This paper examines the nature of Aristotelian phronesis , how it is attained, and who is able to attain it inside the polis . I argue that, for Aristotle, attaining phronesis does not require an individual to perfect his practical wisdom to the point where he never makes a mistake, but rather it is attained by certain individuals who are unable to make a mistake of this kind due to their education, habituation, and position in society.

An essential challenge of Aristotle’s Politics arises from the juxtaposition of contrasting and competing arguments in favour of virtuous monarchy, on the one hand, and the collective superiority of “the many”, on the other. This paper examines the purely theoretical reception of this contrast in the writings of some late medieval Aristotelians by focusing on a key section in Politics Γ (1280a8–1284b34). After reviewing Aristotle’s problematic position, the paper discusses its interpretation in the commentaries of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas/Peter (...) of Auvergne and Walter Burley, as well as its use in the works of Giles of Rome, John of Paris and Marsilius of Padua. On that basis, finally, the paper outlines some general trends with regard to how medieval scholars dealt with Aristotle’s idea of the rule of the many as opposed to that of one or few virtuous persons. (shrink)

Aristotle claims that human beings are by nature political animals. We might think there is a way for non-Aristotelians to affirm something like this—that human beings are political, though not by nature in the Aristotelian sense. It is not clear, however, precisely what this amounts to. In this paper, I try to explain what the claim that human beings are political animals might mean. I also consider what it would it look like to defend this claim, which I call the (...) normative political animal thesis. I argue that this thesis cannot be given a general defense. Successful arguments for the normative political animal thesis must be made within particular ethical frameworks. To illustrate what such an argument might look like, I sketch a defense of the normative political animal thesis within a roughly Lockean rights theory, where its adoption seems especially promising. (shrink)

La formule selon laquelle « l’homme est un animal politique par nature » est une des plus connues d’Aristote, pour cela même méconnue. L’objet de cette étude est de montrer qu’il n’y a pas lieu d’interpréter cela d’une façon trop naturaliste, ou, pire, « réductionniste ». Que la nature soit à l’origine de l’élan ayant présidé à l’apparition de la polis est certain, mais qu’elle gouverne tout le processus l’est nettement moins. À commencer par les critères de la distinction entre (...) les différentes constitutions, faites par les citoyens eux-mêmes. De même en va-t-il pour l’acquisition de la vertu morale, qui n’est nullement donnée par la nature et que les citoyens se devraient de posséder. D’où il résulte qu’en matière de politique, il est bien plus question d’éducation que de nature. (shrink)

En este artículo me ocupo inicialmente de la teoría de la esclavitud de Aristóteles en el libro i de la Política, con el fin de mostrar la utilización de dos procedimientos: uno dialéctico, a partir de la discusión con Platón, y otro retórico, con la utilización de metáforas y testimonios con los que configura el marco epistemológico de su teoría. Luego, me concentraré en un asunto por esclarecer: la diferencia ente los endoxa, la tesis y el testimonio. Al describir el (...) método dialéctico en los Tópicos, Aristóteles precisa el significado de los términos endoxa y tesis. Por su parte, en los libros i y ii de la Retórica, Aristóteles se ocupa del testimonio. Por consiguiente, identificaré estos dos tipos de procedimientos, los tipos de pruebas y las conclusiones en el libro i de la Política de Aristóteles, a partir de las características elaboradas en los Tópicos y en la Retórica. (shrink)