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Reason to value" : process, opportunity, and perfectionism in the capability approach

In Lori Keleher & Stacy J. Kosko (eds.), Agency and Democracy in Development Ethics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press (2019)

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  1. Distinguishing Disadvantage from Ill-Being in the Capability Approach.Sebastian Östlund - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (4):933-947.
    Central capabilitarian theories of well-being focus exclusively on actual opportunities to attain states of being and doing that people have reason to value. Consequently, these theories characterise ill-being and disadvantage as deprivations of such opportunities and attainments. However, some well-being aspects are inherently negative. They make up the difference between not being well and being unwell in that they constitute ill-being. While disadvantage can be plausibly captured by deprivations, ill-being cannot be fully captured by them. I support this claim by (...)
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  • Neutrality and Perfectionism in Public Health.Hafez Ismaili M’Hamdi - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics 21 (9):31-42.
    The aim of this article is twofold. First is to demonstrate that most values that underpin public health policy are a source of reasonable disagreement amongst citizens to whom said policy applies....
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  • Doctor, please make me freer: Capabilities enhancement as a goal of medicine.Jon Rueda, Pablo García-Barranquero & Francisco Lara - 2021 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy (3):409-419.
    Biomedical innovations are making possible the enhancement of human capabilities. There are two philosophical stances on the role that medicine should play in this respect. On the one hand, naturalism rejects every medical intervention that goes beyond preventing and treating disease. On the other hand, welfarism advocates enhancements that foster subjective well-being. We will show that both positions have considerable shortcomings. Consequently, we will introduce a third characterization in which therapies and enhancements can be reconciled with the legitimate objectives of (...)
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