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Why isn't the mind-body problem medieval?

In Forming the Mind. Springer Verlag (2005)

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  1. Is the Hard Problem of Consciousness Universal?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):227-257.
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  • Updating the philosophical concept of form (morphé) as the embodied structural and teleological informational program in human beings.Alberto Carrara - 2018 - Humana Mente 11 (34).
    The contemporary philosophy of mind and neuroethics are two of the liveliest fields of interdisciplinary reflection which deal with the everlasting topic: what/who we essentially are. One of the many questions that can be tackled in order to go deep in this knowledge is: why man is naturally inclined towards specific tiers for survival which constitute his/her teleological project of flourishing? Two different, but complementary, answers are brought to light in this work. The author argues for an apparently obvious, but (...)
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  • Ibn Bājja, Abū Bakr ibn al-Sāʾiġ (Avempace).Marc Geoffroy - 2011 - In H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Springer. pp. 483--483.
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  • The Rediscovery of Common Sense Philosophy.Stephen Boulter - 2007 - Basingstoke, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This book is a defence of the philosophy of common sense in the spirit of Thomas Reid and G.E. Moore, drawing on the work of Aristotle, evolutionary biology and psychology, and historical studies on the origins of early modern philosophy. It defines and explores common sense beliefs, and defends them from challenges from prominent philosophers.
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  • Causality and “the mental”.Jennifer Hornsby - 2015 - Humana Mente 8 (29).
    Many analytic philosophers of mind take for granted a certain conception of causality. Assumptions deriving from that conception are in place when they problematize what they call mental causation or argue for physicalism in respect of the mental. I claim that a different conception of causality is needed for understanding many ordinary causal truths about things which act, including truths about human, minded beings — sc. rational beings who lead lives.
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