understanding. (shrink)

I advance a variety of intellectualism about knowing-how that is, paradoxically, suggested by Ryle's positive discussions of that phenomenon. I discuss the roots of the view in Ryle's work, its affinity with John Hyman's () view of factual knowledge, and important points of contrast with Stanley and Williamson's () proposal. Drawing on work by Cath () and Wiggins () I also discuss conditions on knowing practically, in ‘the executive way’, as an alternative to appealing to practical modes of presentation.

Over the past half century, our best scientific understanding of the immune system has been transformed. The immune system has turned out to be extremely sophisticated, densely connected to the central nervous system and cognitive capacities, deeply involved in the production of behavior, and responsive to different kinds of psychosocial event. Such results have rendered the immune system part of the subject-matter of psychology and cognitive science. I argue that such results, alongside the history of psychoneuroimmunology, give us good reason (...) to be skeptical about the characterization of cognitive science and psychology as studying the mind and the mental. (shrink)

When I fiddle with my hair, or adjust my posture, it is plausible that these activities fall well below my cognitive radar. Some have argued that these are examples of ‘sub‐intentional actions’, actions which are not intentional under any description at all. If true, they are direct counterexamples to the dominant view on which the difference between actions and other events is their intentionality. In this paper, I argue that the case for sub‐intentional actions fails. Firstly, I show that the (...) main argument for the sub‐intentionality of these actions has a structural fault. Secondly, I argue that two apparently natural ways to remedy this fail. Thirdly, I argue that one of the main arguments for thinking of the phenomena as actions undermines thinking of them as sub‐intentional. Finally, I argue that a natural defensive move for the defender of sub‐intentional actions actually undermines the theoretical significance of the view. Ultimately, my aim is to show that although the case for sub‐intentional actions seemed both simple and compelling, it is in fact deeply troubled. (shrink)