The paper is the final, fifth part of a series of studies introducing the new conceptions of “Hilbert mathematics” and “ontomathematics”. The specific subject of the present investigation is the proper philosophical sense of both, including philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of physics not less than the traditional “first philosophy” (as far as ontomathematics is a conservative generalization of ontology as well as of Heidegger’s “fundamental ontology” though in a sense) and history of philosophy (deepening Heidegger’s destruction of it from (...) the pre-Socratics to the Pythagoreans). Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s derivative “fundamental ontology” as well as his later doctrine after the “turn” are the starting point of the research as established and well known approaches relative to the newly introduced conception of ontomathematics, even more so that Husserl himself started criticizing his “Philosophy of arithmetic” as too naturalistic and psychological turning to “Logical investigations” and the foundations of phenomenology. Heidegger’s “Aletheia” is also interpreted ontomathematically: as a relation of locality and nonlocality, respectively as a motion from nonlocality to locality if both are physically considered. Aristotle’s ontological revision of Plato’s doctrine is “destructed” further from the pre-Socratics' “Logos” or Heideger’s “Language” (after the “turn”) to the Pythagoreans “Numbers” or “Arithmetics” as an inherent and fundamental philosophical doctrine. Then, a leap to contemporary physics elucidates the essence of ontomathematics overcoming the Cartesian abyss inherited from Plato’s opposition of “ideas” versus “things”, and now unifying physics and mathematics, particularly allowing for the “creation from nothing” instead of the quasi-scientific myth of the “Big Bang”. Furthermore, ontomathematics needs another interpretation of arithmetic, propositional logic and set theory in the foundations of mathematics, where the latter two ones are both identified with Boolean algebra, and the former is considered to be a “half of Boolean algebra” in the exact meaning to be equated to it after doubling by a dual anti-isometric counterpart of Peano arithmetic. That unified algebraic realization of the foundations of mathematics is related to Hilbert mathematics in both “narrow and wide senses” where the latter is isomorphic to the qubit Hilbert space, thus underlying all the physical world by the newly introduced substance of quantum information being physically dimensionless and generalizing classical information measured in bits. The substance of information, whether classical or quantum, visualizes the way of the unification of physics and mathematics by merging their foundations in Hilbert arithmetic and Hilbert mathematics: thus how ontomathetics is a “first philosophy”. The relation of ontomathematics to the Socratic “human problematics”, furthermore being fundamental for Western philosophy in Modernity, is discussed. Ontomathematics implies its “substitution” by abstract information (or by “subjectless choice” relevant to it), thus “obliterating the human outline on the ocean beach sand” (by Michel Foucault’s metaphor). A reflection back from the viewpoint of mathematic to Western philosophy as the philosophy of locality ends the study. (shrink)

REVIEW (1): "Jeff Kochan’s book offers both an original reading of Martin Heidegger’s early writings on science and a powerful defense of the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) research program. Science as Social Existence weaves together a compelling argument for the thesis that SSK and Heidegger’s existential phenomenology should be thought of as mutually supporting research programs." (Julian Kiverstein, in Isis) ---- REVIEW (2): "I cannot in the space of this review do justice to the richness and range of Kochan's (...) discussion [...]. There is a great deal in this foundational portion of Kochan's discussion that I find tremendously interesting and engaging [...]." (David R. Cerbone, in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science) ---- REVIEW (3): "Science as Social Existence will be of interest not only to Heidegger scholars but to anyone engaged in science and technology studies. [...] This is an informative and original book. Kochan should be praised for his clear, pleasant-to-read prose." (Michael Butler, in CHOICE). (shrink)

The fact that humans are responsible for climate change is certain. But the meaning of the fact of human responsibility is not disclosed by stating the fact: there is a distinction between the two principles, de facto and de jure, the right to state a fact and the right to assert the meaning of the fact. This distinction must be preserved in order that humans may interpret the nature of our responsibility, as a form of justice. In fact, the nature (...) of human responsibility can never be exhaustively determined. To recognise the fact of human responsibility for climate change may only lead us to acknowledge that climate change coincides with the plundering and exploitation of the earth as a natural resource, together with the industrial pollution which fouls our atmosphere. It is something else again to know precisely what must be done, how to think and write and interpret the science, or even what can be achieved before it is too late to prevent the worst effects of global warming. In this essay I analyse the central claims of proponents of the idea of the Anthropocene, arguing that they are arrogant and perhaps even naïve: in particular, the suggestion that humanity and nature have now fused to become a geological force is shown to be theological in its orientation. The essay also exposes Anthropocenology as a form of pedagogy, meaning that rather than opposing the neoliberalism that it attacks, Anthropocenology joins itself to the biopolitical institutions of education, seizing power in order to govern a totalized human population all the more effectively. (shrink)

Husserl argues in the Crisis that the prevalent tradition of positive science in his time had a philosophical core, called by him "Galilean science", that mistook the quest for objective theory with the quest for truth. Husserl is here referring to Gottingen science of the Golden Years. For Husserl, theory "grows" out of the "soil" of the prescientific, that is, pretheoretical, life-world. Scientific truth finally is to be sought not in theory but rather in the pragmatic-perceptual praxes of measurement. Husserl (...) is faulted for taking measuring processes to be "infinitely perfectible". The dependence of new scientific phenomena on the existence of prior "prescientific" inductive praxis is analyzed, also Husserl's residual objectivism and failure to appreciate the hermeneutic character of measurement. Though not a scientific (theory-)realist, neither was he an instrumentalist, but he was a scientific (phenomena-)realist. (shrink)

RESUMEN El presente articulo procura dar cuenta del problema de la formación de conceptos en Ser y tiempo a partir de la contramovilidad que asume la filosofia respecto de las tendencias auto-supresivas de la vida cotidiana. En un primer momento se distinguen algunos niveles, tendencias y direcciones involucrados en los procesos de formación de conceptos de las ciencias y de la filosofia desde la estela de Ser y tiempo. En un segundo momento se deslindan algunas operaciones categoriales inmanentes a la (...) formación de conceptos a partir del despliegue de lo que Heidegger denomina el acto fundamental de la objetivación, identificable con la tematización y con las direcciones en la que ésta se ejecuta. En un tercer momento, y a modo de cierre, se intenta echar luz sobre la peculiar actitud fundamental de la filosofia para mostrar que ésta se caracteriza, en contra de la Grundhaltung de las ciencias, por lo que podemos denominar con Heidegger una contra-tendencia respecto de la actitud natural-cotidiana. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ ____ -/- ABSTRACT This article accounts for the different levels, tendencies, and directions involved in theprocess of concept-formation that is proper to both sciences and philosophy in Being and Time. It distinguishes different immanent categorial operations that belong tothe concept formation from the perspective of the unfolding of the fundamental act of objectivation. The article shows, additionally, that Heidegger identifies this Grundakt with thematization and with the concrete directions within which thisact is executed. The paper clarifies, finally,what it is the Grundhaltung of philosophy in order to show that its fundamental attitude is characterized by a Gegenbewegung or Gegenzug. (shrink)

This thesis investigates the meaning of the historical epoch of post-modernity by way of Martin Heidegger's claim about the end of philosophy. While Heidegger himself never uses the term "post-modernity" in his writings, his thinking can nonetheless be interpreted as providing important insights towards developing an essential understanding of post-modernity. Uncovering these insights and developing such an understanding form the purpose and goal of the present thesis. The thesis sets out from the peculiar lack of understanding surrounding the term "post-modernity." (...) In doing so, it unravels the formal structure of post-modernity as that of a historical epoch lying in-between the end of one historical epoch, namely modernity, and the beginning of another that is still to come. While other thinkers of the Western philosophical tradition can be said to make interesting and important connections in relation to this topic, Heidegger's thinking about the end of philosophy reveals itself as an especially appropriate pathway into answering the question about the meaning of post-modernity. Heidegger's thinking may be presented in different ways. In order to think along with Heidegger and his project of thoughtfully preparing Western humanity for a "crossing" from metaphysics to the next chapter of their history, Heidegger's claim about the end of philosophy is contextualized within the overall structure of his Gesamtausgabe. This contextual understanding of Heidegger's thinking reveals his much neglected 1964 lecture "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" as an appropriate "tool" for uncovering the meaning of post-modernity. "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" opens up the horizon with respect to which metaphysical thinking may be transformed into the "other" kind of thinking needed to traverse the crossing of post-modernity. After projecting a preparatory "preview" of it, the horizon of the other kind of thinking—what Heidegger calls Ereignis—is opened up through a restructuring and further uncovering of the subject-matters discussed in "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking." This involves a disclosure of the meaning of Heidegger's claim about the end of philosophy in the sense of its development into independent sciences; the end of philosophy in the sense of the completion of metaphysics; and the task of thinking at the end of philosophy. After laying bare the horizon of Ereignis from "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking," an answer to the question of the meaning of the historical epoch of post-modernity is offered. With respect to the horizon of Ereignis, the meaning of post-modernity reveals itself as the threefold phenomenon of entanglement, nihilism, and not knowing. The result of this answer is not so much a better understanding of the meaning of post-modernity as it is a better understanding of why we lack such an understanding in the first place and in what sense this lack is necessary. (shrink)

Neste artigo, o autor examina a abordagem da ciência e da técnica que foi apresentada por Martin Heidegger no seu curso de inverno de 1928, intitulado Introdução à filosofia. A tese central examinada é a de que a ciência e a técnica mostram a impotência originária do ente humano. O conceito de impotência é circunscrito pela determinação concreta da transcendência do Dasein, a cujas determinações negativas acrescenta-se, ainda, aquela que resulta da interpretação ontológica do conceito de jogo.In this paper the (...) author examines Heidegger's account of science and technology, that is presented in Winter course of 1928 Introduction to Philosophy. The main examined thesis says that science and technology display the primordial impotence of human being. The concept of impotence is circumscribed by the concrete determination of transcendence of Dasein, to which negative determinations adds, yet, that resulting from the ontological interpretation of concept of game. (shrink)