Healthcare systems contribute considerably to worldwide carbon emissions and therefore reinforce the negative health impacts of climate change. Significant attempts to reduce emissions have been made on the macro level of politics and on the institutional level. Less attention has been paid so far to decisions that take place at the micro level of immediate doctor–patient contact. Current bioethical debates discuss potential tensions between ‘Green Healthcare’ and an orientation towards ethical principles such as promoting patient welfare or respect for patient (...) autonomy. The article addresses this debate from a different angle starting from the premise that at least some patients might have a preference to reduce carbon outputs that are often deeply rooted in their personal value system. Taking different accounts of patient autonomy as a starting point, the article analyses whether such preferences must be respected as being part of patient autonomy. The analysis comes to a positive conclusion but highlights that certain factors such as misinterpretation, lack of understanding or pressure must be carefully considered. In addition, a patient’s climate-related preference does not per se justify the choice of treatment but must be integrated into shared decision-making and reconciled with the healthcare professional’s expert judgement on the intervention being a legitimate and promising way for reaching certain treatment goals. As a recommendation, empirical research on stakeholders’ attitudes, knowledge and practice regarding ecological sustainability in clinical decision-making is needed together with further ethical analyses. (shrink)

Kidney markets are prohibited in principle because they are assumed to undermine the seller’s dignity. Considering the trade-off between saving more lives by introducing regulated kidney markets and preserving the seller’s dignity, we argue that it is advisable to demand that citizens restrain their own moral judgements and not interfere with the judgements of those who are willing to sell a kidney. We also argue that it is advisable not only to limit the political implications of the moral argument of (...) dignity concerns toward a market-based solution but also to re-evaluate the dignity argument itself. First, if the dignity argument is to be given normative force, it must also consider the dignity violation of the potential transplant recipient. Second, there seems to be no compelling notion of dignity that demonstrates why it is morally permissible to donate but not to sell a kidney. (shrink)