Explanation has played myriad roles in truthmaker theory. The notion of explanation is sometimes thought to give content to the very idea of truthmaking, and is sometimes used as a weapon to undermine the entire point of truthmaker theory. I argue that the notion of explanation is dialectically useless in truthmaker theory: while it’s true that truthmaking offers a form of explanation, this claim is theoretically unilluminating, and leaves truthmaker theorists vulnerable to various kinds of attack. I advocate an alternative (...) approach to truthmaker theory that downplays the role of explanation, and show how it releases the enterprise from a variety of problematic commitments that have troubled truthmaker theorists. The “ontology-first” approach to truthmaking that I advocate not only restores the initial impulse behind truthmaking, but also has a number of theoretical advantages. Most prominently, it dodges the infamous problem of negative existentials, and lessens truthmaker theory’s dependence on contentious intuitive judgments about both explanation and truthmaking. (shrink)

According to some philosophers, if truthmaker theory is true, then all truths have truthmakers, but there are no truthmakers for negative truths - therefore, the theory is false. In this paper, I defend truthmaker theory by arguing against both claims. I begin by examining and rejecting a recent attempt to argue against. I then present my own argument against by considering the connection between truthmaking and the more general notion of grounding. Finally, I critically examine the proposal by Ross Cameron (...) and argue that the world as a whole can make all negative truths true, despite an apparent inconsistency in and an implausible consequence of Cameron's account. The discussion reveals how negative truths are grounded in reality on the basis of a reassessment of how such truths matter to truthmaker theory. (shrink)