Descartes croyait que le monde étendu ne se terminait pas par une borne, mais pourquoi? Après avoir expliqué la position de Descartes au §1, en suggérant que sa conception de l’étendue indéfinie de l’univers devrait être entendue comme actuelle, mais syncatégorématique, nous nous penchons sur son argument dans le §2 : toute postulation d’une surface extérieure au monde sera autodestructrice, parce que la simple contemplation d’une telle borne nous conduira à reconnaître l’existence d’une étendue allant au-delà. Au §3, nous identifions (...) l’hypothèse fondamentale qui sous-tend cet argument en comparant les conceptions respectives de Descartes et de Malebranche quant au statut ontologique des modes de l’étendue. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the controversy between Henry More and René Descartes on the indefinite extension of the world. I provide a new reading of Descartes’ famous final answer of 15 April 1649. I read the entire debate in the terms of a disagreement concerning the epistemological status of the necessity of our judgement about the extension of the universe. Accordingly, the disagreement on the infinity of the world constitutes a case of a more general disagreement on the nature (...) of the necessity of the theorems of Cartesian Physics. In particular, as concerns Descartes’ last reply, I argue that his assertion that a finite world is contradictory should be interpreted as a reply to More’s claim that the thesis of the infinity of the world, in so far as it cannot be grounded on the identity between matter and extension, does not express a logical necessity. Descartes’ assertion of the logical impossibility of a finite world, far from being, as it has always been read, a concession he made under the pressure of More’s objections, expresses the more radical element of the entire debate about the extension of the universe. (shrink)

The idea of the missing shade of blue presents a difficulty for Hume's first principle that ‘all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from simple impressions, which are correspond...

This paper considers Anselm’s Proslogion argument against a background of historical events that include philosophical disputes between Christian and Jewish polemicists. I argue that the Proslogion argument was addressed, in part, to non-Christian theists and that it offered a response to Jewish polemicists who had argued that the Christian conception of God as an instantiated unity was irrational. Anselm is not trying to convince atheists that there really is a God. He is arguing that the Christian conception of God is (...) logically coherent. (shrink)