Genetic information affects patients’ families differently than other types of medical information. Family members might have a compelling interest in patients’ genetic information, but who counts as family? In this article, I assess current definitions of family and propose a pluralistic account of family, which comprises definitions of family based on biomedical, legal, and functional aspects. Respectful of various forms of family, a pluralistic account includes those with interests in genetic information. Finally, I apply it in the hypothetical case of (...) a sperm donor with a hereditary condition. (shrink)

In “Genetic Privacy, Disease Prevention, and the Principle of Rescue,” Madison Kilbride argues that patients have a duty to warn biological family members about clinically actionable adverse genetic findings. The duty does not stem from the special obligations that we may have to family members, she argues, but rather follows from the principle of rescue, which she understands as the idea that one ought to prevent, reduce, or mitigate the risk of harm to another person when the expected harm is (...) serious and the cost or risk to oneself is sufficiently moderate. We doubt, however, whether the principle of rescue can ground a duty to warn in the cases Kilbride envisages, and we suggest that Kilbride may have underappreciated the role that special obligations could play in generating a duty to warn family members. (shrink)