Commentators such as Terence Irwin (1999) and Christopher Shields (2006) claim that the Ring of Gyges argument in Republic II cannot demonstrate that justice is chosen only for its consequences. This is because valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with judging its value to be overridable. Through examination of the rational commitments involved in valuing normative ideals such as justice, we aim to show that this analysis is mistaken. If Glaucon is right that everyone would endorse Gyges’ behavior, (...) it follows that nobody values justice intrinsically. Hence, the Gyges story constitutes a more serious challenge than critics maintain. (shrink)

RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é investigar a justificativa para o contrato no início da história do pensamento político grego, tendo em vista o estatuto do acordo no livro II da "República" de Platão. Pretendese avaliar como Glaucon apresenta o contratualismo da maioria das pessoas como um desdobramento da tese de Trasímaco de que o justo é o vantajoso para o mais forte e em conexão com os valores que levam as pessoas a admitirem a necessidade do contrato em razão (...) do medo que elas possuem daquilo que poderia ser considerado o maior mal: sofrerem injustiças e não poderem se vingar, enquanto abdicam do que consideram como o maior bem: cometer injustiças sem serem punidas. ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to investigate the justification for the contract in the early history of the Greek political thought, focusing on the statute of the agreement in book II of Plato's "Republic". It is intended to evaluate how Glaucon presents the contractualism of the majority of people in connection with Thrasymachus's thesis that the fair is what's advantageous for the strongest and in connection with the values that lead people to admit the necessity of the contract because of fear that they have about what could be considered as the greatest evil: suffering injustice and being unable to take revenge while they abdicate what they see as the greatest good: doing injustice without being punished. (shrink)

Plato’s division of goods performed by Glaucon in the Republic involves three kinds of goods: the first kind would be desirable for their own sake; the second, desirable in themselves and in their consequences, and the third kind, only desirable in their consequences. The problem to understand it is thus presented: in which of these kinds is justice observed, and which one provides happiness to men. According to Socrates, justice should be placed on the second kind of good if men (...) want to be happy. However, it is not in this way that the many hold justice, for they include it in the third kind. Having this difference under perspective, Glaucon defends this point of view, willing afterwards to listen to Socrates’ refutation of his argument and the defence of justice as being a good desirable in themselves and their consequences. The aim of our work is to present an interpretation that can justly adapt to what Glaucon understands as 'in themselves' and as a 'consequence' of the goods in this division. (shrink)

This paper argues that the dialogical dynamic gives important information on the importance of, and the hierarchy between, the reasons illustrated in favour of justice in Plato’s Republic. Despite his interlocutors’ request to focus exclusively on the effect of justice in and by itself, Socrates indicates that the description of the consequences of justice included in Book 10 is an integral part of his defence, and that some of these consequences, the rewards assigned by the gods in the afterlife, are (...) more important than both the other consequences of justice and the benefit of justice in and by itself. (shrink)

Glaucon's Challenge at the beginning of Book 2 of Plato's Republic has long prompted interpretive difficulties, due to a misunderstanding of its central aspect. The task of this essay is to correct...

In Book 1 of Plato’s Republic, Thrasymachus contends two major claims: (1) justice is the advantage of the stronger, and (2) justice is the good of the other, while injustice is to one’s own profit and advantage. In the beginning of Book II, Glaucon self-proclaims that he will be representing Thrasymachus’ claims in a better way, and provides a story of how justice has originated from a state of nature situation. However, Glaucon’s story of the origin of justice has an (...) implication that justice is the advantage of the weak rather than the stronger. This is inconsistent with Thrasymachus’ first claim which states that justice is the advantage of the stronger. This is a problem for Glaucon since Glaucon is supposed to be representing Thrasymachus’ original claims in a better way. In this paper, I provide two solutions to this puzzle with the help of elementary game theory. (shrink)