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Structured propositions

Jeffrey C. King

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)

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Russellian Propositions and Properties.Jan Almäng - 2012 - Metaphysica 13 (1):7-25.details This paper discusses a problem for Russellian propositions. According to Russellianism, each word in a sentence contributes its referent to the proposition expressed by the sentence. Russellian propositions have normally been conceived of as problematic for two reasons, viz. they cannot account for the unity of the proposition and they have problems with non-referring singular names. In this paper, I argue that Russellianism also faces a problem with respect to properties. It is inconsistent with both traditional realism and trope-theories. The (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
How Cognition Meets Emotion: Beliefs, Desires, and Feelings as Neural Activity.Paul Thagard - unknowndetails Deep appreciation of the relevance of emotion to epistemology requires a rich account of how emotional mental states such as happiness, sadness and desire interact with cognitive states such as belief and doubt. Analytic philosophy since Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell has assumed that such mental states are propositional attitudes, which are relations between a self and a proposition, an abstract entity constituting the meaning of a sentence. This chapter shows the explanatory defects of the doctrine of propositional attitudes, and (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
A repair of Frege’s theory of thoughts.Mark Textor - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.details Frege’s writings contain arguments for the thesis (i) that a thought expressed by a sentence S is a structured object whose composition pictures the composition of S, and for the thesis (ii) that a thought is an unstructured object. I will argue that Frege’s reasons for both (i) and (ii) are strong. Frege’s explanation of the difference in sense between logically equivalent sentences rests on assumption (i), while Frege’s claim that the same thought can be decomposed differently makes (ii) plausible. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
Reply to Nes.Tim Crane - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):215–218.details Brentano (1874) described intentionality in a number of different ways: as ‘the intentional inexistence of an object’, ‘reference to a content’, ‘direction towards an object’, and ‘immanent objectivity’. All these phrases were intended to mean the same thing, but such elegant variation can give rise to confusion. In my Elements of Mind (2001) I tried to give a simpler description: intentional states all involve directedness upon an object and what I call (following Searle 1992) aspectual shape. My aim in doing (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Why the tuple theory of structured propositions isn't a theory of structured propositions.Bjørn Jespersen - 2003 - Philosophia 31 (1-2):171-183.details Download Export citation Bookmark 19 citations

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